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Glossary of silk weaving terms 
 
 
Alkali: a chemical silk weavers use to soften the silk yarn     
 
Charobab: An ikat woven sampot with silver and golden metal threads. 
 
Cocoon: a pupal casing made by moths, caterpillars and other insect larvae. 
 
Dye stuff: natural or chemical materials silk weavers use to colour the silk yarn. 
  
Ikat weaving: a silk weaving technique in which the weaver creates various 
patterns and colours before the weaving process. 
 
Kaben: a measure term silk weavers use to indicate the length of the silk cloth. 
In Khmer lexicon one kaben is about four metres.  
 
Kiet: Red, purple or indigo coloured silk head clothes worn by Cham/Malay 
women 
 
Koli:  an weight indicator silk weavers use. One koli of silk yarn means two 
kilogram silk yarn.  
 
Krama: a garment with many uses, including as a scarf, bandanna, to carry 
children and to cover the face. 
 
Loom: a machine or device for weaving thread or yarn into textiles. 
 
Phamung – a plain woven skirt from Thailand. In Thai language Pha means 
‘fabric’ and Mung means ‘purple’.  
 
Pidan: a type of silk cloth used in Cambodian weddings, funerals or Buddhist 
ceremonies as a tapestry. 
 
Sampot hol: an ikat woven skirt with a variety of designs such as birds, flowers, 
Buddha temples, or boats. 
 
Sarong: An ikat woven skirt made of silk yarn dyed in different colours.  
 
Sericulture: the rearing of silk worms for the production of raw silk.  
 
Warping: preparing the warp by rolling all the warp-yarns on to a beam, under 
the same tension, strictly parallel to each other and in a certain order. 
 
Yarn: a long continuous length of interlocked fibers suitable for use in the 
production of textiles.
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Preface 
 
 
This dissertation has its origins in a 2000 master thesis called ‘Verweven 
handel – een studie naar de organisatie van zijdeweven in Cambodja’ 
(Zwart 2000). Conducting fieldwork in Cambodia, Zwart found that the 
Cambodian silk industry was dominated by indigenous Khmers, the 
dominant ethnic group in this country. Zwart also discovered that the 
cloth the Khmer weavers produced, were further distributed to Khmer 
Diaspora communities in the United States, France and Australia. Prof. 
Dr. Heidi Dahles was fascinated by the existence of an indigenous 
Khmer-dominated silk industry departing from Cambodia and crossing 
borders to Khmer diaspora communities all over the world (ibid.). Her 
interest in the Cambodian silk weaving industry was kindled by the 
expectation to find an economic sector based on Khmer ethnic linkages. 
Such an economic sector would contest the the idea that industries and 
business networks in Southeast Asia are often dominated by ethnic 
Chinese traders and merchants and not by indigenous Southeast Asians. 
Related to this idea is another dominant narrative stating that many 
Southeast Asian ethnic groups, including the Khmers, keep the market 
arena at arm’s length for religious reasons. So, how did Zwart (2000) 
come to the conclusion that the silk industry in Cambodia is controlled 
by indigenous Khmers and not by the powerful ethnic Chinese diaspora?  
 
To answer this question Prof. Dr. Heidi Dahles incorporated Zwart’s 
master study into her research programme entitled ‘Organizational
Cultures in Transborder regions. A comparative research on processes of 
identity formation and local management industries in organizations
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operating in Southeast Asian growth triangles’. This research program 
departs from the assumption that identity, religion and culture do matter 
in the business arena and counters the existing idea that business, 
especially when it crosses national borders, no longer has anything to do 
with a shared ethnic background, identity or religion. As the neo-liberal 
capitalist idea holds, it is all about money, opportunities, windfall 
positions and profits, and not about ethnicity.  
 
In this dissertation I will attempt to argue against the neo-liberal 
argument that doing business is purely a rational and profit-oriented 
affair. I will try to illustrate that ethnic backgrounds, religious 
orientations and cultural repertoires do matter in the organization of the 
Cambodian silk weaving industry. Although this dissertation deals with 
the ethnically complex Cambodian silk weaving industry, it focuses 
predominantly on the presence and absence of Khmer and Chinese 
identities among the actors in this industry. It has never been my 
ambition to write a monograph of the Cambodian silk weaving industry, 
but merely to illustrate how ethnic identities are socially constructed and 
exhibited in the silk weaving industry. A focus on the interplay between 
Khmer and Chinese identity is legitimate because most of my informants 
explicitly displayed these two identities and not other ones, such as a 
Cham, Thai or Vietnamese identity. It must be stated, however, that 
Cham, Tonkinese, Malay and Javanese people have also introduced silk 
weaving techniques in Cambodia and still manufacture silk cloth. For 
this reason, I would like to encourage scholars to also examine the 
ethnically complex character of the Cambodian silk weaving industry  
from a Cham, Vietnamese or Javanese perspective. 
 
Writing this dissertation was a long process and could not have been 
completed without the help of many significant others. First I want to 
thank the NWO-ASPASIA research program and the faculty of Social 
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Sciences of VU University Amsterdam for generously funding my 
fieldwork in Cambodia. I also want to thank colleagues and friends in 
Cambodia and Vietnam for their assistance, advice, expertise, company 
and introduction to crucial informants. I specifically mention Sophal (for 
being a good friend and interpreter), Sopheap (for your funny Khmer 
language classes and support all year long), Dr. Penny Edwards, Dr. Tim 
Winter, Dr. Philip Peycam, Dr. Michael Vickery, Dr. James K. Chin, Dr. 
Philip Taylor, Dr. Li Tana, Dr. Kim Sedara, Dr. Leakthina Chau-Pech 
Ollier, Boris Dongelmans, Seng Bunly, Kikuo Morimoto, Roger Henke, 
Leeshai Lemish, Pak Sokhom, Simon Tha, Gabriela Byrde, Stephen Le 
Comte, Suon Prasith, Lin Jia Xu, Un Bunna, Shamin Toy, Hor Soneath, 
Albert Farats, Bun Heng Kor, Suy Chan Sitha, Thdam Suosday, Sompen 
Kutranon, Men Sinoeun, Sari Laakson, Madhurja Kumar Dutta, Teruo 
Jinnai, Nina You, Bich Ngoc (interpreter in Vietnam), Frank (interpreter 
in Vietnam) and of course all my informants, the silk weavers and 
traders.  
 
Once back in Holland, I had to transform my data into a scientifically 
acceptable dissertation. Having an energetic and extravert personality, I 
had some problems locking myself up eight hours a day for almost two 
years. Luckily I was able to ‘produce’ company myself and halfway 
through my writing process I got company from a beautiful son, Teun. 
Although he caused some sleepless night, my days became less lonely 
from that moment onwards. Very important in this period was also the 
practical and moral support of Gerrie and Yvonne, who took care of Teun 
with a lot of love and patience. I want to thank Joanne too for baby 
sitting and assisting me completing the lay out of this dissertation. 
Crucial family support came from Ben too who lend me money in order to 
survive the Duch social service system.   
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Academically and socially inspiring were my colleagues of the department 
of Culture, Organization and Management of the faculty of Social 
Sciences of VU University Amsterdam. I want to mention in particular: 
Juliette Koning, Sytze Kingma, Kees Boersma, Carel Roessingh, Esther 
Zwart, Henk van den Heuvel and Theo Kamsma. I also want to thank my 
editor, Saskia Stehouwer. She not only converted my text into an 
academically acceptable dissertation, but was a pleasant person to work 
with as well.  
 
Then of course I want to thank my promoter and co-promoters; Prof. Dr. 
Heidi Dahles, Prof. Dr. Oscar Salemink and Dr. John Kleinen. I will start 
with Prof. Dr. Heidi Dahles. We spent a lot of time together discussing 
this dissertation and travelled to conferences in China and Cambodia. 
Heidi, you are an intelligent and experienced social scientist and I have 
learned a lot from your working skills, analytical precision, and you have 
shown me what it takes to become a skilled social scientist. You were 
also a great mental coach and in periods of struggle and low self-esteem 
you gave me the confidence I needed to finish this dissertation. The help 
of Prof. Dr. Oscar Salemink and Dr. John Kleinen was also of great value. 
With their enormous expertise on the history of Vietnam and Cambodia 
they were in particular critical about my historical sections. Thanks to 
their critical readings, this dissertation has become more accurate and 
with historical depth.   
 
Last but certainly not least I want to thank my wife Marjolein. She 
quitted her job as a psychologist in Holland for one year and decided to 
join me in Cambodia. Her support in Cambodia was enormous. She 
archived my fieldwork data, wrote down my interview sessions, created a 
domestic atmosphere and organized meals and karaoke sessions for 
Cambodian friends. Back home she was also a great moral support. To 
Marjolein I dedicate this dissertation.         
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Introduction:  An elder silk weaver at work 
 
 
 
In a corner under her wooden house in Veal, a large weaving town in Takeo 
province in the southeast of Cambodia, Sotheap, an elderly lady, sits at her 
spinning wheel routinely plying yarn. Like many women of her age she cuts her 
hair short and wears a sampot hol1, a silk skirt with flower motifs, and a white 
Chinese blouse. Sotheap shares the space under her house with many other 
family members, two weaving looms, an oxcart, racks of drying farm produce 
such as sweet corn and tobacco, her poultry, and three cows. Her in-married 
son-in-law, a farmer from a neighboring village, is busy preparing a second 
wooden frame loom (kei thbanh) for his eldest daughter. While spinning the yarn 
Sotheap gives instructions to a young grandchild who ties silk threads on an 
old wooden spinning wheel (rohat) to create patterns such as flowers, frogs, 
raindrops, or Buddha statues. She does this time-consuming job after she 
returns from school to relieve her mum, the main weaver of the family. Mum 
spends ten hours a day sitting on a wobbly wooden bench, bowing deep over a 
large wooden frame loom. Sotheap explains that her efforts are crucial for the 
family and that all family members will service her to finish the sampot in time, 
as a prolonged period of drought has impeded the family from harvesting their 
crops for the third year in a row.  
 
Sotheap is a fantastic storyteller and while she is talking about her life as a silk 
weaver her emotions shift from great enthusiasm and joy to anger and fear. She
                                                 
1
 
The Khmer term hol refers to a variety of designs on silk skirts, such as birds, flowers, Buddha temples, or 
boats. Hol also refers to the ikat silk weaving technique in which the weaver creates various patterns and 
colors before the weaving process.
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enjoys telling about how she roamed through forests and wastelands together 
with her mother to collect dye-stuff from the bark of the kapok tree, the
tamarind tree, the areca palm or the ebony tree. In these days (the 1940s) silk 
weavers did not buy white chemical dyes from a middleman (chmaon kandal)
but made natural dyes themselves. As a young kid she learned from her mother 
that the strength and the color of the yarn enhanced the prestige of the family 
and were secrets she should never pass on to strangers. She also remembers 
very lively how her mother grew mulberry plants in the backyard of their house 
and taught her how to feed the leaves to young silk worms. Feeding the worms 
was extremely labor-intensive, as the young silk worms needed to be fed until 
they would stop eating and change color (mostly when they were around ten 
days old). Having done this she had to move the worms to compartmentalized 
trays in a shed behind her house where the worms would spin themselves into 
cocoons. For the next two weeks it was her duty to safeguard the cocoons 
against insects and to ensure that the worms did not start to chew their way 
out of the cocoons. If the cocoons had the size of her finger her mother ordered 
her to place them in a special pot filled with boiling water, soap and alkali to 
remove the gummy sericin. Her mother was afraid to place the living cocoons in 
the boiled water herself, as monks in the pagoda had forbidden her to kill 
animals. Afraid to lose merit at her old age her mother outsourced this job to 
her, because she was still young and would have enough time left to make 
merit.  
 
Sotheap was taught silk weaving by her mother and elder cousin in the 
beginning of the 1960s, during king Sihanouk’s nationalist ‘Sangkum Reastr 
Niyum’ regime. Finishing her first sampot hol at the age of thirteen, she knows 
for sure that she was the youngest weaver in Cambodia ever to accomplish that. 
In the 1970s, during the Khmer Rouge regime (1975-1979), she and her family 
were ordered to work in a textile factory in Battambang, a town in the 
Northwest of Cambodia. Talking about the civil war brings back painful 
memories of Khmer Rouge atrocities, as her husband, two daughters, one son 
and many distant kin members were killed. Almost thirty years later, she still 
remembers the terrible smell of the dead bodies thrown into deep wells just 
behind the village she was transported to. In 1979, shortly after the defeat of 
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the Khmer Rouge by Vietnamese troops, Sotheap returned to her home in Veal, 
where she resumed the family’s silk weaving activities. She still feels indebted to 
the middleman who provided her, a widow with children, with credit to buy a 
new loom. With this loom she was able to earn enough money to feed her family 
under the extreme post-war conditions. Every fortnight she rode her bike for 
five hours from Veal to the markets in Phnom Penh to barter her silk products 
for rice.  
 
In the mid-1990s her life finally took a turn for the better. She and her eldest 
daughter had proven themselves skilled and reliable weavers to Chen (literally 
the ‘Chinese’, as the middleman is called) and he rewarded them with a second 
loom. For Sotheap the second loom came at the right time, as her eldest 
granddaughter had reached the age to be able to weave sampot hol herself. With 
more productive hands around, Sotheap can spend more time on her religious 
duties in the local pagoda to make merit for a better life in the future. Looking 
back at her life as a silk weaver not only brings back memories of joy and pride, 
but also of painful backbones and fingers that grew crooked, and of fear and 
anger towards the middleman. Sotheap shivers when she tells how Chen roams 
around on his motorbike to check the colors she applies and the clarity of her 
patterns. Sotheap fears his judgment, as Chen has the power to lower the price 
of her products.  
 
Talking about Chen, Sotheap suddenly said that her grandmother was Chinese 
as well. Her mother once told her that her grandmother had come to Cambodia 
a long time ago and had married a Khmer farmer. When she was a kid her 
parents never talked to her about grandma’s background, afraid that she would 
not hold her tongue to pro-Mao Sihanouk state cadres. Upon her revelation 
Sotheap hastens to add that she herself is not a Chen but a real ‘Khmer’ and a 
devoted Buddhist. However, to prove her Chinese background, Sotheap invites 
me inside the house to show me a small Chinese shrine. In front of the shrine 
she tells me how her daughter fell seriously ill ten years ago and went to the 
kruu (medical doctor) in her village. Dissatisfied with his advice she turned to a 
Chinese fortune-teller at Saiwaa market who explained to her that it was saen 
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kbal tuk, the Chinese month of the ghosts, and that her daughter’s sickness 
was caused by the angry ghosts of her (Chinese) ancestors. Since that year, 
Sotheap has followed the fortune-teller’s advice, burning incense and offering 
fruit during saen kbal tuk. Next, Sotheap turns to a corner of her house to 
rummage in an old carton box from which she lifts a pair of black hand-woven 
farmer’s pants (kho kansaen). These pants look like traditional Chinese 
garments, which are often worn at religious events in rural China. ‘These are 
my grandfather’s,’ she explains, ‘he used to wear them at weddings or when he 
visited the pagoda.’ 
 
Cambodian silk weaving: an example of Khmer modernization 
A striking example of Khmer modernization is said to be the booming 
postwar Cambodian handloom weaving industry that can be traced back 
to the courts of Angkor2. Especially the hand-woven ceremonial dress, 
the sampot hol, is defined as typically Khmer and provides Cambodia 
with a cultural asset invested with great ethnic pride (cf. Dahles and 
Zwart 2003). As the story goes, the ‘hol’ silk weaving techniques have 
been passed down from family to family from the 12th century onwards. 
The mulberry trees necessary to feed the silk worms and the weaving 
looms necessary to manufacture the silk skirts were destroyed by Pol Pot 
soldiers in the 1970s. By means of a happy ending, peace building 
organizations rescued the Cambodian silk weaving industry from its 
downfall and ‘restored’ it again in the 1990s.  
 
A prominent aid worker who is said to have rescued the Khmer silk 
weaving techniques is the Japanese silk expert Kikuo Morimoto. As an 
apprentice of the Japanese art of yuzen – silk dying for kimonos – this 
Japanese silk expert came to Cambodia in the mid-1990s and invested 
much effort into re-establishing the silk production and revitalizing the 
                                                 
2
 
The 12th centry Angkor empire was the largest kingdom that ever existed in Southeast Asia and included 
present day Thailand, Cambodia, Lao PDR and Vietnam.    
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silk weaving techniques that were said to have been destroyed by the civil 
war (Dahles and Ter Horst 2006: 124). To accomplish this, he bought five 
hectares of forest in the area adjacent to the ancient Angkor Wat 
temples, where he raised mulberries and produced natural dyes with the 
help of sixty skilled silk yarn producers from Tani, a river town near the 
Vietnamese border. Moreover, Morimoto contracted two experienced 
weavers from Takeo province to pass on their silk weaving techniques to 
younger weavers. This way it was his ambition to protect the authenticity 
of Cambodian silk weaving techniques and patterns, which had been 
passed on from mother to daughter from the age of Angkor onwards 
(Morimoto 1995). Morimoto’s efforts to revive Cambodian silk weaving 
techniques also caught the eye of the international jury of the prestigious 
Rolex Award, with which Morimoto was honored in 2004, establishing his 
reputation as the initiator of post-war silk weaving in Cambodia as a 
traditional Khmer craft (Dahles and Ter Horst 2006: 124). 
 
Jean Delvert (1961) showed that silk weaving was mainly carried out 
along the banks of major rivers in Cambodia: along the Mekong River to 
the north of Phnom Penh; along the Bassac River in Kandal province to 
the southwest of Phnom Penh; and in the southernmost provinces 
bordering Vietnam. Smaller areas of textile production also existed in the 
north of the country, in villages in Battambang province and around 
Siem Reap. In these days silk weaving villages in Cambodia’s rural areas 
were local affairs and could easily be identified by the presence of 
mulberry trees providing food for silkworms. The silk weavers cultivated 
their own mulberry trees, looked after their own dye-stuff, reeled their 
own silk yarn, and wove their own sampot whereas Chinese middlemen 
peddled their commodities to the markets (cf. Delvert 1961).  
 
Silk weaving villages still exist in the rural areas of Cambodia, but the 
mulberry trees are said to have been destroyed during the Khmer Rouge 
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regime and silk yarn is now imported from abroad. Today silkworm 
cultivation takes place in the Vietnamese Central highlands, involving 
Kinh immigrants from the Northern Red River Delta region (Braun 2000). 
From the Vietnamese border town Tan Chau silk yarn is further 
distributed to wholesalers and retailers in the Phnom Penh markets. 
Rural middlemen in turn re-distribute the silk yarn to the weavers and 
return the finished sampot to the Phnom Penh outlets (cf. Dahles and Ter 
Horst 2006). From there, sampot hol are further distributed to 
Cambodian Diaspora communities in Australia, France and the United 
States (Dahles and Zwart 2003).   
 
The dependence on Vietnam for raw silk, and on Cambodian Diaspora 
communities as export channels raises questions that pertain to debates 
about how the once village-based Cambodian silk weaving industry 
transformed into a transnational business network. Before the 1970 civil 
wars, the silk trade was said to have been dominated by ethnic Chinese 
living in Cambodia. However, during the war many Chinese died or fled 
the country (Dahles and ter Horst 2006: 125) which caused a void in the 
silk trade. Once peace was restored, so the story goes, this void was filled 
by Khmer women establishing themselves as silk vendors. Zwart, who 
conducted ethnographic research among women traders at the Phnom 
Penh markets for three months in 2000, did not come across any 
reference to ethnic Chinese identity among the market traders, 
wholesalers, middlemen or weavers. On the contrary, Zwart (2000) 
claims that the women she interviewed had established contacts with silk 
weaving villages and middlemen along family lines and ethnic ties that 
were identified as explicitly Khmer.  
 
The observation of an all-Khmer-dominated silk weaving industry seems 
to confirm Joel Kotkin’s (1993) ‘ethnic advantage’ theory and the view 
proliferated by many stakeholders that the silk weaving industry is 
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modernizing within the parochial boundaries of Khmer ethnicity. The 
claim of ethnic Khmer dominance in the silk trade (Zwart 2000) is also in 
line with academic studies conducted in the Upper-Mekong region, where 
open borders are said to have liberalized trade relationships and 
strengthened the power of ethnic groups living and trading across 
borders (cf. Walker 1999). This applies in particular to the Khmer people, 
as - due to the shrinking territorial power of the Angkor kingdom and the 
atrocities of the 1970 civil wars - the number of ethnic Khmers living 
outside the Cambodian kingdom must equals the number living within 
the country easily.  
 
Traditional modernity 
At present, after years of civil wars, Cambodia is witnessing a series of 
transitions from socialism to liberalism and from economic isolation to a 
free market economy (Ollier and Winter 2006: 2). As any war-stricken 
nation that tries to forget its violent past, Cambodia has turned to its 
glorious era, linked to the 12th century temple complex of Angkor. 
Whether one arrives at the airport of its capital city Phnom Penh or at 
the ‘new’ international airport nearby the tourist town of Siem Reap, 
images of this triple-towered temple complex provide the visitor with a 
warm welcome. Wherever one goes to in Cambodia, ‘the stones of Angkor’ 
are everywhere: on the national flag, on banknotes, on stamps, on cafes, 
on craft labels, public buildings, and newspapers.  
 
Although the Cambodian state has liberalized its markets, has embraced 
a multitude of economic flows, and certainly does not defy capitalism, it 
always has and still does glorify the 12th century material world of 
Angkor as its engine of modernity. This has been the case even during 
colonialization. Although the French colonialists neglected modern values 
of citizenship, liberty, economic prosperity and equality, they did use the 
Angkor Wat temple complex as a religious totem pole to unite the plural 
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Cambodian ethnoscape under French tutelage. The French installed 
Prince Norodom Sihanouk as king in order to prevent Buddhist notions 
of political subjection to become replaced by the communal one they 
feared most: Marxism. Afraid as they were of the revolutionary power of 
the Khmers, French colonists deliberately bypassed them and preferred 
ethnic Vietnamese and Chinese to oil the wheels of their administration 
and economy (Chanda 1986). Perhaps for this reason the Khmers were 
portrayed as noble, peaceful and ascetic people (Cooper 2001, Edwards 
1999, Norindr 1997) who simply lacked capitalist skills; skills that the 
Vietnamese and the Chinese had in abundance.  
 
What the French feared most came true when they gave the kingdom its 
independence back in 1955: the ‘noble’ Khmers turned into aggressive 
revolutionaries at lightning speed. During Pol Pot’s Marxist attempt to 
transform Cambodia into an agrarian utopia, hundreds of thousands of 
‘foreign’ subjects most appreciated by the French  –  capitalists, artisans, 
intellectuals - were hunted down and killed by teenage soldiers (Ong 
2003: 18). The Khmer Rouge leadership praised the Khmers for their 
labor skills instead of their ascetic qualities, because they had built the 
system of irrigation canals, dams, and reservoirs of the 12th century 
Angkor kingdom, and were thus seen as the most suitable workers to 
complete Pol Pot’s ambitious agricultural project. Even after Cambodia’s 
transition from communism to socialism, state leaders continued to 
celebrate the Khmers for their material power and imagined the 
monuments they had built as socio-political totem poles of ethnic 
homogeneity (Edwards 1999). Unlike the Khmer Rouge regime the 
Vietnamese-backed Khmer People Republic (KPR) accepted the private 
sector and introduced solidarity groups (krom samaki); i.e., production 
units of seven to fifteen families, united in a common endeavor to raise 
food or to produce goods. In particular the trade relationship between the 
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state and the peasantry was to be improved and consolidated in 
accordance with the socialist motto (cf. Gottesmann 2003).  
 
In the 1990s supranational and international donor organizations tried 
to ‘liberate’ Cambodia from its Marxist/socialist legacy, in order to 
change it into a modern, democratic, capitalist, neo-liberal nation. After 
nearly two decades of isolation the future was about regional integration 
and about embracing the multitude of cultural and economic flows that 
this process would bring along (Ollier and Winter 2006: 8). In lieu of an 
effective state a broader civil society, comprised of bilateral donors, 
multilateral banks, and numerous non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), had the aim to liberate Cambodia (ibid.). This ‘liberation process’ 
involved a process of ‘NGOization’, which again drew upon culture for 
achieving development goals and economic prosperity (ibid.:11). As Ingrid 
Muan (2001) noted, the stones of Angkor and the noble Khmer also 
became the focal point of post-conflict ‘restoration culture’ missions. In 
other words, whether Cambodia was in transit from colonialism to 
communism, communism to socialism, or socialism to capitalism: 
Angkor and the Khmers have always been central themes of 
modernization.  
 
A marginal Chinese narrative 
In Cambodia the ‘hol’ silk weaving techniques and patterns are seen as 
symbols of Khmer modernization, merging the Cambodian national and 
Khmer ethnic identity into one tightly knit and homogeneous ethno-
national identity. Yet, both the authenticity claim of the ‘hol’ silk weaving 
techniques and the hypothesis of ethnic Khmer dominance on both a 
production and trade level is at jeopardy if we give the case-study around 
the elderly silk weaver Sotheap a closer look. Only at first sight does 
Sotheap’s story deal with her being a ‘good’ Khmer, a faithful Buddhist 
and loyal Cambodian citizen, reflecting the national pride and fear the 
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Cambodian state injects into its subjects. On a second level though, her 
story contained references, albeit marginal ones, to Chinese ancestors, 
Chinese signs and her submission to an ethnic Chinese middleman. In 
other words, a gap exists between the ethnic Chinese business networks 
she is a member of and the narratives of her Khmer authenticity 
promoted by everyone in Cambodia. This raises the following questions: 
how to interpret the narrative that Khmer traders filled the void that 
ethnic Chinese middlemen left behind after the civil war was over 
(Kleinen and Mar 2004)? What to think about the story that the ‘sampot 
hol’ is an authentic Khmer dress? And how to understand the narrative 
that Cambodia is modernizing within the boundaries of Khmer identity? 
 
To answer these questions it is helpful to first call to mind the long-
lasting historical presence of Chinese communities in Cambodia, and 
examine under what conditions they migrated to Cambodia. The earliest 
Chinese reference to the kingdom comes from the Chinese emissary 
K’ang T’ai, who together with Chu Ying was sent on a tribute mission to 
Funan somewhere between 245 and 250 A.D. (Hall 1981: 27). At the end 
of the 13th century a second written Chinese account on Cambodia 
appeared, by the Chinese emissary Zhou Daguan who had observed the 
Angkor Kingdom for more than a year. The Chinese community in 
Cambodia expanded further in the 15th century, also due to the arrival of 
many sea-born merchants, such as Zheng He, Wang Chi, Kapitan Li Tan 
and Mac Cuu (cf. Frost 2003). The era of French colonialism (1863-1955) 
saw the arrival of even more Chinese immigrants. In his seminal study 
‘The Chinese of Cambodia’, William Willmott (1967) describes the arrival 
of five language groups in the colonial period; i.e. the Teochew, the 
Cantonese, the Hakka, the Hokkien and the Hainanese (Edwards 2003: 
13). The Teochews were prominent in business and trade; the Cantonese 
were specialized craftsmen; the Hainanese dominated the food and 
catering industry, the Hokkien followed careers in the officialdom 
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government and the Hakka, the smallest group, had specialized in 
running coffee shops and peddling fruit (ibid.). Most Southern Chinese 
immigrants were farmers, though, who were subcontracted by the 
French to work at their pepper, fruit and rubber plantations.3  
In other words, historical reports point at a long-lasting dominance of the 
Cambodian trade by the ethnic Chinese and not the Khmers, questioning 
the narrative of Khmer modernization. However, why do the ethnic 
Chinese play such a powerful role in the Cambodian economy, but a 
marginal one when it comes to the production of culture? Also, why do 
the Chinese in Cambodia not attempt to assert themselves and contest 
the grand Khmer narrative through counter-narratives? One possible 
reason could be found by alluding to the recent history of the ethnic 
Chinese in Cambodia and the repressive measures that were taken 
against them. In 1953, king Norodom Sihanouk launched an ethno-
nationalistic citizenship law aiming to promote national unity based on 
Khmer supremacy (Ovesen and Trankell 2003: 195). Under this 1954 
citizenship law the ethnic Chinese were forced to become Khmers (col 
khmae)4 to prove their familiarity with Khmer manners, customs and 
traditions, and to forget about their Chinese background (ibid.). General 
Lon Nol (1970-1975) accentuated the ethnic homogeneity of Cambodia 
even more, asserting that all ethnic groups in Cambodia belonged to the 
‘great Khmer race’. During the Khmer Rouge regime (1975-1979) rigorous 
attempts were made to extinguish all marks of heterogeneity and to 
                                                 
3
 
In his 1971 study ‘Les Chinois du Cambodge Littoral’  Roland Pourtier also emphasized a rural Chinese 
identity, portraying the Chinese predominantly as pepper and fruit planters living in the ethnic Chinese 
enclaves Kampot and Ha Tien.  
4 The term ‘col khmai’ comes from the term ‘coul ciet’, which literally means ‘’enter the nation’’, ‘’to be 
naturalized’’ or to ‘’change one’s citizenship’’. ‘Col Khmae’ literally means ‘’enter the Khmers’’ in the sense of 
‘’becoming Cambodian’’. This because under the 1954 citizenship law different terms relating to nationality 
(Cambodian) or ethnicity (Khmer) does not exist. A Cambodian national automatically becomes an ethnic 
Khmer.        
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adjust ethnic groups to Khmer-style housing, dress and food (cf. 
Edwards 2003).  
Yet, the recent history of Chinese oppression in support of nationalist 
agendas has come to an end and does not explain why in some contexts 
– such as on the wholesale markets in Phnom Penh – Chinese identity is 
proliferated by silk traders. Moreover, as elsewhere in Southeast Asia, 
the ethnic Chinese in Cambodia are allowed to express their Chinese 
identity again and Chinese schools, associations, temples, newspapers, 
housing styles and festivals have revived like never before (Edwards 
2003). This also holds for the middlemen in the silk weaving villages, but 
the elderly silk weaver Sotheap, and as we will see in this thesis, many 
others along with her, identifies herself predominantly as Khmer. Why is 
that so? 
 
To come to terms with this somewhat paradoxical situation it is 
necessary to leave behind primordial notions of ethnicity and instead 
depart from the assumption that ethnicity is a social construction which 
obtains meaning in specific social and historical contexts. Having 
established this approach to ethnicity, the question is in which contexts 
people define themselves either as Khmer or as Chinese. In this regard 
we should remember that the Cambodians have been hegemonized by 
many regional and global powers for centuries and are used to dealing 
with many different codes of conduct, values and belief systems, as well 
as multi-layered discourses (Hsiao 2002: 111). Living as minorities in a 
hegemonized nation the ethnic Chinese might also have deployed what 
Frost (2003) calls ‘transcultural bodies’, in which their being an ethnic 
Chinese, a mixed, a national or an indigenous person, comes to the fore 
depending on the social and political context in which the diasporic 
subject is positioned. The dilemma in this thesis thus revolves around 
the marginal role of the ethnic Chinese in the grand narrative of Khmer 
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modernization, with the objective of finding out in which occasions and 
in whose company they choose to discuss their Chinese background. 
After my conversations with a Cambodian silk weaver who surprisingly 
started talking about ethnic Chinese identity, this theme came to 
constitute the leading thread in a research on processes of modernization 
and ethnicization in the Cambodian silk weaving industry. 
 
Towards the next chapters 
In this introduction I have outlined the gap between the ethnic Chinese 
identity of the silk weavers and traders and the Khmer modernization 
narrative that traces silk weaving back to the 12th century temple 
complex of Angkor. The aim of chapter one will be to ‘produce’ theoretical 
knowledge on how we can interpret this gap between the grand Khmer 
narrative celebrated by many stakeholders, and the re-emerging ethnic 
Chinese one. As indicated, the contribution of Chinese labor is 
considered of crucial importance for the country’s economy, with the silk 
industry as a clear illustration of this. Culturally however, the position of 
the ethnic Chinese in Cambodia can be compared to that of their 
counterparts in Thailand who show a high degree of assimilation (Dahles 
and Ter Horst 2006). One may therefore raise the following question: On 
which occasions and for what reasons do the powerful ethnic Chinese in 
Cambodia either attempt to assert themselves, or succumb to the ‘grand’ 
Khmer narrative? 
 
In chapter two I will give a brief overview of the history of Cambodia and 
critically assess the bureaucratic myth that Cambodia is an all-Khmer 
nation. This chapter will show how in particular the Marxist/Maoist-
inspired Khmer Rouge regime (1975-1979) attempted to primordialize the 
Cambodian subject, with devastating effects. Even today the impact of 
the Khmer Rouge regime is noticeable in Cambodia, as it is still one of the 
poorest nations of Southeast Asia. But as this chapter will illustrate, the 
Introduction 
 
 30
Cambodian economy is showing signs of recovery, and one of these signs 
is the rise of an indigenous silk weaving industry. 
 
In chapter three, I will deconstruct the ‘grand narrative’ of Khmer 
modernization and describe under what diasporic conditions and 
motivations silk entrepreneurs transplanted their business into 
Cambodia. This chapter attempts to describe how the sampot hol arrived 
in Cambodia in the late nineteenth century. Following the sampot hol 
through time and space this chapter will problematize the narrative of 
Khmer modernization and illustrate the important role ethnic Chinese 
migration plays in the contemporary modernization process of the silk 
weaving industry.     
  
In chapter four I will attempt to explain in more detail how descendents 
of the ethnic Chinese are currently modernizing the Cambodian silk 
weaving industry. In so doing I will elaborate on the ‘hol’ silk weaving 
techniques first, and describe how labor-intensive it is to manufacture a 
sampot hol. I will go on to illustrate how the silk weaving industry is 
organized in terms of production and trade relationships. This will make 
clear that the Cambodian silk weaving industry is not a village-based 
household industry anymore but has become a transnational business 
network that starts as a ‘worm’ in Vietnam and ends up as a sampot in 
the United States.  
 
In chapter five I will offer ethnographic descriptions of silk producers and 
traders negotiating their identity in the Cambodian silk weaving industry. 
Embracing a material view on the subject it is my ambition to show how 
a small but powerful wholesalers elite came to control the cross-border 
silk yarn trade along Chinese business ethics, and how they expected a 
similar organizational style from the middlemen they subcontracted. In 
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addition I will also attempt to illustrate under what material conditions 
ethnic Chinese silk traders expect a Khmer identity token from ‘their’ silk 
weavers.  
 
In chapter six I will get into the gap that exists between the re-emerging 
ethnic Chinese modernization process and the marketing of silk products 
as ‘authentically’ Khmer. Following the business career of a former silk 
weaver, this chapter will describe the reasons why the ethnic Chinese 
silk traders in Cambodia do ‘not’ counter the grand narrative of Khmer 
modernization.  
In the concluding chapter I shall attempt to bring together the 
‘conflicting’ modernization narratives that exist in Cambodia and link 
them to the theoretical framework. Interpreting empirical data I gathered 
during my fieldwork period against the background of theoretical debates 
I have outlined about ethnic Chinese migration conditions and the ability 
of ethnic Chinese to shift strategically between competing narratives of 
modernization, I shall attempt to answer the central research question.
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Chapter 1 
How to Dress the Khmer?: A Theoretical Exploration 
 
 
 
‘A Klee painting named ‘Angelus Novus’ shows an angel looking as though he is 
about to move away from something he is fixedly contemplating. His eyes are 
staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how one perceives the 
angel of history. His face is towards the past. Where we perceive a chain of 
events, he sees one catastrophe, which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage 
and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, 
and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; 
it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer 
close them. This storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back 
is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what 
we call progress’ 5. 
  
         (Walter Benjamin, 1940) 
  
 
Introduction 
Until now most studies conducted on Cambodia have denied its multi-
ethnic composition and have not paid attention to narratives of Chinese 
economic domination, let alone to their role in the cultural domain. 
Discussing modernization in Cambodia often means glorifying the brave 
Khmer warriors of a far away past and forgetting about all the other 
cultural stuff. In their attempt to find the ‘noble’ Khmer, many previous 
efforts to study Cambodian modernization have led to painful confessions 
of how difficult it was to find traces of Khmer modernization. In a famous 
and often cited PhD thesis ‘Svay - a Khmer village in Cambodia’, the 
American anthropologist May Ebihara (1971) had the ambition to present 
                                                 
5 Linking Cambodia with the ‘Angelus Novus’ is not my intellectual property. In their edited bundle 
‘Expressions of Cambodia’ Leakthina Chau-Pech Ollier and Tim Winter (2006) already used Paul Klee’s 
painting  to characterize contemporary Cambodian culture.      
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a detailed anthropological study of the Khmer peasant culture. Her 
intention was to study a lowland, rice-growing Khmer village (because
she was convinced the Khmer comprised the dominant part of the 
nation’s population), which had a Buddhist temple (because she was
convinced that 90 per cent of the Cambodians were Buddhists). However, 
in her foreword May Ebihara describes how difficult it was for her to find 
a ‘real’ Khmer village, and after long discussions with her supervisor she 
came to the conclusion that only one region, a region somewhere south 
of Phnom Penh, pseudonymically called Svay, matched with the ethnic 
and religious composition she had in mind. Other regions were discarded 
because they had large minority groups such as ethnic Chinese or 
Vietnamese that practiced, in her words, somewhat a-typical economies 
(ibid.).  
 
The question that intrigues me is not why scholars have the ambition to 
write books on Khmer economies or Khmer Buddhism, but why they still 
feel this special urge to write only about Khmer forms of modernization 
and to depict Chinese or Vietnamese forms as a-typical. What then 
distinguishes ethnographers from pre-colonial missionaries, colonial 
administrators, postcolonial state leaders and post-conflict peace 
builders, who all had and have the tendency to link Cambodian culture 
back to the 12th century ruins of Angkor. 
 
Chinese migration to Southeast Asia 
In the ‘grand narrative’ the Cambodian silk weaving industry is portrayed 
as a traditional form of Khmer modernization that can be traced back to 
the ancient temple complex of Angkor. Yet, the ethnic Chinese 
background of the silk producers and traders questions this narrative 
and makes it worth to theorize under what conditions ethnic Chinese 
migrated to Cambodia. While documentation on the growth of a Chinese 
community in Cambodia is scarce, stories of early Chinese immigration 
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live on in the rich oral tradition, in Cambodian place names, and in 
Khmer folklore (Edwards 2003: 8). Early French reports recount how 
successive waves of Chinese migrated to Cambodia in the first, sixth, 
thirteenth, eighteenth and twentieth centuries (cf. Coedes 1942; Malleret 
1959; Pelliot 1903).   
According to Wang Gungwu (1991) the successive immigration waves of 
Chinese to Southeast Asia can be divided into four major patterns: 
huagong (Chinese coolies), huaqiao (Chinese sojourners), huayi (Chinese 
re-migrants) and huashang (Chinese traders and craftsmen). Although 
precise figures are not available, in the 1990s the total number of 
Chinese living overseas was estimated to be 37 million spread over 136 
countries (cf. Ma and Cartier 2003). Among migration scholars, however, 
it is widely accepted that modern Chinese emigration began with the 
arrival of Europeans in Southeast Asia in the early 1500s under whose 
patronage the Chinese became the dominant middlemen group in the 
colonies. During the early colonial age ethnic Chinese filled many roles 
for the Europeans, including those of middlemen trading with the 
indigenous population, tax farmers and clerks (Kuhn 2006: 164).  
Initially the Chinese ‘government’ depicted their migrants as pirates, 
traitors and deserters who were ungrateful to China, to their homeland, 
their parents and ancestors (Edwards 2003: 9). This hostile attitude 
changed in the mid- to late nineteenth century due to China's defeat by 
foreign powers in the Opium Wars and the demand for coolies by these 
foreign powers in the colonized Southeast Asian countries (ibid.). In 1860 
the Qing government signed conventions with Britain and France, which 
recognized the rights of Chinese subjects working overseas (ibid.:10). 
Especially the late Qing reformers Sun Yatsen and Kang Youwei are said 
to have actively encouraged Chinese sojourners to migrate to Southeast 
Asia and send their remittances back to their families in the southern 
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Chinese provinces. In particular the 1911 Revolution - which saw the 
abandoning of traditional ways of thinking, such as Confucianism and 
the adaptation of Western styles of governance - unleashed an enormous 
flow of coolies to Cochinchina and Cambodia (ibid.).  
Philip Kuhn (2006: 163), however, questions the argument that state 
conventions were the push factors of migration, and argues that Chinese 
migration to Southeast Asia or elsewhere has always been about 
individually calculated business affairs of families trying to monopolize 
overseas market niches. Rather than seeing wars, poverty or state bio-
politics as prime movers of Chinese migration, Kuhn (ibid.:167) says we 
should see the crowded, commercially vibrant society of late-imperial 
China as a gigantic arena of trade relationships in which trade families 
and craft families were conditioned to respond to various kinds of 
business opportunities abroad. Not state policies, but the fact that labor 
was the most marketable resource for a family with too many males in 
relation to its cultivable land unleashed strategies of migration to earn 
money elsewhere (ibid.). This was the case because the remittances sent 
home by these traders added an economic margin critical to family 
survival in the poor and war-stricken Chinese hinterlands (ibid.). The 
challenge for these men, according to Kuhn,  was to find a niche, a niche 
that had economic value for the new host nation and would fill the 
pockets of their family at home as well (ibid.: 168). 
In a related vein Steven B. Miles (2006: 220) has shown how many 
Cantonese families in the seventeenth century Pearl River delta have sent 
sojourners both upriver along the West river basin, and abroad to 
Vietnam and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. According to Miles this was 
due to their geographical position along riverbanks and the riverine 
opportunity they had to search for lucrative markets in other river deltas, 
both at home and abroad (ibid.:  224). In particular families from Nanhai 
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and Shunde county are said to have adopted migration as a family 
strategy to conquer overseas markets, win civil degrees and pursue land 
there (ibid.: 221). Studying Shunde and Nanhai county genealogies Miles 
comes up with a new perspective on the migration of the Cantonese 
diaspora; not only overseas migration, but riverine migration along the 
West river basin appears to have been a main route to Southeast Asia as 
well (ibid.: 225). 
The rise of transnational trading and business networks 
It is well documented that the arrival and settlement of ethnic Chinese 
‘niche seekers’ gave rise to new commercial elites in Southeast Asia, the 
so-called  ‘middlemen minorities’. According to Light and Gold (2000: 6) 
Howarth Paul Becker (1956) was the first scholar who devoted an entire 
chapter to the ‘dual ethnics’ of ‘middlemen trading people’. Becker saw 
these middlemen trading minorities as ‘strangers’ living both inside and 
outside the social structure of a local society. Because of their ‘dual 
position’, he argued, they were valuable business partners, because they 
could conduct business in an objective manner and extend credit only to 
those who were able to pay (ibid.). Light and Gold (2000:5) continue that 
it was Max Weber (1969) who coined the term ‘pariah capitalism’, 
referring to the diasporic position of European Jews who continued a 
commercial livelihood through the practice of sojourning. Weber saw the 
European Jews’ tendency to engage in trade as inextricably related to 
their status as ‘strangers’ in society. The Jews, he argued, developed 
particularistic resources that supported and enhanced their business 
activities. These resources included entrepreneurial values, beliefs, 
institutions, and social networks through which the children of 
middleman merchants easily moved into mercantile roles, continuing the 
tradition of their family and people (ibid.).  
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At present, it is heavily debated whether these ‘middlemen minorities’ 
still organize their trade ventures within the boundaries of a shared 
ethnicity. The cultural argument goes that producers and traders are still 
attached to a strong and tightly integrated diaspora (cf. Wu 2001). The 
reason for this is that their reciprocal relationships are embedded in a 
Confucian value system that emphasizes harmony and consensus, trust 
and responsibilities towards the lineage (cf. Fukuyama 1995; Kotkin 
1993; Redding 1990). This trust system has been referred to as guanxi 
(good connections), a trust mechanism that facilitates quick decisions 
and makes the family enterprise adaptable to rapidly changing situations 
(Clarke, Yue and Von Glinow 1999: 174). 
 
Premised as it is on equal relations of reciprocity, guanxi appears not to 
diffuse ‘non-economic’ norms of filial duty but seems to be a trust-
regulated system reevaluated over the course of a relationship (cf. Burt 
2005; Yang 1994). In what Clifford Geertz (1963, 1978) cited in Burt 
2005:105), dubbed as a process of clientelization gossip mechanisms are 
often used to collect information about future business partners. In 
particular in uncertain situations gossip mechanisms contain elements 
of evaluation or interpretation of a certain person (ibid.) and can be seen 
as stories that are crucial to build and maintain guanxi relationships. 
Mayfair Yang (1994) explains how entrepreneurs use gifts and favors to 
cultivate personal relationships (guanxi) and create relationships of 
mutual dependence this way. Besides economic advantage Yang (1994) 
argues these gifts also ensure political security for an entrepreneur and 
are seen as crucial means to get trade licenses, tax discounts or police 
protection.  
 
Because those active in guanxi networks are often distant kin, neighbors, 
former schoolmates or people with the same surname or dialect, most 
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ethnic Chinese guanxi networks are seen as family firms, a building 
block Southeast Asians seem to miss. In this regard Tania Murray Li 
(1998) and David Szanton (1998) note that Malay and Javanese youths 
are reluctant to submit to family authority, at least when it comes to 
economic affairs. For Malay and Javanese youngsters, in sharp contrast 
to the Chinese, the family is not an enterprise, but the independent 
responsibility of their parents. As a result, the cultural argument holds 
that Southeast Asian families cannot rely upon the nuclear family as a 
business resource and for this reason can never increase their stocks, 
turnover and profit margins (Hefner 1998:13).  
 
The economic argument states that there is nothing ‘ethnic’ about the 
business success of the ethnic Chinese middlemen minorities over their 
Southeast Asian counterparts; they are simply better in dealing with 
capitalist principles such as money handling, risk taking, innovation and 
opportunity seeking (Hefner 1998: 18). As the ‘early start’ argument of 
Maurice Freedman (1979) goes, Chinese immigrants to Southeast Asia 
came from a society in which the tools of commerce were already 
widespread before the Chinese began their migration (ibid.). The most 
notable items in this toolbox, he says, were familiarity with the use of 
money and the existence of institutions for managing investments and 
credits. With this knowledge at hand the ethnic Chinese were able to 
adapt more quickly than the natives to the commercial opportunities of 
pre-colonial and modern Southeast Asia (ibid.).  
 
Departing from ‘an organizational imperative perspective’ Chang and 
Tam (2003: 27) argue that Chinese business success has always been 
based on the adage ‘being at the right place, at the right time’.  This is 
because ethnic Chinese already took advantage of booming Asian 
economies in the early colonial period by establishing niche businesses 
within the colonial economy (Zwart 2006: 35). This structural position is 
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said to have given them an ‘early start advantage’ over other competitors 
and enabled them to cooperate with western companies investing in the 
region. To supply western companies with cheap labor and raw materials 
the capitalist argument holds that Chinese entrepreneurs had to flatten 
their organization style and morph traditional elements into something 
hybrid that resembles neither ethnic Chinese capitalism nor indigenous 
identities (cf. Yeung and Olds 2000).  
 
Somewhere in-between the cultural and capitalist argument one can find 
the ‘embeddedness’ argument pinpointing at the interplay between state 
structures, capitalism and culture (Dahles 2004; Granovetter 1985; 
Hamilton 2000; Hefner 1998). As Mark Granovetter (1985) already aimed 
to show, there is a higher level of social interaction in the market place 
than both cultural and capitalist scholars acknowledge. In this respect 
Jamie Mackie (1998: 129-146) indicated that immigrants to Southeast 
Asia have always been recruited to a variety of organizations, including 
kinship networks, dialect group associations, chambers of commerce, 
and mutual aid organizations. In particular ‘revenue farms’ are said to 
have absorbed immigrants into a multi-purpose social network and 
provided them with access to housing, employment, business contacts 
and capital (Wilson 2004: 65-66).  
Politically oriented scholars also promote the ‘embeddedness’ of ethnic 
Chinese capitalism in state structures, because success in their view 
depends on someone’s ability to bond with government officials for the 
procurement of rents (Gomez 1999; Khan and Jomo 2000). Gomez (1999) 
proposes to add the ‘state patronage’ element to the culture-versus-
capital debate, because many ethnic Chinese companies received 
support from government officials to guarantee their existence. These 
rents include monopoly profits, subsidies and transfers, are organized 
through political mechanisms and are also meant to keep competitors at 
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a distance (Khan and Jomo 2000: 5). Rent-seeking activities can range 
from bribing or even coercion at the extreme end to perfectly legal 
political activities such as lobbying or arranging charity donations (ibid.).  
In classical economic definitions government rents are seen as illegal and 
unproductive practices that hamper economic growth in the region. Khan 
and Jomo (2000) in contrast argue that rents in many Southeast Asian 
economies are essential for maintaining social order, and necessary for 
economic growth. In this regard Andrew Wedeman (2003) observed how 
economic growth in China depended heavily on the ability of 
entrepreneurs to bond with the officialdom. On a more local level, 
Prasenjit Duara (1988) and Mayfair Yang (1994) found that the success 
of gentry-merchants in rural China depended heavily on their ability to 
seek rents by the local officialdom. Even wealthy ASEAN members such 
as Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand have provided many examples of 
how business tycoons have fused with the dominant political parties 
(Case 2000, 2002, 2003). In brief, political-economic scholars argue that 
the state is still a significant stakeholder in promoting capitalism in the 
region and that rent-seeking must be seen as a crucial part of Chinese 
and Southeast Asian modernization. 
 
Identity politics 
To their credit, each of the above approaches to business networks 
explains the structure and continuation of economic cooperation within 
and across borders. All four arguments (cultural, economic, institutional 
and political), however, suffer from the same flaw, because they do not 
take into account the diverse experiences of migrants (Ma and Cartier 
2003: 5) and thus have no explanation for the heterogeneity that exists 
within ethnic groups. Often ethnic Chinese business networks are seen 
as a homogenous ethnic group, which stems from the idea that shared 
homelands are bonding factors of ethnicity (cf. Pan 1998). But as 
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Skeldon (2003: 54) has noted, mainland Chinese were not even a 
uniform group within China itself, but attached themselves variously to 
ethnic groups, sub-ethnic groups, and speech groups. Emphasizing the 
diversity of the ethnic Chinese, Wang Gungwu (1991) indicated how 
different ‘classes’ of ethnic Chinese migrated to Southeast Asia and how 
some ended up as coolies on pepper plantations, others as craftsmen in 
workshops and again others as traders in rural areas.  
 
As for Cambodia, the American anthropologist William Willmott (1967) 
argues that a distinction has to be made between Chinese coolies and 
traders in terms of assimilation. Sojourning between their families at 
home in China and the plantations in Cambodia, Willmott argued that 
ethnic Chinese traders (often referred to as ‘compradors’) established far-
flung networks and preserved a distinct Chinese identity. In reversal, 
settling in Cambodia and intermarrying with local Khmers, ethnic 
Chinese coolies are said to have adopted the Cambodian language, 
culture and religion. Edwards (2003), however, nuanced Willmott’s 
speculation of assimilation and argued that Chinese immigrants in 
Cambodia created ‘hybrid’ or ‘creolized’ cultures. The hybridity of ethnic 
Chinese identity, she says, is best symbolized in the deity Bentougong, a 
Chinese deity cult that is widely practiced by ethnic Chinese and Khmers 
throughout Cambodia. Defining the identity of ethnic Chinese as hybrid, 
Edwards echoes Homi Bhabha’s (1994) notion of ‘in-between identities’ 
that are alike and different from their parents’ culture at the same time.  
 
But while historians and sociologists have described communities of 
locally born Chinese in the 19th and 20th century in terms of ‘hybrids’ or 
as ‘creolized’, largely by studying the domestic culture, outside the 
household these same ‘creoles’ and ‘hybrids’ engaged in a variety of 
public activities through which they continued to identify themselves as 
authentic Chinese (Frost 2003). In particular transnationalism scholars 
How to Dress the Khmer? 
 
 43
have observed the significance of multiple affiliations and social identities 
and pointed at the co-presence of ‘double’ identities (cf. Glick Schiller, 
Basch and Blanc-Szanton 1992). Studies on ethnic Chinese identities in 
Thailand indicate that the Sino-Thai – though still capable of speaking 
Chinese dialect – stand out in their display of Thai identity, in particular 
in public. Their identity is a double one, although they usually claim that 
the Thai part is stronger (Chantavanich 1997: 249; Suryadinata 1997: 
12-13). Chinese identity, then, constitutes an addition to their cultural 
repertoire illustrating an advanced proficiency in applying the 
appropriate paradigm to the appropriate occasion (cf. Dahles and Ter 
Horst 2006). As has been pointed out by Dahles (2004), quoting Hsiao 
(2002), abilities like these characterize, for example, diasporic and other 
communities of practice, in which members ‘shift between many different 
paradigms with no conflict’. 
 
The concept of transnationalism depicts identity as a ‘process’ by which 
immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link 
together their societies of origin and settlement (Glick-Schiller et al. 
1992). In such definitions the homeland is ‘original’ and the diaspora is a 
sort of variation of this ‘authentic form’ (cf. Pan 1998). According to Lavie 
and Swedenburg (1996) however, the essential identity marker for the 
ethnic Chinese is not China anymore, but mainly the countries they have 
been residing in for generations. Ien Ang (2001: 35) also points at an 
increasing disengagement with China as an identity marker of 
Chineseness and warns us that many ethnic Chinese do not want to 
return to China at all. Ethnic Chinese identity, she says, has nothing to 
do with ‘homeland nostalgia’ anymore, but has become a ‘cultural toolkit’ 
containing resource potential. This is a vision shared by Wang Gungwu 
(1991), who argues that early Chinese traders did not have a notion of 
ethnicity at all, only a concept of Chineseness they used to strengthen 
business ties. Or, as Ien Ang (2001: 35) puts it: 
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‘Chineseness’ has become an open signifier invested with resource potential, 
the raw material for the construction of syncretic identities suitable for ‘living 
where you are at’.  
 
Materialism 
In brief, identity is not something primordial but must be seen as a social 
construct that can be used symbolically and seems transposable from 
one domain to the other. Yet, and that is a shortcoming in many 
analyses on strategic shifting identities, what makes ethnic Chinese 
identity the open signifier with resource potential that can be used 
strategically depending on its context and situation? While scholars 
praise the multi-layered, flexible and strategic ‘character’ of the ethnic 
Chinese, they are not very explicit as to what they mean with context, 
situations and politics. As Steven B. Miles (2006: 222) complains, 
transnationalism scholars have documented the history of emigrant and 
host communities well but have neglected to write about migrants’ 
experiences in the networks that link them. This is why Philip Yang 
(2006: 174) suggests it is much more useful to conceptualize 
transnationalism as a mode of immigrant labor market incorporation 
that provides immigrants with an alternative to gain employment and 
social mobility in the receiving society.  
 
As indicated in the introductory chapter, many of the silk weavers and 
the silk traders are descendents of ethnic Chinese migrants who set up 
their businesses along river banks in Cambodia. Their situational context 
is predominantly one of reeling silk yarn, manufacturing silk skirts, 
subcontracting kin members, getting discounts and marketing the 
finished skirts on the market. The entire labor process, however, is not in 
the hands of the silk weavers anymore; nowadays, a division of labor 
exists between silk weavers who produce the sampot hol and middlemen 
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and wholesalers who import the silk yarn and peddle the finished 
product in the market place. Approaching the Cambodian silk weaving 
industry as a labor market and linking labor relationships to identity, 
gives credit to a vision neglected by transnationalism scholars but 
celebrated by Marxist scholars for decades: materialism. Coining the 
concept of ‘historical materialism’ Karl Marx (2000 [1867]) departs from 
the assumption that in order to exist human beings collectively work on 
nature to produce the means to live. Not all human beings do the same 
work however; there is a division of labor in which people not only do 
different jobs, but also live from the work of others by owning the means 
of production. As Marx has put it in the preface of ‘A Contribution to the 
Critique of Political Economy’ (1977 [1859]:21): 
 
‘In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite 
relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production 
appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of 
production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the 
economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and 
political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social 
consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general 
process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of 
men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines 
their consciousnesses’. 
 
It is a central claim of theories inspired by Marxism that improved 
production methods created unequal divisions of labor and downgraded 
the position of the worker (Inglis and Hughson 2003: 402). This is 
because production and trade relationships became an interplay of two 
opposed classes: capitalists who controlled the great mass of productive 
powers and workers, who controlled no such powers, except their own 
capacity for labor (Marx 2000 [1867]). Capitalists in these unequal 
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production relationships had the means to set up enterprises and 
produce new thoughts, while workers owned nothing and had to sell 
their labor to the capitalists (ibid.). As Marx (ibid.:149) states:  
 
‘A spinner treats spindles only as implements for spinning, and flax only as the 
material that she spins. She must seize upon these things and rouse them from 
death sleep, change them from mere possible use values into real and effective 
ones’.    
In other words, and this is an important theme in Marx’ sociology, the 
labor process turns into a process by which the capitalist ‘consumes’ the 
labor power of the worker in a twofold way. First because the capitalist 
sees to it that the work is done in a proper manner, and that the means 
of production are used with intelligence, so that there is no unnecessary 
waste of raw material, and no wear and tear of the implements beyond 
what is necessarily caused by the work (ibid.). Secondly, by the purchase 
of the worker’s labor power, the capitalist incorporates him as a living 
ferment, together with the lifeless constituents of his product (ibid.:150). 
As a consequence, Marx argues, human labor itself converts into a 
commodity, because the wage the worker receives from the capitalist 
does not exceed the investments of the capitalist and certainly does not 
correspond with the ‘surplus value’ he receives on the market place, an 
exchange value Marx dubbed as ‘exploitation’.  
According to Marx ‘exploitation’ is an inevitable aspect of capitalist 
societies, because capitalists will compete with each other, and as 
competition between capitalists grows so does the misery of the workers. 
Yet, competition between capitalists gradually leads to the concentration 
of accumulated capital in fewer and fewer hands and class distinctions 
between the few haves and the majority of have-nots are inevitable. As 
Marx (2000 [1867]: xiv) argues, while the number of exploited workers 
swells and their poverty increases, so does the intensity of their wrath 
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against their oppressors. In ‘The Communist Manifesto’, Karl Marx and 
Friedrich Engels (1848) already suggested a course of action for a 
working class revolution to overthrow the ruling capitalist class and 
bring about a classless society. Though the bourgeoisie has played a 
progressive role in destroying feudalism, it also created a contradiction 
within capitalism between the forces of production and the relations of 
production. As Marx and Engels described it (Marx and Engels 1967 
[1848]: 5): 
 
‘The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all 
feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It … has left remaining no other nexus 
between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous “cash payment” ... 
for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted 
naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation ... Constant revolutionising of 
production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting 
uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones 
... All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last 
compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life, and his relations 
with his kind’. 
 
Marx and Engels defended communism as a theory to overthrow the 
capitalist class and outlined a set of demands including the abolition of 
landownership, a progressive income tax, centralization of the means of 
communication, and the expansion of the means of production owned by 
the state. The implementation of these policies, Marx and Engels 
believed, would eventually lead to a stateless and classless society in the 
hands of those who deserved it, the workers.  
 
But as the case-study organized around the elderly silk weaver Sotheap 
indicates, after the Khmer Rouge regime was overthrown by Vietnamese 
troops, she returned to her village and was able to resume silk weaving 
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due to the financial assets of the middlemen in her village, a gesture she 
still is grateful for. Simultaneously, however, she fears the quality 
inspections of her middleman, because he has the power to lower the 
exchange value of her commodities. Contrary to the Khmer Rouge rebels, 
however, the silk weavers do not bear a grudge against the ‘exploiting’ 
practices of the ethnic Chinese capitalists, but seem to accept them as 
part and parcel of their position in the labor process. That again raises 
questions pertaining to theoretical debates on why peasants, in this case 
the Cambodian silk weavers, do not strike against their middlemen, but 
seem to accept the rather low exchange values of the sampot.           
 
The logic of subsistence 
Whereas Marx developed his theories on historical materialism, capitalist 
modes of production and class struggle in 19th century industrial towns 
in Great Britain, Cambodia consists predominantly of peasants, and 
modernizes in a rural way. The agricultural sector in Cambodia is still of 
critical importance and provides the livelihoods of the majority of the 
population (Mekong River Commission 2003: 145-146). In fact, some 
ninety per cent of the Cambodian population depends upon agricultural 
crops, fisheries, livestock or handicrafts production for its living (ibid.). 
The silk weavers do not form an exception to this rule and the production 
of sampot is often an important asset alongside other rural activities 
such as rice growing, pig raising and fish farming.  
 
As for his emphasis on the urban exploited worker, Johnson (2004: 4) 
argued that Marx was convinced that the peasantry class had no 
existence in the modern era and would eventually disappear due to the 
rise of industrialism and capitalism. Marx’ vision of the disappearing 
peasantry class, Johnson continued, was shared by thinkers such as 
Kautsky and Lenin. Like Marx, he writes, these two Russian thinkers 
How to Dress the Khmer? 
 
 49
characterized peasants as simple, undifferentiated and barbaric people 
who were unable to shape history and block the development of 
civilization (ibid.) Today, Johnson (2004) argues that this vision is still 
shared by western development organizations paying too much attention 
to industrial development and a capitalist mode of production to 
modernize an economy (ibid.: 5). From the colonial period onwards the 
American model of integration of agriculture and industry, also called the 
Green Revolution, was designed in Southeast Asia to incorporate it into 
an emerging capitalist world order and to promote the development of the 
capitalist farmer (ibid.). Overall, however, this strategy failed as only a 
minority of peasants became capitalists and the vast majority remained 
petty producers, depending upon state subsidies and public and private 
financing for both their production and consumption needs (Johnson 
2004: 5). Alvin So (1986: 76) argued that Marxist thinkers overlooked the 
extent of commercialization of agriculture in China before its 
incorporation into the capitalist world-system. While studying the 
economic development of silk districts in the Pearl River Delta, So (1986) 
illustrated that the Chinese gentry-class did not adopt a capitalist mode 
of production but opted for the petty producer path of commercialization.  
According to Johnson (2004:4) Alexander Chayanov (1966) argued that a 
petty mode of production must be distinguished from a capitalist mode of 
production because there is no appropriation and realization of surplus 
value or accumulation of capital. This is because the distinctive economic 
behavior of the subsistence-oriented peasant family results from the fact 
that, unlike a capitalist enterprise, it is a unit of consumption as well as 
a unit of production (ibid.).  
 
According to James Scott (1976: 13-14), paraphrasing Chayanov (1966),  
many of the seeming anomalies of peasant economics arise from the fact 
that the struggle for a subsistence minimum is carried out in the context 
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of a shortage of land, capital, and outside employment opportunities. 
James Scott argued that it was Chayanov who has shown how the 
proportion of the year spent in crafts and trades increases as the land 
available to the peasant family diminishes (ibid.). According to Chayanov 
(1966), the continued application of labor to poorly compensated farming 
or handicrafts must thus be seen as a product of the low opportunity 
costs of labor for the peasant and the high marginal utility of income for 
those near the subsistence level. For this reason, he says, it also makes 
sense for the peasant to continue to apply labor until its marginal 
product is quite low and at the same time allow others to extract high 
return from their predicament (ibid.).   
This is also the reason why James Scott (1976) complains that Marxist 
approaches to exploitation have been too one-sidedly materialistic 
(ibid.:165), because exploitation in peasant economies is not just a 
problem of income but mostly a question of peasant conceptions of social 
justice, of rights and obligations, and of reciprocity (ibid.: vii). Other than 
industrial societies, Scott argues that peasant societies maintain a 
‘subsistence ethic’ that prefers safety and reliability to long-run profits 
(ibid.:13). The landlord in these unequal labor relationships takes the 
risk of cultivation and gives financial assistance to his tenants. The 
tenant as a consequence is considered ‘an inferior member of the 
extended family’ of landlords in these societies, a position he, to a certain 
extent, accepts (ibid.)6.  
                                                 
6  In ‘The Rational Peasant: The political economy of Rural Society in Vietnam’, however, Samual L. Popkin 
(1979) attacks the position of James Scott by proposing a rational choice alternative he dubs as political 
economy. According to Popkin the peasant is not so concerned with maintaining the status quo as moral 
economist such as James Scott would have us believe. Rather, he says, the peasant is always concerned with 
maximizing his or her utility and is willing to gamble and take risks in order to secure a higher social level. 
Therefore, his argument continues, peasant's behavior is always guided by economic rationality. 
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A traditional modernity 
The above materialist view asks attention to relationships between 
identity, unequal production relationships and the logic of subsistence 
within peasant societies. As the research has shown, silk traders identify 
themselves as ethnic Chinese, whereas silk weavers, albeit member of 
the same ethnic group, identify themselves as Khmers Yet, linking 
identity with production relationships and subsistence logic alone does 
not explain why the powerful silk traders, as capitalists, market the silk 
products conform the culture of ‘their’ workers, the Khmer weavers. As 
indicated in the introductory chapter, there is a gap between the grand 
Khmer narrative of the silk weaving techniques and its ethnic Chinese 
origin, a gap the ethnic Chinese silk traders do not seem to counter. This 
again questions theories on how the ‘grand narrative’ of Khmer 
modernization should be interpreted in Cambodia against the 
background of an ethnic Chinese dominance of the silk industry.  
According to Marx, as cited in Inglis and Hughson (2003: 23), the state is 
supposed to secure the interests of the few capitalists, and deploy 
‘ideologies’ that mask the true, class-based exploitative nature of society. 
To accomplish this the economic and political elite has created a cultural 
superstructure, alienated from, and out of control of, the people who 
operate within it; a situation Marx described as ‘commodity fetishism’. 
Marx, as cited in McLellan (1984:184) expressed this form of alienation 
as follows:  
 
‘The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e. the class 
which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling 
intellectual force.The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of 
the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships 
grasped as ideas’ . 
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According to David Howarth (2000: 19) Antonio Gramsci (1971) deployed 
the concept of hegemony to explain a more sympathetic interplay 
between material organization and ideology. Howarth (2000: 89) borrows 
from Gramsci (1971) the insight that ideologies have a validity which is 
also psychological, and create the terrain on which men move, acquire 
consciousness of their position and obtain commonsensical conceptions 
of the world. Howarth also agrees with Gramsci that different classes and 
ethnic groups must come to share a common set of political objectives 
based on a new set of beliefs and practices, an outcome Gramsci (1971) 
refers to as ‘winning hegemonies’ (ibid.). To stabilize new systems of 
meanings Howarth (ibid. 111) borrows from Ernesto Laclau (1990) the 
insight that class or ethnic differences must be silenced by ‘empty 
signifiers’. Examples of ‘empty signifiers’ are myths by which Howarth 
(2000: 11) means that states have created social imageries that are 
designed to make sense of dislocations. These myths, however, are not 
only traumatic in the sense that they threaten identities, but are also 
productive in the sense that they serve as the foundation on which new 
identities are constituted Glynos and Stavrakakis (2004: 207). 
 
According to Gilloch (1996:9) the multiple functions of myths and 
positive connotations of ‘ideologies’ have also been a key feature in the 
work of the German theorist Walter Benjamin. Gilloch agrees with 
Benjamin that myths are fallacious stories which serve to explain and 
account for natural occurrences, catastrophes and other phenomena 
with reference to superhuman beings, spirits, demons and magic (ibid.). 
As a consequence, Gilloch continues, they stand in opposition to true 
knowledge and involve human powerlessness in the face of unalterable 
natural laws and the subordination of reason (ibid.:10). This again, he 
concludes, is caused by the fact that human beings worship their own 
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products in ‘commodity fetishism’ and are governed by the unchanging 
rhythms of the machinery they must serve (ibid.).  
 
It is a central claim of Baudrillard (1998 [1970]) too that we have become 
‘victims’ of a postmodern world dominated by simulated experiences and 
sign values, a situation he refers to as hyper-reality. This ‘hyper-real’ 
world, he says, is dictated by the needs of consumption, advertising 
campaigns and companies seeking to sell their wares and services. 
Baudrillard thus points at a new sort or new sorts of ‘commodity 
fetishism’ and argues that the rise of the ‘consumer society’ means that 
we have come to live more and more under the silent gaze of the mythical 
objects we want (ibid.).  
 
Yet, whereas writers such as Marx and Baudrillard depict ‘commodity 
fetishism’ only negatively as a form of ‘alienation’ or ‘gaze’, Gilloch (1996), 
and I agree with him, uses the term myth also as a metaphor that can 
contain positive elements (Gilloch 1996: 12). In his writings on Paris 
Walter Benjamin, as cited in Gilloch (1996:12), characterizes the 
commodity culture of nineteenth-century metropoles as a dream world 
and the materialization, albeit in a distorted form, of genuine desire and 
aspirations (ibid.:13). According to Gilloch it has been one of Benjamin’s 
central claims ever since that the modern must not to be understood as 
the end point of a continuous, linear, development or as the culmination 
of human endeavor and achievement (ibid.). On the contrary, Gilloch 
continues, modernity is merely the nothing-new that struts boastfully 
around the city streets in the borrowed garb of the latest fashion; it is the 
always-the-same dressed up as the ever-new (ibid.:14). That is also why 
Walter Benjamin coined the term traditional modernity, because 
modernity, in the words of Gilloch (1996: 14), has not progressed beyond 
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‘prehistory’, but instead constitutes a perpetual relapse into the always-
the-same of myth.  
 
Another reason why Gilloch (1996) embraces Benjamin’s concept of 
‘traditional modernity’ is his concern with the rescue and preservation of 
‘traditional’ artifacts, and with their subsequent re-use or re-functioning 
in the pressing political struggles of the moment (ibid:14.). As indicated 
in the introductory chapter, the Royal family, the Cambodian state, the 
Cambodian diaspora, peace-building organizations and the ethnic 
Chinese silk traders are concerned with the rescue and preservation of 
the ‘hol’ silk weaving techniques as well, and market the sampot hol as a 
remnant of an ancient Khmer tradition. As the Khmer modernization 
narrative goes, the origin of the ‘hol’ silk weaving techniques lies in 
‘glorious’ ruins of Angkor, its destruction in the ‘evil’ Communist 1970s 
and its revival again in the ‘liberal’ 1990s. In particular development 
agencies such as the Japanese ‘Institute for Khmer Traditional Textiles’ 
and the French ‘Artisan d’ Angkor’ claim the rescue of the Cambodian 
silk weaving industry and blame Khmer Rouge revolutionaries for the 
destruction of this once glorious Khmer weaving tradition.     
 
Using Walter Benjamin’s (1940) explanation of Paul Klee’s painting 
‘Angelus Novus’ Ollier and Winter (2006: 7) outlined how the postwar 
Cambodian state worships its past relics and anticipates on a 
consumption desire for Khmer authenticity for its progress. Drawing 
upon the empirical research of a team of international scholars they 
articulated how a postwar cultural economy has emerged in Cambodia 
framed around two ‘traditional’ themes; the Angkor Wat temple complex 
and the Khmer Rouge revolution (ibid.). As Winter (2006: 49-50) observes, 
within Cambodia’s post-conflict tourism industry, the face of 
Jayavarman VII, the builder of Angkor, adorns souvenir books, 
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postcards, CDs and glossy magazines and serves to commemorate him 
as a megalomaniac leader of an exalted monumental culture. In a related 
vein Timothy Dylan Wood (2006: 181-192) illustrates how the 
Cambodian state branded Pol Pot’s place of dead, Anlong Veng, as a 
popular tourist destination as well. Advertising the death of Pol Pot, 
however, the celebratory tone framed around the ‘glorious’ leader 
Jayavarman VII was replaced by an understanding and explanation for 
the most ‘evil’ Communist revolution ever in Southeast Asia, the one led 
by Pol Pot. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have outlined theoretical debates on diasporic migration 
conditions, ethnic Chinese business networks, identity politics and 
materialism in an attempt to construct a theoretical framework that will 
guide us towards an understanding of the gap that exists between the 
‘grand Khmer narrative’ of Khmer modernization and the long-lasting 
dominance of the ethnic Chinese. Economically, ethnic Chinese 
dominance is accepted in Southeast Asia; culturally, however, their 
position is marginal and shows a high degree of assimilation (Dahles and 
Ter Horst 2006). It is not my ambition to bring to the fore ethnic Chinese 
dominance in the economic domain of the silk weaving industry and 
disqualify the Khmer modernization narrative as ‘phantasmatic’ or 
‘imagined’. Yet, I will use ethnic Chinese ‘marginality’ as a starting point 
to problematize narratives of Khmer modernization and ethnic identities 
in Cambodia and illustrate the economics and politics behind it. Of 
course there is nothing new about the social construction of myths and 
cultures in Southeast Asia, but the role of the ethnic Chinese in this 
regard has not yet been considered. Hence, grounded in an 
anthropological tradition and addressing the themes of diasporic 
migration conditions, ethnic Chinese business networks, identity politics 
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and materialism, this thesis revolves around the following research 
question: 
 
‘How does the ethnically complex organization of the silk weaving industry 
relate to diverging modernization narratives and which interests do these 
narratives serve in the contemporary Cambodian nation state in general 
and its silk industry in particular?  
 
To operationalize the central research question, the following sub-
questions will be used:   
1. Under which historical conditions did Chinese silk traders and 
weavers transplant their business to Cambodia (chapter three)? 
2.  How is the contemporary silk weaving network organized in terms 
of production and trade relationships (chapter four)? 
3. How do silk producers and traders negotiate their identities within 
the economic domain of the silk weaving industry (chapter five)? 
4.  Why do ethnic Chinese silk traders and other crucial stakeholders 
(the state, NGOs and local communities) market silk weaving products 
as authentically Khmer (chapter six and conclusion)?
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Chapter 2 
Cambodia: A Plural Society Against All Odds 
            
 
 
Introduction 
In the dominant narrative silk weavers are considered loyal Khmer 
citizens, devoted Buddhists and folkloristic producers of high Khmer art 
working in an unaffected tropical landscape (cf. Delvert 1961; Forest 
1980). John Kleinen (2005), however, has warned us that such (colonial) 
perceptions of rural hinterlands are rather romantic and lack the insight 
that they are always constructed within a constantly changing political 
environment. Kleinen also argues that underneath the image of Khmer 
ethnic pride, Cambodia hides a burden that stems from an extremely 
violent past (Kleinen and Mar 2004).  
 
In the following pages I will illustrate how the Cambodian subject became 
multi-layered; continually adapting to foreign lifestyles, codes of conduct 
and cultural repertoires. The reason for this was that from the fall of 
Angkor in 1433 onwards the once mightiest kingdom of Southeast Asia 
shrunk to a vassal state under the command of Vietnamese, Thai and 
French troops. Next, I will also illustrate how the Cambodian state coped 
with this hegemonizing past and how it deployed a form of chauvinism, 
which could best be labeled as ethno-nationalism. In particular the 
Maoist-inspired Khmer Rouge regime (1975-1979) considered the multi-
layered Cambodian subject as a burden and ‘forced’ the Cambodians to 
become Khmers (col khmae). Tragically, however, Pol Pot’s attempt to 
primordialize the nation failed dramatically and even today the 
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psychological, economic and cultural destruction of Cambodia is still 
visible. Yet, albeit one of the poorest nations of Southeast Asia, 
Cambodia is modernizing itself, one of the signs of this being the rise of 
an indigenous silk weaving industry, as this chapter will show.   
 
The dominant discourse about Cambodia 
Officially, ninety per cent of the Cambodian population is considered 
ethnic Khmers, descendants of the Angkor Empire, the largest Southeast 
Asian kingdom ever that extended over much of Southeast Asia and 
reached its zenith between the 10th and 13th centuries (cf. Chandler 
1993). No one knows for certain how long the Khmers have lived in what 
is now Cambodia, where they came from, or what language they spoke 
before the era of Christianity (ibid.: 9). We do know that the inhabitants 
of present-day Cambodia spoke languages related to present-day Khmer, 
a language that is not typically Cambodian but related to the wider mon-
Khmer family, a language system that is widely scattered over mainland 
Southeast Asia, and that is also used in some parts of India (ibid.). Still, 
the most beloved and embraced narrative of origin about Cambodia is the 
one known as Indianization, whereby elements of Indian culture, i.e. 
Hindu epics, Buddhist legends, ideas of universal kingship, a vocabulary 
of social hierarchies, iconography, astronomy, musical instruments and 
Sanskrit writing systems, were absorbed into Cambodian culture from 
the third century A.D. onwards (Chandler 1993: 11).  
 
The narrative of an Indian Khmer is strengthened by a legend that can be 
traced back to the marriage of an Indian Brahman named Kaundinya, 
who married a Khmer dragon princess, nagi. This origin myth was first 
recorded by Chinese officials, who named the territory Funan, a maritime 
oriented state that stretched over contemporary Southern Cambodia and 
Cochinchina (ibid.:13). According to French historians such as George 
Coedes and Louis Malleret, the Funan empire came under attack by 
Cambodia: A plural society against all odds 
 
 59
another Khmer-speaking dynasty named Chenla, a vassal kingdom of 
Funan, occupying what is nowadays northern Cambodia and Southern 
Laos (ibid.:14). Responsible for this overthrow was the young warrior 
Bhavavarman, the eldest son of the Chenla ruler, Viravarman. The son of 
Bhavavarman, Isanavarman I, who succeeded him in c. 611, extended 
his power westwards towards the region that was later to become the 
center of the Angkor monarchy (Hall 1981: 105-107).   
The ‘golden age’ of Khmer civilization was the period between the ninth 
and thirteenth century. Under Jayavarman VII (1181-ca. 1218) 
Cambodia extended its territory in a series of successful wars against its 
close enemies the Chams, the Vietnamese and the Thai, as far as what is 
nowadays the bay of Bengal (ibid.:105). Particularly important for the 
success of the Angkorean Khmers was an elaborate system of canals and 
reservoirs, which made possible an early ‘green revolution’ providing the 
country with large surpluses of rice (ibid.:116). Possibly because the 
glorious Angkorean kingdom was a successful agrarian one, the Khmers 
see themselves quintessentially as peasants, and their primary crop, 
paddy rice, as an important identity marker for their individual identity 
(Chandler 1993; Vickery 1986).  
In Cambodia the adagio also goes that a Khmer is a Buddhist. Since the 
late 13th century Theravada Buddhism became the ‘Wheel of Life’ for the 
Khmers and today the temples are still the spiritual and symbolic centers 
of Khmer ethnic identity. In religious texts Theravada Buddhism is a 
tolerant, non-prescriptive religion in which each individual takes full 
responsibility for his own actions and omissions. Theravada Buddhism is 
based on three concepts: dharma (the doctrine of the Buddha); karma 
(the belief that one’s life is rewarded on the basis of the sum of one’s 
good actions); and the sangha, the ascetic community within which man 
can improve his karma (Keyes 1995: 84-86). Women are not allowed to 
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join the sangha and, perhaps for this reason, men are considered more 
ascetic and other-worldly than their female counterparts in Cambodia.           
 
The arrival of foreign hegemonizers 
Following Jayavarman VII's death Cambodia experienced six centuries of 
gradual decline due to his violent relationship with several neighboring 
powers (Hall 1981:459-466). In the 12th century A.D., the Chams, a 
Hindu kingdom, fought a series of wars with the Angkorian Khmer in the 
west. This kingdom controlled the lands between Hue, in central Annam, 
and the Mekong Delta in Cochinchina, gaining prosperity from maritime 
trade including piracy (ibid.: 201-210). The Chams never conquered 
Cambodia, among others because they were conquered themselves by 
the Vietnamese in 1471 (Ovesen and Trankell 2003: 204). Many Cham 
fled to Cambodia and settled along the Tonle Sap and Mekong rivers, as 
well as in Battambang, Pouthisat, Takeo, Kampot, Kampong Cham, 
Kampong Thum, and Kampong Chhnang provinces (Collins 1996). Today 
two separate groups can be distinguished within the Cham ethnic 
category; first the Cham people, who trace their ancestry to the Champa 
kingdom and speak both the Khmer and the Cham language, which both 
belong to the Austronesian family (Ovesen and Trankell 2003: 204-205). 
A second group is referred to as ‘Chvea’, which is the Khmer word for 
Java, suggesting a penultimate origin in the Malay-Indonesian area. The 
‘Chvea’ prefer to call themselves ‘Khmer Islam’ – stressing their linguistic 
and national belonging and their separate religion (ibid.). Together they 
number about 230,000 and can be found mainly in Kampong Cham, 
Kampot and a region north of Phnom Penh (ibid.).  
According to the nationalist history of Cambodia the Vietnamese began 
an historic period of expansion from 1000 AD onwards and conquered 
the eastern rim of the Khmer empire, comprising central present-day 
Vietnam (Champa), southern present-day Vietnam (Kampuchea krom) 
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and large parts of present-day eastern Cambodia (Clayton 2000: 46). In 
accordance with the nationalist argument, the Vietnamese emperor Minh 
Mang (1813) ordered 10,000 troops into Phnom Penh, at which point 
Cambodia, became a Vietnamese colony (ibid.). Besides occupying 
Cambodia the nationalist argument also goes that the Vietnamese 
supported their position with a hegemonic mission civilisatrice and 
imposed a variety of cultural and language policies on Cambodians in all 
social strata (ibid.: 47). The Cambodian king Chan for example was 
required to visit a Vietnamese temple in Phnom Penh, to wear a 
Vietnamese mandarin costume and to bow for the Vietnamese emperor 
(Chandler 1993: 126).  
Although the Vietnamese withdrew from Cambodia in 1841, today some 
600,000 (five per cent of the total population) Vietnamese live in 
Cambodia (World Factbook 2005). Especially the Cambodian border 
provinces Prey Veng and Svay Rieng have a significant Vietnamese rice 
farming population who have settled there in search of land. Most 
Khmers regard the Vietnamese as intruders (youns) and in recent 
Cambodian history the Vietnamese expansion across the borders has 
been a recurrent theme in anti-Vietnamese Khmer propaganda (Ovesen 
and Trankell 2003: 195).   
In the fifteenth century another nationalist argument goes that Thai 
troops successfully attacked the Western rim of the Khmer empire and 
were responsible for the fall of the city of Angkor in 1433. A new Khmer 
capital was established at Udong, a city south of present-day Phnom 
Penh, but its monarchs could survive only by entering into what 
amounted to vassal relationships with the Thai and with the Vietnamese 
(Chandler 1993; Hall 1981). In 1767 the Thai capital of Ayutthaya was 
besieged and destroyed by the Burmese, but the Thai quickly recovered 
and soon reasserted their domination over Cambodia (Hall 1981: 465). 
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The youthful Khmer king Ang Eng (1779-96), a refugee at the Thai court, 
was installed as monarch at Udong by Thai troops. Like its Vietnamese 
counterpart in the East, Thailand annexed Cambodia's three 
northernmost provinces and the northwestern provinces of Battambang 
and Siemreap, hegemonizing them under a Thai cultural sphere of 
influence (Chandler 1993, Hall 1981).  
 
Nevertheless the argument goes that the postcolonial Cambodian 
governments only regarded Vietnam and China as the big threats to 
Cambodian political, economic and territorial sovereignty, and not 
Thailand (Ovesen and Trankell 2003: 195). The reason for this, according 
to Ovesen and Trankell (2003), is that the main cultural divide running 
through Indochina is the one separating mainland Southeast Asia into 
the ‘Indianized’ states of Burma, Thailand, Laos and Cambodia, and 
Sinicized Vietnam. As their cultural argument goes, the Confucian 
culture of the Vietnamese and Chinese is often perceived as ‘foreign’, 
while the attitude of the Khmers towards the ‘Buddhist’ Thai culture is 
significantly more positive (ibid.).      
 
When the Cambodian king Norodom signed a protectorate treaty with the 
French in 1863 Thai and Vietnamese territorial expansion finally came to 
a halt. The French demonstrated less economic interest in Cambodia 
than in Vietnam, and the country mainly functioned as a strategic buffer 
for Vietnam against English colonial interests in Thailand (Osborne 
1969). But like all the other Cambodian colonizers, the French did 
believe in their sacred mandate to civilize and educate the world (Norindr 
1997: 5). Convinced of their cultural ascendance over the Cambodian 
people, they exclusively promoted their own history and culture (ibid.). 
Cambodia, in the French mind, was regarded as an empty space, a void 
that could legitimately be exploited and colonized (ibid.). French language 
schools, French art institutions, French administrations, French 
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monuments, French buildings, French markets, were all hegemonic 
practices meant to portray Cambodge as a backward nation and 
attempts to deny its existence as a sovereign nation (Edwards 1999). 
 
Postcolonial processes of ethnic homogenization 
Because of his concern with territorial independence, Cambodia’s first 
postcolonial ruler, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, launched a Khmer 
nationalist discourse aiming to promote national unity and counteract 
the perceived dominance of Vietnamese and Chinese elements (Ovesen 
and Trankell 2003: 195). In the 1960s he devised an ethnic classification 
scheme to which certain non-Khmer ethnic minorities, such as the 
Vietnamese and Chinese, were excluded as foreigners (ibid:196.). To 
distinguish them as such a law was promulgated in 1954 conferring 
Cambodian citizenship on children at least one of whose parents is a 
Cambodian citizen (ibid.). The 1954 citizenship law excluded from 
Cambodian nationality ethnic Vietnamese, Cham and Chinese residents 
who were either not born there, were born before 1954, or were born 
there after 1954 but not of a Cambodian partner (ibid.). Such people 
could gain citizenship only by ‘becoming Khmer’ (col khmae)7 through 
undergoing ethnic tests proving their fluency in the Khmer language and 
their famility with Khmer manners, customs and traditions (ibid., cf. 
Edwards 2003). That is also why many ethnic Chinese in Cambodia refer 
to themselves as ‘khmae-yeung’ (we Khmers), where Khmer indicates not 
ethnic origin but attachment to the Khmer nation. And that is also why 
they are often described as having ‘col khmae’ (entered the Khmers) even 
where they have joined Chinese associations or retained other outward 
markers of Chinese identity (Edwards 2003: 3-4).  
 
                                                 
7 By means of the 1954 citizenship law Sihanouk also encouraged indigenous minority groups in the north-
eastern provinces of Rattanakiri and Mondulkiri to replace their clan identity and ‘become’ a Khmer.     
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In the 1970s general Lon Nol took over Sihanouk’s power during a coupe 
d’état but at the same time stressed Cambodia’s ethnic homogeneity, 
asserting that all ethnic groups in Cambodia belonged to the great 
Khmer race (Edwards 2003:24). Although most ethnic Chinese had 
become Khmers Lon Nol shut down Chinese schools and newspapers, 
and disciplined Chinese and Vietnamese to get rid of their customs, 
morals and their communist way of thinking (ibid.). The 1975-1978 
Khmer Rouge further racialized the Khmer body as a dark-skinned 
peasant and downgraded the ‘white’ ethnic Chinese as bloodsucking 
capitalists and communist spies. During Pol Pot’s regime all marks of 
heterogeneity had to be abolished, and millions of people were relocated 
in distinct working areas (Thion 1988:250). In these working zones 
ethnic Chinese were forced to ‘become Khmer’ in housing, language dress 
and food (Becker 1986: 255). To resist ‘Khmerisation’ was to threaten the 
founding principles of the Khmer Rouge regime and in the eyes of some 
Pol Pot cadres ethnic dissent was a crime equaling political dissent. 
Tragically, between 1975 and 1978 more than half of the 400,000 ethnic 
Chinese in Cambodia were killed for their class, intellectual or business 
background (Kiernan 1986:18-29).    
 
In January 1979, backed by the Vietnamese army, the People Republic of 
Kampuchea state took over power and carried out a policy of unity and 
equality among the people of all nationalities living in Cambodia (Ovesen 
and Trankell 2003:198). As article 5 of the PRK constitution reads: 
 
‘All nationalities must love and help each other. All acts of discrimination 
against, oppression of a division among the nationalities are prohibited. The 
State takes care of ethnic minorities so that they can rise to the common level. 
The State pays special attention to the development of economy, education, 
culture, social affairs, health and communication in the mountain regions and 
remote areas’ (in: Ovesen and Trankell 2003:198).  
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However, going against the foreign policy agenda of the PRK Ben Kiernan 
(1985) has argued that manifestations of Chineseness were still 
repressed, because the surviving Chinese population in Cambodia was 
recast as a fifth column for PRC interests and supporters of the Pol Pot 
regime. Stephen Heder (1981:19), who conducted 1,500 interviews with 
Cambodian refugees between December 1978 and November 1979, also 
reported that Vietnamese troops had restricted the movement of Chinese 
around Cambodia, barring their entry to the towns (cf. Edwards 2003). 
During the PRK regime the Chinese in Phnom Penh were also denied the 
freedom to celebrate Chinese New Year, practice ancestor worship, or to 
honor Chinese shrines (ibid.: 31). PRK discrimination against the ethnic 
Chinese continued after the issue of circular ‘351’ in 1983, a nationwide 
registration of Chinese businesses (ibid.). Like Sihanouk and Pol Pot’s 
policy of ethno-nationalism the ‘351’ registration campaign defined 
Chineseness on the basis of skin color, clarity of Khmer pronunciation, 
or display of cultural artifacts such as Chinese couplets or ancestral 
shrines in the home (ibid.). Afraid of becoming labeled as ‘351’, many 
Chinese staged an overtly Khmer identity, married a local Khmer and 
stopped speaking Chinese in public (ibid.). Symptomatic for the anti-
Chinese sentiments was a famous ‘351’ joke among Khmers that there 
was a run on toothpicks as the Chinese had bought them all to prop 
their eyes open (ibid.).  
 
The establishment of the State of Cambodia (SOC) in 1989 finally led to a 
gradual relaxation of restrictions imposed on the Chinese, in line with 
changes on the international political scene (ibid.:32). The Vietnamese 
withdrawal from Cambodia in 1989, the attendant healing of the Sino-
Soviet rift and a concerted effort by the international community to 
secure peace in Cambodia led to direct meetings between Beijing and 
Phnom Penh during the October 1990 peace talks in Jakarta (ibid.). After 
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this meeting the SOC restored the rights of ethnic Chinese to practice 
religious customs and to celebrate Chinese festivals; in 1991, Chinese 
New Year festivities were officially allowed for the first time since 1975 
(ibid.). From that period onwards Cambodia witnessed a huge revival of 
Chinese associations and temples with branches in every province, 
district and village. After the general elections in 1993, which resulted in 
the coalition government of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) and the 
Sihanouk royalists, FUNCINPEC, the National Assembly also adopted a 
new Constitution for the Kingdom of Cambodia (Ovesen and Trankell 
2003: 200). But although it acknowledges cultural differences between 
its ethnic minority groups, the 1993 Constitution still, like the 1954 one, 
marks the ethnic Chinese as Khmers and refuses to depict Cambodia as 
a multi-ethnic nation (Ovesen and Trankell 2003:200):  
‘Every Khmer citizen shall be equal before the law, enjoying the same rights, 
freedom and fulfilling the same obligations regardless of race, colour, sex, 
language, religious belief, political tendency, birth origin, social status, wealth 
or other status’  .  
A painful reality 
After centuries of being attacked by neighboring powers and two civil 
wars in the 1970s nothing is left of the glorious Angkor empire and 
Cambodia has become a tiny little state comprising an area of 181,040 sq 
km, bordering the Gulf of Thailand, situated in between Thailand, 
Vietnam, and Laos (World Factbook 2005).  When I arrived in Cambodia 
in 2003 it was caught in a year full of political deadlocks,8 the outbreak 
                                                 
8
 
Despite a convincing victory of Prime Minister HUN Sen’s CCP party, neither of the two rivaling parties, the 
Royalist FUNCINPEC party and the democratic Sam Rainsy Party, agreed to form a coalition. After eight 
months of negotiation FUNCINPEC did join CCP to form a cabinet. This to the anger of the left winger Sam 
Rainsy, who accused the Royalists of taking two million dollars of bribe money to form a cabinet with Hun 
Sen.    
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of SARS and anti-Thai riots9 in Phnom Penh, a year that also saw the 
sacking of the Thai Embassy and the closure of the Thai-Cambodian 
border (Southeast Asian Affairs 2004: viiii). And although the kingdom of 
Cambodia became the tenth member of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) in April 1999, this did not bring about the desired 
socio-economic changes, technological innovations, improved 
infrastructure, good governance, trade relationships, rapid urbanization, 
foreign investments, demographic transformations and increase of the 
GNP.   
 
This means that after a decade of Soviet help, fifteen years of UN aid and 
five years of ASEAN membership, Cambodia is still one of the poorest 
nations in the world, and, behind Burma and Bangladesh, among the 
poorest in Southeast Asia. This means that with an average income of 
260 dollar a year (Mekong River Commission 2003:64), forty per cent of 
the population lives under extremely poor conditions, while most other 
Southeast Asian nation states have graded their average GNP figure up 
to 1000 dollars or more (Chia 2003). Because of the extremely poor 
health services, inadequate nutrition and strenuous physical labor 
Cambodians seldom reach an age older than fifty-four years (ibid.: 50), 
whereas most Southeast Asian countries are currently experiencing a 
growth in the proportion of their population of 65 years and older (Hugo 
2003: 108). Health conditions for children in Cambodia are also among 
the worst in the Asia, due to a number of factors including low birth 
weights and diseases such as malaria, diarrhea and dysentery. UNICEF 
studies point out that literacy rates are worrisome in Cambodia as well, 
as seventy per cent of the population is not capable of reading. In 
particular women are denied access to schools, as peasant families prefer 
                                                 
9 This contradicts with the cultural argument of Ovesen and Trankell (2003: 195) that Cambodians favour 
Thai people over Vietnamese.    
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to keep their daughters at home because of the important role they play 
in domestic and household economic activities (UNICEF 2002). 
 
Sadly, the 1970s civil wars still have profound implications for the 
gender, size and age structure of Cambodian families, as many women 
lost their husbands in the Pol Pot working camps and became the sole 
breadwinners of their households. Most of the female-headed households 
can be found in urban areas, because rural women raising their children 
on their own are more likely to lose their land due to poverty, which 
forces them to move to urban areas in search of work.10 As a result of Pol 
Pot’s peasant revolution, fertility rates declined dramatically in the 1970s 
and bounced back with a ‘baby boom’ after peace was restored in the 
1980s. As a consequence the average size of the contemporary family is 
5,4 persons, and fifty per cent of its members are twenty-five years or 
younger (Mekong River Commission 2003: 45-46), an age-size structure 
that is in sharp contrast with the declining fertility rates in other parts of 
Southeast Asia (Hugo 2003:112).  
In many other Southeast Asian economies the state has restructured its 
postcolonial economic space with a sharp increase in the growth of non-
agricultural labor force and the contribution of non-agricultural activities 
to gross domestic product (De Koninck 2003:191-230). Cambodia, 
however, like Laos and Burma still depends heavily on its rural 
                                                 
 
10
 
Officially, however, Cambodia privatized its land system in 1989 and Prime Minister Hun Sen promised 
that all those whose main occupation was agriculture would receive land according to their household size. In 
the last decade, however, significant socio-economic changes such as refugee repatriation, urbanization and 
an increasing population growth changed the composition of stakeholders asking for land titles (Chan and 
Sarthi 2002). Following the law of the market, only people with adequate financial resources and/or political 
access were able to obtain proper land certificates from their respective Cadastral Office. In many areas a 
proper certificate costs up to US$ 300-400, mainly in the form of unofficial payments to officials and 
representatives spread across different departments. Predictably, many Cambodians obtain their land titles 
through lower administrative levels by means of unofficial application receipts, which means that their land 
titles are not necessarily tenable by law.  
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hinterlands with an urbanization rate of ten per cent (Mekong River 
Commission 2003: 48). Whereas farmers in other countries have 
modernized their agricultural equipment and cultivate multiple crops, 
the majority of peasants in Cambodia still ploughs their paddies with ox-
carts and practice a subsistence style of farming. Living conditions for 
the peasants are humble and most of them do not have a latrine, access 
to water or access to commercial energy from the state supplier Electricité 
du Cambodge, which in turn gives them limited opportunities for 
agricultural processing and non-farming activities (Sarthi, Kim, Chap 
and Meady 2003). 
Another factor that limits the non-farming activities of peasants is their 
lack of access to productive land. In Democratic Kampuchea private 
landownership was prohibited, but after the war Cambodian leaders were 
still not eager to privatize plots. In 1989, the government of Cambodia 
officially re-privatized its land and re-distributed small parcels to rural 
households. In practice, however, only about ten per cent of the 
households have been granted ownership certificates and many only 
have temporary certificates. This is mainly due to the land-grabbing 
activities of a small Cambodian upper class in Phnom Penh who are 
eager to buy fertile land as investment for their capital (Chan and Sarthi 
2002). Therefore, Cambodian farmers only have about one hectare per 
household and female-headed households only have half a hectare. In 
comparison, in the 1960s under Sihanouk, the average landholding was 
2.2 hectares with 84 per cent of the households farming on one to six 
hectares. 
Yet, despite the incredible amount of casualties11 and the extremely poor 
human indicators, both economic and political development have moved 
                                                 
11
 
Mortality levels under the Khmer Rouge regime have been the object of an enduring scholarly debate. It is 
widely accepted, though, that most people in the working zones were not killed but died from hunger, 
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on since the ill-fated 1970s (Sjöberg and Sjöholm 2006:495-517). 
Democratic elections have been held, the press is reasonably free, the 
presence of NGOs, both national and international ones, is noticeable, 
foreigners are investing in the economy again and Cambodia has become 
a member of both the ASEAN and World Trade Organization (ibid.). After 
the 1993 elections, held under the auspices of the United Nations 
Transitional Authority (UNTAC), Cambodia also started up a relatively 
successful change from a centrally planned economy into a market-based 
one. From the mid-1990s economic growth climbed, from five per cent in 
1994 to seven percent in 1996, but it fell down drastically again to a 
freezing point due to renewed political unrests in 199712 and the fall of 
the Thai bath during the Asian financial crisis (Sok 2004: 5).  
 
As a consequence of Hun Sen’s 1997 coup d’état, ASEAN suspended 
Cambodia’s membership, the UN declared its seat vacant and foreign 
donors and investors withdrew their personnel and money. Since major 
investments in Cambodia came from the Asia Pacific region and ASEAN, 
the crisis created a ‘credit-crunch’ for Asian entrepreneurs and caused a 
decline in investment (Sokhom 1999:2). To make things worse, the 1997 
Asian crisis also had strong effects on Cambodia’s foreign trade, because 
the crisis devaluated in particular Eastern Asian currencies. This again 
                                                                                                                                                 
overwork and disease. Initially, the death toll of 2 to 3 millions of people presented by the new PRK authorities 
in the 1980s was accepted by UNTAC officials. However, in 1985 Stephen Heder nuanced this figure and 
estimated some 1.5 million deaths. Two years later Ea Meng Try came up with 1 million deaths, a figure that 
is now widely cited by diplomats and journalists (see: Desbarats, J. 1995: 92).      
12 1997 was an extremely violent year in the political arena. On march 31 a grenade was thrown into a group 
of Sam Rainsy supporters demonstrating outside the National Assembly. In July Prime Minister Norodom 
Ranariddh, while being busy closing a peace deal with leftover Khmer Rouge revolutionaries, got attacked by 
the second prime Minister Hun Sen. On 5 July, troops loyal to Hun Sen (CPP party) clashed with those loyal 
to the Prince (Funcinpec party) and heavy fighting erupted on the streets of Phnom Penh. Following Hun Sen’s 
coup in Phnom Penh, remnants of Funcinpec forces formed an alliance with the last of the Khmer Rouge at 
the Thai border. Again, there were serious fights at the Thai border, but Hun Sen’s troops flexed their muscles 
successfully and secured their power take-over in Cambodia. At the moment of writing Samdech Hun Sen is 
still Cambodia’s ‘Strongman’.            
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led to an increase in Cambodia’s import and a drop of its exports 
because the fall of the dollar made it unprofitable to export processed 
products such as timber and rubber to overseas markets (Kao 2000).  
 
Flirting with the Chinese again 
Lacking an indigenous private sector prime minister Hun Sen realized 
that the economy depended heavily on the investments of foreign 
entrepreneurs and visited mainland China in April 2004. That month he 
spent six days visiting Beijing, Shanghai, Hainan and Guangzhou and 
proudly announced that he had signed sixteen agreements with China 
for aid and loans (Asia Times 2005). In the Chinese Cambodian 
newspaper Sin Chew Daily China is mentioned as the largest foreign 
direct investor providing around US$217 million to Cambodia (China 
Daily 2005). Most Chinese investment can be witnessed in the garment 
sector13, which accounts for around 95 per cent of the country’s exports 
and provides employment for 200,000 people in about two hundred 
factories (Falcus and Frost 2003).  
 
Beside the garment factories many Chinese entrepreneurs run electric 
power plants, pharmaceutical factories, cement factories, sugar 
refineries, banks, hospitals, restaurants, hotels, or discos (Frost 2003). 
Stimulated by the new foreign investment law adopted by the National 
Assembly on 4 August 1994,14 Cambodia’s protected export status, its 
cheap working force and perhaps its large ethnic Chinese diaspora 
already controlling the business arena, some 22,000 Chinese 
                                                 
13
  
For a detailed study on the Cambodian garment industry: Derks, A. (2005).   
14 This law on investment guarantees that investors shall be treated in a non-discriminatory manner, except 
for land ownership; that the government shall not undertake a nationalization policy which adversely affects 
private properties of investors; that the government shall not impose price controls on the products or 
services of an investor who has received prior approval from the government; and that the government shall 
permit investors to purchase foreign currencies through the banking system and to remit abroad those 
currencies as payments for imports, repayments on loans, payments of royalties and management fees, profit 
remittances, and repatriation of capital.  
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entrepreneurs landed at Pochentong airport in 1995 alone (cf. Edwards 
2004). During the last decade, Chinese entrepreneurs invested enormous 
sums of money in the Cambodian tourist industry as well, opening up 
hotels, restaurants, karaoke bars and souvenir shops in the 
touristscapes Phnom Penh and Siem Reap (Sok 2004: 29-46). As one of 
the oldest polities in the Southeast Asian region Cambodia can claim a 
rich cultural heritage, in particular thanks to the Angkor Wat temple 
complex. Interestingly, this cultural icon attracts mainly tourists from 
eastern Asian countries such as China, Korea, Taiwan and Japan, 
reaching a peak of one million visitors in the year 2004 (ibid.).   
But despite the flourishing Chinese-controlled garment and tourist 
industries, bilateral and multilateral donors such as the World Bank, 
USAID, Asia Foundation and UNDP watch Hun Sen’s flirtations with 
China with growing suspicion and question the sustainability of these 
foreign investments for long-term economic development (ibid.). In the 
donors’ argument the Chinese garment industry is only located in 
Cambodia because of its favorable export quotas and tax exemptions 
with the United States and the European Union.15 They are skeptical 
about the future of the 200,000 Cambodian textile workers now that the 
WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing has expired in 2005 (ibid.).  
The Chinese-controlled tourist industry is seen as vulnerable as it is 
foreign-managed and closely related to uncontrolled global effects such 
as the outbreak of SARS, the bird flu, terrorist attacks or the Tsunami. 
The donors wonder what will happen to the seventy thousand 
Cambodians working in the tourist sector when the bird flu breaks out 
(ibid.) or if terrorists would bomb a hotel in the touristscape of Siem 
Reap. To develop the economy and provide enough jobs for the enormous 
                                                 
15 The garment industry in Cambodia has greatly benefited from favorable trade agreements with the US and 
the EU such as the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) and the Generalised System Preference (GSP).     
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amount of young newcomers, the foreign experts agree that the 
Cambodian government has to fashion its own economic environment in 
the future, in which domestically rooted industries must create jobs for 
this enormous flow of Cambodian youngsters (ibid.).  
In general UN development reports are rather pessimistic and tend to see 
factories and mechanized forms of agriculture as the only answers to low 
GDP figures and other poor development indicators. From their arrival in 
the 1990s onwards aid organizations and international donors 
overwhelmed Cambodia with reports about its being a poor, traumatized, 
violent, corrupt and bankrupt nation, and offered meta-solutions on how 
to stabilize the country again. However, when the economy continued to 
stagnate and health and education indicators did not improve, the global 
rescuers seemed hurt in an almost narcistic way and passed the 
responsibility back to the Cambodian government again. In a devastating 
Worldbank report (2004) researchers mentioned corruption coupled with 
non-transparent regulations and bureaucratic red tape as the main 
factors that impeded small entrepreneurs in the private sector from 
growing naturally. In the same report they argued that one hundred 
million of donor dollars were not used that year to repair roads or to 
build schools, but instead disappeared into the pockets of the political 
elite. That same year, following the outcomes of this report, a furious 
Worldbank President James Wolffensohn threatened prime minister Hun 
Sen on national television, saying that Cambodia would be withdrawn 
from the donor list if he did not tackle his corruption problems.  
But despite fifteen years of UN rescue operations and billions of dollars of 
aid money, Cambodia remains an ugly duck of ASEAN and excels in 
extreme social-demographic indicators of poverty. It is striking that aid 
organizations do not blame themselves for their poor performances but 
instead keep on blaming the corrupt, feudal and patrimonial practices of 
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the Cambodian government. Also, aid agencies wish to see flourishing 
domestic industries, but at the same time seem to frown when 
witnessing ten people under a house weaving a silk skirt on a wooden 
handloom. Attacking the narrative of Western modernization as the only 
stairway to heaven, Kenneth Pomeranz (2000) argued that the backbone 
of China’s contemporary economic success has always been its labor-
intensive, rural hinterlands. In Chinese versions of modernization rural 
and labor-intensive industries have always accounted for the bulk of 
Chinese economic growth and have always been characteristic signs of 
Chinese development.   
 
Silk weaving: a Cambodian blessing? 
In the dominant discourse silk weavers are considered loyal Khmer 
citizens and devoted Buddhists, who have sat enlightened behind their 
loom from the 12th century onwards. In such kinds of ethnic 
categorizations Cambodia is a rural, all-Khmer and strictly Theravada 
Buddhist nation. Beyond the surface of such neat ethnic categorizations 
however hides a painful reality of foreign hegemonization, civil wars and 
subsequent extremely poor human indicators. From the fall of the 
Angkor empire in the fifteenth century onwards Cambodia has been 
invaded by the Cham, Siamese, Vietnamese and colonized by the French. 
As a consequence the Cambodian subject has had to adapt to many 
codes of conducts and deploys a multi-layered identity.   
 
However, from Cambodia’s independence in 1953 onwards, postcolonial 
governments, undoubtedly traumatized by having been hegemonized for 
such a long period, considered the multi-layered Cambodian subject as a 
burden. The most extreme regime to wash out this hybridity was the 
Maoist-inspired Khmer Rouge. In an iconoclastic fury against the hybrid 
Cambodian subject they eliminated Vietnamese Lon Nol supporters, 
Chinese capitalists, French Sihanouk followers and Cham ethnic 
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minorities. The result of their ‘cultural revolution’ was devastating for the 
physical and emotional infrastructure of Cambodia, and wretchedly, the 
country sank even deeper into its misery than ever before. Tragically, 
beyond the image of Khmer ethnic pride thus hides the reality of a poor 
nation having no confidence in itself at all. Or, as my interpreter once 
commented on this lack of confidence;                            
 
‘What Cambodia is? Just look at the map. It looks like a scared Rabbit. 
That is what we are, scared rabbits.’  
 
Yet, and this is a positive comment I want to make at the end of this 
chapter, although many Cambodians lack confidence in themselves their 
economy is slowly modernizing. Albeit depicted as ‘backward’ by western 
donors and aid organizations, the booming indigenous silk weaving 
industry must be seen as a rural form of modernization. In fact, 
numerous weaving studies in Asia (Arterburn 1982, Frederico 1997, So 
1986, Pomeranz 2000) have shown that labor-intensive rural industries 
are positive signs of development and specific forms of modernity 
produced in relation to domestic and regional forces, moralities and class 
struggles. Far from seeing ten people busy around a loom as a form of 
backwardness and a lack of proper technologies, these scholars have 
pointed out that we must see it as a means to proliferate new products, 
innovate new techniques and a way to conquer new market segments 
(ibid.). Therefore we can listen to the somewhat pessimistic discourses of 
international donors defining Cambodia’s rural, labor-intensive and rent-
seeking economy as a huge impediment for growth, or opt for taking into 
account the more optimistic discourse of Kenneth Pomeranz (2000) who 
argued that labor-intensive and rent-seeking economies can flourish well 
and must perhaps be seen as Asia’s rural answers to western forms of 
urban modernization.    
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Chapter 3 
Weaving Into Cambodia: Deconstruction of a myth 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Both popular and academic scholars have defined the Cambodian silk 
weaving industry as an authentic form of Khmer modernization having 
its roots in the 12th century court of Angkor (Dahles and Zwart 2003; 
Green 2003; Morimoto 1995). In chapter one, however, we have seen that 
Sotheap’s Chinese grandmother taught her silk weaving techniques and 
many other silk weavers also identified themselves as Chinese who had 
‘become’ Khmers (col khmae). As the interview fragments presented below 
imply, too, there is more to outward claims of Khmer ethnic affiliation 
than meets the eye.  
 
Meet Pheach Tot (77) from Prey Chambak village16; 
 
‘I was taught silk weaving by my mother and grandmother. I remember 
very well how they grew mulberry trees in the garden of our house and fed 
silk worms. My mother was koncen (Chinese Cambodian) and my father 
Khmer. My mother never talked about her Chinese descent because she 
was afraid for Maoist spies who had good connections with Mao. I 
remember how my mother once told me (that) if I ever had to escape I had 
to go to Malaysia, because Chinese have a good living there. Every August 
my mother celebrated saen kbal tuk (The Hungry Ghost festival) and in 
April, during Cheng Ming, she worshipped her ancestors at our family 
                                                 
Interview, 16 December 2004  
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grave just outside the village. She never worshipped Khmer New Year, 
only Chinese New Year. I do celebrate Khmer New Year and Phcum Ben, 
too’.   
 
Meet Seng Leang Chou (64) from Chum Baik village:17 
 
‘I was taught silk weaving by my mother. My mother did not raise silk 
worms herself but bought silk yarn in Kampot Province. There were many 
silk reelers there, they were Chinese people. My mother was a Khmer 
yeung18, just like every other silk weaver in the village. Yes, we are all like 
that. During Pol Pot I was never afraid for my Chinese descent, because 
Pol Pot only killed rich people, not poor people like me’.   
 
Meet Leam Sinith (58) from Veal Village:19    
 
‘My mother was a silk weaver and my father a farmer. They were Chinese 
and also spoke a Chinese dialect. I do not know that language, they never 
taught me that, because that was too dangerous. My mother was very 
busy and often helped my father in the fields. In her spare time she wove 
sampot hol and taught me how to weave them, too. My mother bought silk 
yarn from a woman in Toul Rolork nearby mount Chisor. She is now the 
owner of the Neary Khmer silk shop. Before Pol Pot my parents only 
celebrated Chinese festivals and during the Lon Nol period I often wore 
Chinese clothes, a Chinese shirt, a black farmer’s pants and a sampot hol. 
I still wear a sampot hol and a Chinese shirt, but I do not know very much 
about the Chinese culture anymore’.  
                                                 
17 Interview, December 2004 
18 In Cambodia ethnic Chinese sometimes also identify themselves as ‘Khmer yeung’, meaning ‘we Khmers’. 
According to Penny Edwards (2003) they want to show their affinity with Cambodia and Cambodian society 
this way.   
19 Interview, November 2004 
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Meet Chea Rot (66) from Krang Phnum village:20 
 
‘When I was a kid my grandparents never talked about their Chinese 
background. I knew they came from China, but did not know why they left 
China. My mother told me they were afraid that I would talk about their 
background and betray them. I do have a picture of my grandfather 
wearing an army uniform. He died during Pol Pot. One day I went to the 
Chinese textile factories in Phnom Penh and showed the manager the 
picture. The manager told me I could be very proud of him because he had 
a high position in the army’. 
 
This chapter aims at answering the first research question: ‘Under which 
diasporic conditions did Chinese silk traders and weavers transplant 
their business to Cambodia’? In so doing, I will first deconstruct the 
grand Khmer narrative and counter the wish of many national and global 
stakeholders that ethnic Khmers have been in possession of dying and 
silk weaving techniques already from the Angkorean period onwards. In 
fact, precisely because Khmer women did not possess ikat silk weaving 
techniques, Chinese silk weavers were able to fill this market niche and 
establish themselves along the Cambodian riverbanks.  
 
In migration studies, rather abstract notions such as population 
pressure, land scarcity and colonialism are normally depicted as movers 
of Chinese migration (Kuhn 2006:163-172). This gives the impression 
that the early Chinese immigrants were naïve opportunity seekers, who 
after having arrived in a new host land, looked around what to do and 
started a whatever so arbitrary business. But as Philip Kuhn (2006:167) 
has noted, late imperial China was mainly a crowded, commercially 
vibrant society in which families were conditioned for centuries to 
                                                 
20 Interview November 2004 
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respond to various kinds of opportunities and niches. Millions of Chinese 
families transplanted their businesses across the border, and the 
institutions they created to handle these activities were the sojourner’s 
guilds, the branch temples, the secret societies and the revenue farms 
(ibid.:167). These institutions not only functioned as social welfare nets 
for immigrants, but also as vacancy banks informing co-villagers about 
niches on the mainland. This way the silk weavers in Southwest China 
learned that the urban Khmer elite was desperately looking for a new silk 
dress in the late nineteenth century and that French silk industrials 
sought for skilled silk reelers and weavers twenty years later.  
 
By describing under what pre-colonial and colonial conditions the 
Cantonese silk weavers transplanted their business into Cambodia, this 
chapter provides a description of the ways in which the sampot hol  
transformed into an authentic symbol of Khmer ethnic pride. Colonial 
theorists took a rather negative position and depicted the sampot hol as a 
false French imagination interpreting it as a product of the Angkor 
Khmers (Edwards 1999; Muan 2001). Like the French colonists, however, 
these scholars did not recognize the involvement of the Chinese. 
Following the insights of Antonio Gramsci (1971), Chantal Mouffe (1979, 
2000) and Ernesto Laclau (1977, 1990) this chapter argues that the 
marginal position of the ethnic Chinese in the cultural domain must not 
be seen as a burden, but as a ‘winning hegemony’ (Gramsci 1971) of the 
Khmer and Chinese elite, who both had, and still have, very good reasons 
to depict the sampot hol as authentic Khmer.    
 
The origin myth of the ‘sampot hol’ 
By far the most comprehensive work written on the Cambodian silk 
weaving industry comes from the Australian textile scholar Gillian Green. 
On several occasions (Green 2003, 2004) she argues that Khmer women 
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have always woven silk sampot on simple backstrap looms and that 
Khmer kings imported wider and patterned silk clothes from Siam and 
India. Comparing traditional Indian clothes with Khmer costumes on the 
Angkorean bass reliefs, Green (2004: 23-24) argues that the Khmer elite 
derived both weaving techniques and finished textiles from India. While 
Chinese sourced silk clothes were most likely available to the Khmers, 
Chinese costume styles as visualized on the walls of Angkor were not 
adopted by the Khmers.  
 
Although it is true that woven textiles from Gujurat, the Coromandal 
Coast and Bengal were in great demand by the wealthy Southeast Asian 
elite in these days, Anthony Reid (1988: 90-96) has argued that Chinese 
textiles were greatly wanted all over Southeast Asia. Reid also explained 
that the Indians were mostly famous for their cotton woven textiles and 
the Chinese for their silk woven sampot (ibid.: 93). The textile expert 
Michael Howard (cf. 1999) argues that Chinese silks were imported to 
Cambodia in ancient times, but only in limited quantities for elite use, 
and shared a market that included a large amount of cloth woven by 
neighboring Cham. 
 
Moreover, why should early Khmer kings not accept a Chinese costume? 
Khmer kings accepted foreign commodities as long as these would 
strengthen their position as chacravartin (ruler of the world)21. This was 
because the ‘temporary’ status of Khmer rulers, as reincarnations of 
Shiva, was based on a worldview that another ruler with more karma in 
store could easily take in his divine position at any moment. As a 
consequence early Southeast Asian kings were eager to earn merit to 
strengthen their position as chacravartin and grabbed all possible trade 
                                                 
21 Martin Stuart Fox (2003) has argued that six Funanese embassies were sent to China during the third 
century CE to promote trade, particularly in Chinese luxury products such as silk clothing and regalia 
desired as status symbols by Southeast Asian elites to legitimize their power. 
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contacts and commodities to please, feed and dress their subjects (cf. 
Stuart-Fox 2003; Reid 1988). In addition, early Khmer rulers borrowed 
from India their statecraft principles and a Sanskrit text, the Arthasastra 
explains that neighboring kingdoms, in Cambodia’s case Siam and 
Annam, should always be distrusted as potential enemies, while enemies 
of enemies, in this case Malaysia and China, should be treated as 
friends. Therefore, would it make any sense to argue that Khmer rulers 
only accepted Indian textiles and closed their border for the import of 
Chinese textiles, notably the largest textile supplier in the region?  
 
Sericulture in ‘The Dark Age’ of Cambodia 
If we presume that the Khmer kings only imported silk clothes from India 
and closed their borders for Chinese sampot, does that mean they 
adopted silk weaving techniques from the Indians as well? Although it is 
true that the Khmers borrowed from India their religion, language and 
statecraft principles, this does not imply that they also borrowed all other 
things. While Gillian Green suggests that Khmer women adopted silk 
weaving techniques from the Indians, she could not strengthen her case 
with drawings on bass reliefs of Khmer women sitting behind a weaving 
loom, and found only one written account of 12th century Chinese 
emissary Zhou Daguan, about a Khmer Leou22 woman weaving a sampot 
on an archaic backstrap loom. Surprisingly enough, Green fails to 
mention a very explicit observation of the same Chinese emissary that 
the Khmers at that time were not able to raise mulberry plants at all and 
lacked techniques to weave silk sampot (Daguan 1993 [1297]). Michael 
Howard (1999) argues that the Khmer learned to weave sampot from 
Cham and Tai speaking people settling in Khmer territory (ibid.).  
 
                                                 
22 Khmer Leou  is an umbrella term for all kinds of hill tribe people in Cambodia. 
Weaving into Cambodia 
 
 83
In establishing an ethnic linkage between contemporary weavers and the 
Angkor Court, Gillian Green (2003) fails to consider the impact of the 
extremely violent pre-colonial context of Cambodia. Like all other 
followers of the main discourse, she holds the 1970s civil wars 
responsible for the destruction of the silk weaving industry. However, 
these advocates Khmer roots of contemporary silk weaving do not take 
into consideration that Cambodia has been a battlefield since the twelfth 
century and that Khmer kings mobilized thousands of Khmer warriors 
yearly to protect their kingdom against foreign intrusion. In pre-modern 
days Khmer greatness was mostly based on territorial conquest and a 
narcistic commemoration of past glory in the shape of monuments 
(SarDesai 1997:30). At its peak the Angkor Empire extended from the tip 
of the Indochinese peninsula northward into Yunnan and westward from 
Vietnam as far as the Bay of Bengal (Acharaya 2000).  
 
Prior to the French protectorate in 1863, periods and zones of peace were 
an exception in Cambodia and Khmer kings continually had to mobilize 
over a hundred thousand men to protect their kingdom, which in 
practice was the majority of the male population (Tarling 1992: 461-2). If 
the wars went badly and the odds were against the families at home, 
rivaling armies could bring enormous damage to the paddies, poultry, 
cattle, and agricultural equipment, and usually burned down every 
village (ibid.). How could households with husbands and sons always on 
duty ever set up an extremely labor-intensive enterprise such as silk 
weaving? How could pre-modern Khmer women, often widows with young 
children, cultivate paddies, raise their children, clean the house, prepare 
food, cultivate mulberry trees, reel silk yarn, spin the yarn on wheels, 
prepare the warp table and weave sampot on their own?     
     
Moreover, while pre-modern discourses emphasize mythical stories and 
often mention nothing about their material base, mulberry plants had to 
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be cultivated, raw silk had to be reared and silk sampot had to be woven 
on looms. As I will indicate in the next chapter silk rearing and weaving 
is an extremely labor-intensive job and one needs a lot of productive 
hands around to get it done. To cultivate mulberry trees for instance, one 
needs to be skilled to cultivate them on dikes and irrigate them during 
the dry season. Although the mulberry tree is not a very demanding tree, 
it does take a full year to grow, which means it must survive the 
monsoon rains and the extreme heat during the dry season. Although it 
has been observed that Khmer farmers cultivated multiple crops and 
Khmer kings built impressive water reservoirs, agronomists in the 1980s 
challenged the view that the multiple crops witnessed by the Chinese 
emissary Zhou Daguan were the result of the highly celebrated 
Angkorian irrigation system. In Van Liere’s opinion for example, these 
reservoirs did not help but instead hindered the drainage of water 
towards the fields and led to the degradation of soils, the leaching and 
deprivation of the required nutrients, the silting up of reservoirs and the 
deforestation of slopes (in: Mabbet and Chandler 1995: 152). From his 
perspective, multi-cropping - including the cultivation of mulberry trees - 
could not be the result of an advanced Khmer irrigation system23.  
 
Another argument levied against the multiple-crop version of the 
irrigation hypothesis is the supposedly centrally managed Angkorian 
scheme to grow multiple crops, while there was plenty of land available 
for the much more common and effective ‘slash and burn’ agricultural 
system (in: Mabbet and Chandler 1995: 153). Unlike in the 
overpopulated deltas in Vietnam and China, however, there was plenty of 
                                                 
23 It must be stated though that since the 1990s French, Australian, and Cambodian archeological teams 
have countered Van Liere’s irrigation thesis. Using traditional methods such as ground survey in conjunction 
with advanced remote-sensing applications, these research teams came to the conclusion Angkor did have an 
advanced irrigation system that made possible multiple cropping. See: Evans et al  (2007).    
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land available in Cambodia (see also: Fischer 1964)24. That makes one 
wonder why Khmer farmers would build dikes and irrigation systems to 
cultivate multiple crops, while they could easily avoid this time-
consuming and labor-intensive farming system by simply cultivating 
other plots next door? Therefore, taking into account the critique on the 
working of Angkor’s irrigation system, and the fact that plenty of land 
was available for the more common ‘slash and burn’ farming system, the 
question can be raised how mulberry trees could ever have been 
cultivated by the Khmer at all.  
 
Sericulture in ‘The Age Of Commerce’ 
As for the modern period (1500-1850), Gillian Green (2003: 45) mentions 
that no single sampot survived the courts of Angkor and that information 
about silk weaving in Cambodia is hard to find. Again, this is only partly 
true, because she fails to analyze existing sources about the 
unavailability of silk yarn and clothes in Cambodia. In the ‘Age of 
Commerce’ (1450-1680), Cambodia, like many other Southeast Asian 
states, moved its capital from inland Angkor to riverine Phnom Penh, due 
to the arrival of the Ming fleets, and even emerged as one of the 
flourishing port polities in mainland Southeast Asia (cf. Ishii 1998). 
During this period traders peddled textiles, silk yarn and dye-stuff to 
Southeast Asian ports, because of the demand for silver, luxury 
agricultural goods such as pepper, cloves, nutmeg, sugar, and benzoic, 
and forest products such as deerskin, sandalwood, sappanwood, 
camphor and lac (Reid 1993: 32). 
 
Especially during the reign of Yongle (1402-1424) an impressive number 
of fleets dispatched from the Chinese coastal areas to Southeast Asian, 
                                                 
24 Charles Fisher (1964) also outlined in this book that the Khmers lacked irrigations skills in the pre-modern 
era. 
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Indian, Persian and even African countries, transporting hundreds of 
thousands of Chinese merchants (Stuart-Fox 2003:80). Anticipating the 
arrival of the Chinese junk traders it became much more strategic and 
lucrative for the Cambodian king to move his palace southwards. Hence, 
the capital of Cambodia, Phnom Penh, like other capitals in Southeast 
Asia came to be organized on the basin of a large river or groups of 
rivers, located at a point where kings could control the movement of 
Chinese people and goods and levy taxes on their products (cf. Stuart-
Fox 2003; Vickery 2004).  
 
The real peak in Chinese maritime textile trade is often ascribed to one 
brave admiral, Zheng He, a Muslim eunuch still deified by ethnic Chinese 
in Cambodia as ‘Sanbaogong’, which literally means ‘The Three Jewel 
Lord’ (Edwards 2003: 16). At the time of his arrival in Cambodia Phnom 
Penh was a constantly busy thoroughfare thronged with the comings and 
goings of foreign merchants. The Chinese constituted there, as 
everywhere, the most active and commercially shrewd, if not the most 
numerous, ethnic group (Igout 1993: 5-6). For this reason Phnom Penh, 
like many other Southeast Asian port cities, enclosed real Chinatowns 
inhabited by Chinese merchants (huashang) and their workers, often co-
villagers.  
 
One century later, Chinese silk yarn and other consumption goods were 
also imported through Ha Tien, a Chinese-ruled port polity situated in 
the Southern province of Kampot. This harbor is said to have been the 
place where Cantonese merchants sold their silk yarn directly to the local 
population, often fellow ethnics (Chin 2004: 63), so that in Chinese 
Cambodian folklore this harbor came to be known as ‘Tuk Meas’ (‘The 
Golden Boat’), referring to the off-loading of Chinese merchandise in 
return for cargos of gold (Edwards 2003:8). Not only in Cambodia, but all 
over Southeast Asia, foreign imported silk yarn came to replace the local 
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production. This to the satisfaction of the local silk weavers, because silk 
yarn production is a slow and tedious job (see chapter four) and the 
availability of commercial silk yarn gives them the possibility to increase 
their silk weaving production.   
 
Far away from the gazing eyes of the Chinese authorities, Ha Tien 
became a mainland Chinese harbor for Cantonese and non-Cantonese 
merchants under the leadership of another great sailor, captain Mac Cuu 
(Chin 2004: 63). Establishing regular trade relationships with many 
southern Chinese ports and Western merchants, Mac Cuu and later his 
son Mac Thien Thu provided a growing local Chinese community in 
Cambodia with all kinds of everyday consumption goods and raw 
materials such as lacquer ware, silk goods and dye-stuff. On their 
missions the Mac Cuu lineage bought local Cambodian products such as 
betel nut, tin, blackwood, nutmeg, clove, deerskin, dried shrimps, rattan, 
pepper and sappanwood (ibid.). This way they managed to build such 
great wealth and fame in Cambodia that Mac Cuu was appointed 
provincial governor of Kampot province by the Khmer king (ibid.).  
 
The observation that Chinese silk yarn and other luxury goods were 
imported to co-ethnics in Cambodia seems to point at the existence of a 
foreign weaving industry and questions the availability of Cambodian-
produced silk yarn. The non-existence of a Cambodian silk yarn industry 
becomes even more explicit in trade reports of Chinese junk traders to 
the then-ruling Japanese Tokugawa Shogunate (1603-1868) (Ishii 1998: 
2). The Japanese historian Yoneo Ishii (ibid.) argued that the Tokugawa 
rulers, fearing the spread of Catholic faith into their country, forbade 
Western merchants, often Christians, to enter their country and trade 
with them. But despite their xenophobic stance against Catholicism 
(ibid.), the Tokugawa rulers made systematic efforts to collect political 
and market information, allowing Chinese junk traders and some VOC 
Weaving into Cambodia 
 
 88
ships to enter the port of Nagasaki. The Tokugawa rulers expected 
reports from the Chinese merchants about the activities of anti-Manchu 
rebel groups in and around the Chinese empire, and the political and 
economic situation of remote polities such as nowadays Thailand, 
Indonesia and Cambodia (ibid.).  
 
Although Cambodia was in a state of complete disorder with kings, ex-
kings and princes bidding for the support of Siam or Hue, it nevertheless 
attracted some thirty-seven junk traders over forty-four years to procure 
cargoes for the Japanese market, making it one of the most important 
Southeast Asian ports (ibid.:154-5). Between 1641 and 1663, during the 
reign of Cambodia’s only Muslim King, Raja Ibrahim, Cambodia even 
surpassed Siam in the dispatching of junks to Nagasaki, and offered an 
alternative to Siam25 for the procurement of sappanwood and deer hide, 
both in great demand on the Japanese market. And thanks to its regular 
trade with Guangnan (Cochinchina) it could furthermore provide 
Tonkinese raw silk to the Chinese merchants, which was also highly 
valued in Japan (Cooke and Li 2004).26 But many Chinese trade reports 
contain the message that raw silk was not produced in Cambodia, 
deconstructing the discourse of the existence of an ancient Khmer 
sericulture tradition.   
 
                                                 
25 At that time Siam was at war with the Burmese. 
26 Cooke and Li (2004) wrote extensively about this Vietnam-Cambodia trade, which was dominated by 
Vietnamese and Chinese traders.  
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Table 1: Chinese junks from Southeast Asian ports to Japan (1651-1724)  
 
Period Tongking Hoi An Cambodia Siam 
1651-1660 15 40 37 28 
1661-1670 6 43 24 26 
1671-1680 41 10 26 38 
1681-1690 12 25 9 31 
1691-1700 6 29 22 19 
1701-1710 3 12 1 1 
1711-1720 2 5 1 4 
1721-1724  4 1 2 
Total 52 199 106 147 
   Source: Reid (1993:18)  
 
Reports of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century British and French 
merchants confirm the non-existence of a Cambodian sericulture 
industry and reveal that raw silk was only produced in the Vietnamese 
Red River delta, but not further south in Cochinchina27 and Cambodia. 
The English merchant Quarles Brown, for instance, set up an import-
export company for the East India Company at Lovec (near present-day 
Phnom Penh), not because war-stricken Cambodia was an interesting 
manufacturing site, but as a kind of ‘second Canton’, in order to buy 
unlimited amounts of Tonkinese and Chinese raw silk (Lamb 1970: 28).  
 
The French silk merchant Pierre Poivre (Li and Reid 1993) observed how 
the lower Mekong region was an interesting stopping place to buy 
Tonkinese, Chinese and Japanese silk, but not an attractive production 
area itself. Coming from a wealthy silk merchant family from Lyon, Pierre 
Poivre, like many other French merchants, first arrived in Cochinchina 
as a novice with the French Société des Missions-Étrangères. But after 
having left the mission station he started to pick up his old trade 
profession and peddled silk yarn with merchants in Canton and Macau. 
Next, a war broke out between China and France and Poivre lost an arm 
                                                 
27 Cochinchina was the name of the seventeenth-century territory comprising present-day Southern Vietnam. 
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and wrote his ‘Memoirs about Cochinchina’ for the East India Company 
in 1744. These memoirs reveal that Poivre was very satisfied with the 
climatological possibilities for mulberry planting and the quality of silk 
yarn in Cochinchina, but that the Cochinchinese, like the Cambodians, 
lacked skills to reel it and did not know how to prepare natural dyes 
(ibid.).  
 
Again a century later, we find an even more specific account from a 
British cartographer, John Crawfurd (1822), who observed that Tonkin 
and Annam were important silk producing areas and that the only region 
not producing silk yarn in Indochina was Kamboja (in: Lamb 1970: 260).  
 
Finally, reports exist from the Vietnamese emperor Minh Mang about the 
deficient sericulture techniques of the Khmers. In the 1840s the Khmer 
court was strongly divided with kings, ex-kings and princes 
indiscriminately paying their tributes to the Chakri dynasty (in Siam) and 
the Hue court (in modern Vietnam) (Hall 1981:459-466). The two 
Cambodian neighbors were at daggers drawn with each other with the 
aim to incorporate Cambodia, and eventually the Western provinces of 
Battambang and Angkor fell into the hands of the Siamese, and the 
eastern provinces of Kampot, Takeo, Kandal and Prey Veng were 
‘assimilated’ by the Hue court. After having incorporated eastern 
Cambodia into Vietnamese territory Minh Mang changed the name of the 
region around Phnom Penh into Tran Tay (‘Western Commandery’) and 
remapped Cambodia into thirty-three provinces all carrying Vietnamese 
names (ibid.). However, Minh Mang had more in mind than merely 
conquering a few neighboring provinces; he also wanted to integrate the 
‘barbaric’ Khmers into the civilized ‘Confucian’ world (Chanda 1986: 51). 
A nineteenth-century Vietnamese general even described Minh Mang’s 
civilization mission as the policy of ‘slowly eating silk worms’, pointing at 
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the Vietnamese appetite for eating silk worms and obviously the Khmers’ 
dislike of this habit. In order to teach the Khmers how ‘to eat silk worms’, 
Minh Mang resettled Tonkinese farmers from the overpopulated Red 
River delta into the newly gained Cambodian territory to teach them the 
Vietnamese language and hairdressing, and how to reel silk yarn (Beck 
2004; Chandler 1993).     
  
The arrival of the Cantonese silk weavers 
Previously, we have seen how Chinese and European merchants looked 
for silk yarn in Cambodia in vain and how the Vietnamese emperor Minh 
Mang settled Tonkinese silk farmers in eastern Cambodia ‘to teach 
Khmers how to eat silk worms’, illustrating the non-existence of an 
indigenous silk industry in Cambodia. However, not one of these 
observations explains the Chinese roots of contemporary silk weavers, or 
makes clear why the contemporary silk weaving industry has Chinese 
roots instead of Khmer ones. The Pol Pot regime was often mentioned by 
silk weavers as an important stopping place for oral history, as the 
parents and grandparents of the weavers did their utmost to hide their 
Chinese identity, while secretly passing on their Chinese language skills. 
Many silk weavers explained that in the 1975-78 Pol Pot working villages 
it was extremely dangerous to exhibit any other than a Khmer peasant 
identity, as it could be a reason to get killed.  
 
To understand where the ancestors of Sotheap came from and why they 
migrated to Cambodia we cannot rely on the oral histories of 
contemporary silk weavers but must travel back into the history of the 
nineteenth-century Southern Chinese weaving regions Shunde, Nanhai 
and Hsiangshan. These territories were the cradles of silk weaving in 
nineteenth-century China and most likely the places where the ancestors 
of the Cambodian silk weavers originally came from. In the mid-
eighteenth century the southern Chinese silk districts were by far the 
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largest silk regions in China, and mulberry trees grew there as far as the 
eye could see. The American anthropologists Howard and Bushwell 
(1925), cited in So (1986: 78), mentioned that 1,440,000 of the total 
number of 1,800,000 farmers in Shunde County alone were engaged in 
some phase of sericulture and mulberry planting. The Shunde county 
silk farmers cultivated their paddies in Guandong province near the port 
of Canton, which formed part of an excellent water transport system. To 
prevent their mulberry trees from flooding, large ponds were dug and the 
excavated soil was thrown around the ponds to raise the ground level. 
These elevated plots were known as ‘sang-chi’ (‘polders’) and were planted 
with mulberries, while fish was grown in the ponds. This created a 
brilliant ecological system, as the fishponds supplied fertilizer for the 
mulberry trees and the mulberry leaves in turn furnished food for the 
fish and enabled the mulberry planters to harvest mulberry leaves three 
or even four times a year (ibid.: 85).  
 
The mulberry polders annex fishponds were not the property of the 
mulberry farmers and silk yarn reelers, but were leased from the local 
gentry class. There are some contradictory definitions on what a gentry-
class entails. Marxist scholars see the gentry class as an economic group 
that owns land and collects rent as a form of livelihood. Alvin So 
(1986:85-88) also sees the gentry class as an educated status group or a 
group of people who hold important positions in the imperial 
bureaucracy and exercise political influence. Studying a silk district in 
Southwest China he observed that the gentry class aspired to a status of 
‘gentry–merchants’, combining pursuits in Confucian education, degree-
seeking and commerce (ibid.). But while the gentry merchants in Shunde 
county owned the polder farms, they chose not to interfere in the silk 
production, which means that the management of the silk labor process 
was entirely in the hands of the peasant class (ibid.). To attract farmers 
to cultivate mulberry trees on their plots the gentry-merchants provided 
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credit for mulberry seedlings and silkworm-rearing instruments such as 
baskets, spinning racks and chopping knives, and sent silkworm-rearing 
teachers. By means of the so-called ‘petty-producer path’ the gentry-
merchants got rich collecting rents from the mulberry plots and the 
mulberry leaf markets they owned (ibid.). These markets were only open 
for Cantonese wholesaler guilds and a no-go area for foreign merchants.  
 
In ‘On Colonialism’ Karl Marx (1972) illustrates how the Chinese 
government appointed Cantonese merchant guilds (cong hongs) to trade 
with foreign merchants, and limited the export of raw silk with 140 piculs 
per vessel. The Cantonese merchants purchased raw silk and textiles 
from the silk markets in the Pearl River delta and had organized 
themselves into guilds and associations (cong hongs) based on native 
place relationships. Some of the cong hong guild members were 
specialized to trade with European merchants, others to trade with 
northern Chinese ports and again others to trade with mainland 
Southeast Asian ports (ibid.). Although foreign merchants had export 
firms in Canton, these became the property of the cong hong merchant 
guilds, preventing them from leaving the factories and entering the public 
markets in Canton. The trade of Chinese silk yarn to the foreign 
merchants was further limited by price monopolies imposed by the 
Cantonese merchant guilds, which foreign merchants had to accept 
without objection (ibid.).  
 
Although most profit went into the pockets of the gentry class, life for the 
silk peasants was fairly good in those days. Spinners in the Pearl River 
delta could earn thirty to fifty per cent over the cost of raw materials, 
while spinners, who also wove silk clothes, could expect to make a profit 
of 300 per cent (Cliver 2004: 5). However, a number of national and 
global events caused a decline in the livelihoods of the Southern Chinese 
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silk farmers from the beginning of the nineteenth century onwards, and 
led to their exodus to Southeast Asia. First, market conditions worsened 
and competition became fierce during the reigns of the Jiaquing (1796) 
and Daoguang (1821-1850), when the global price of raw silk increased 
dramatically and affected the net incomes of both the weavers and 
spinners (ibid.: 6). As net profits fell and markets shrank, silk merchants 
began to withdraw from the silk trade and rural households started to 
weave for their own consumption.  
 
The development of other silk regions in Central China (Guizhou, 
Shaanxi and Hubei) also had a negative effect on the strong market 
position of the silk farmers in the Pearl River delta (ibid.). The loss of the 
First Opium War (1841-2) resulted in the opening up of other treaty ports 
such as Shanghai and the cede of Qing control over the imperial custom 
administration. In Shanghai, British and French merchants could set up 
their own factories and trade with silk farmers in the Central Chinese 
hinterlands without the interference of the old ‘cong hong’ system in 
Canton (So 1986: 63). Subsequently, the silk regions around Shanghai 
(Chekiang and Kiangsu) became the new cradle of silk production in 
China, which led to enormous amounts of unemployed silk peasants and 
traders in the Pearl River delta (ibid.: 64).  
 
Another devastating factor for the livelihoods of the silk farmers was 
formed by the military conflicts and violent uprisings during the Qing 
dynasty in the nineteenth century, which plagued the silk trade and 
reduced agricultural production. The Red Turban Rebellion (1851-1864) 
for instance resulted in an estimated twenty million deaths, devastating 
the silk-producing villages along the Pearl River delta (ibid.). Towards the 
end of their reign the Red Turban rulers also ordered their soldiers to cut 
down the mulberry trees, a catastrophe for the Pearl River 
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sericulturalists (ibid.). To make things worse, the low-lying mulberry 
plots also became subject to severe floodings, a direct result of the lack of 
repair of the embankments after the peasant rebellion (ibid.: 82-83).   
 
The politically and economically turbulent 1850s, caused by the Opium 
Wars and internal peasant rebellions, led to an exodus of Cantonese silk 
merchants, landowners and silk spinners to mainland Southeast Asia 
(ibid.: 195). Examining Pearl River genealogies, especially those from 
Shunde County and Nanhai, Steven B. Miles (2006: 220-246) pointed out 
that many families from this region had sent sojourners both upriver 
along the West river basin, and abroad to Vietnam and elsewhere in 
Southeast Asia, already during the Ming period (1368-1644). Miles 
argued that the core delta counties of Nanhai and Shunde, and to a 
lesser extent Dongguan, Panyu, and Xinhui were the main migrant 
departures, an observation that corresponds with William Willmott’s 
analyses of the Cambodian silk weaving regions.  
 
Examining almost six thousand Cantonese gravestones, twenty per cent 
mentioned the silk weaving regions Shunde and Nanhai as the birthplace 
(Willmott 1967: 20). Notwithstanding the fact that many graves did not 
specify any places of origin and that many silk farmers probably could 
not afford a grave stone (ibid.), this might indicate that some one 
thousand Cantonese silk spinners, weavers (often the same person) and 
traders came from the Southern Chinese counties Shunde and Nanhai, 
weaving themselves literally and metaphorically into Cambodia. 
According to Howard (1999), these Chinese played no role in the origin of 
ikat silk weaving techniques in Cambodia, as they adopted the weft ikat 
technique from Tai speaking people and used a Malay type of frame loom 
to weave textiles such as the sampot hol and the phamung. 
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Table 2: Cantonese in Cambodia by place of origin 
 
 District Perc. of  
5605 
gravestones 
Nanhai 
San-shui 
Dong-guan 
Hua-xian 
Xin-hui 
Bao-an 
Shunde 
Zhong-shan 
Hao-shan 
Pan-yu 
Yao-ming 
Kai-ping 
Tan-shan 
Zheng-chen 
Si-hui  
Qing-yan 
 
 
 
15 
13 
11 
11 
11 
7 
5 
6 
5 
5 
3 
3 
3 
1 
1 
1 
Source: Willmott, W. (1967) 
 
Thus, far away from the violent, poor and overpopulated Pearl River 
delta, the Shunde County silk breeders and weavers established ‘new’ 
mulberry plots in Cambodia, along the rivers Tonle Sap, Mekong and 
Bassac. Crucial were their former patrons, the Cantonese silk merchants 
and landowners, who recognized this demand for silk clothes and 
decided to invest in overseas mulberry ventures and to transnationalize 
their silk enterprises into Cambodia. It was relatively easy for the 
Cantonese silk merchants to start over in Cambodia again, because 
landlordism had never existed and 95 per cent of the Khmer peasants did 
not own more land than they could cultivate themselves28. Familiar with 
land scarcity, overpopulation and landlordism the Cantonese silk 
                                                 
28 This was also because prior to 1904 land was owned by the king and there had always been plenty of 
uncultivated land available to prevent the development of an active land market. 
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merchants must have been stunned by the availability of land and the 
lack of indigenous competition and seized the opportunity to lease 
thousands of hectares of mulberry plots from the king and restore their 
prestige as a powerful landlord class along the riverbanks of the Mekong.   
 
Map 1: Migration patterns Cantonese silk entrepreneurs to Cambodia  
  
 
 
 
The arrival of the silk merchants, spinners and weavers brought along a 
change in dress styles and the introduction of Chinese garments such as 
black pants, white sleeved shirts and the patterned sampot hol (cf. Muan 
and Daravuth 2003). The Cantonese dress makers arrived just at the 
right moment because the Khmer had been attacked for centuries by 
Vietnamese and Thai troops and their mighty kingdom, Angkor, had 
shrunk into a tiny and war-stricken vassal state (Hall 1981:459-466). 
During this downfall there had been little time, space and peace for 
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Cambodian families to produce a weaving culture themselves. Under 
continuous attack by foreign powers, losing their husbands on the 
battlefields, it must have been impossible for Khmer women to grow 
mulberries, feed the worms, reel the silk yarn and weave silk clothes 
themselves, even if they had the skills.  
 
Lacking sericulture skills and a high dress culture themselves the Khmer 
elite adopted the sampot hol from the Cantonese silk weavers, who in 
turn recognized a good business deal. Chased away by Red Turban 
rebels and British merchants from their previous silk districts (cf. So 
1986) the Cantonese silk elite had ambitions to start over again in 
Cambodia and was in need of land titles, officialdom degrees and most 
importantly, customers, to start up profitable silk enterprises again. The 
Khmer elite was willing to meet the Cantonese demands because, as 
liberated Khmers, they needed a symbol to mark their national 
independence. At stake was thus the establishment of a ‘winning 
hegemony’ (Gramsci 1971) in which the Khmer elite, as customers, got 
their much-wanted identity and the economic Cantonese elite, as 
producers, was provided with the opportunity to continue their silk 
businesses again. Not much later French observers witnessed how the 
Khmer aristocracy, like the Chinese gentry class, dressed themselves in a 
silken checkered sampot hol (cf. Edwards 1999, 2001). And in the 1870s 
king Norodom was portrayed in a silken sampot hol, illustrating that the 
Royal House had come to appreciate the silk sampot hol as an important 
dress (ibid.). The sampot hol as a Khmer elite symbol was born.  
 
The arrival of French silk industrials 
Just after the arrival of the Southern Chinese silk entrepreneurs French 
explorers came to Indochina to research, among others, the possibilities 
to obtain silk yarn from China. The procurement of Chinese silk yarn 
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was also of crucial importance to French silk industrials because the 
once-flourishing French sericulture industry had just been hit by a very 
serious disease called ‘pebrine’, which had ravaged the livelihoods of the 
ca. 70,000 silk farmers in Lyon (Frederico 1997: 30). To make things 
worse the disease could not be cured and the only way to minimize the 
risk for the French silk raisers was to buy silk eggs from non-disease-
stricken areas such as China, Japan and Indochina (ibid.). Not 
surprisingly, especially the Lyon business magnates enthusiastically 
supported the conquest of Indochina as a backdoor route to China 
(Andrew and Kanya-Forstner 1976: 981).  
 
At the end of the nineteenth century French naval officers explored a 
direct river trade route from Cambodia to the ‘soft underbelly’ of 
Southern China, with the aim to transform Indochina into a universal 
warehouse in between China and France (cf. Garnier 2000 [1884]). 
However, to the great disappointment of French naval officers such as 
Francis Garnier and Henri Mouhot, they could not cross the Khone 
waterfalls in Northern Cambodia and realized that Phnom Penh would 
never become the ‘Singapore of Indochina’ (cf. Osborne 1969). As a 
consequence, the commercial ambitions of the French industrials to 
compete with European and Chinese powers in Indochina were 
exchanged for protectionist policies, and France became the first western 
power to implement custom duties (Andrew and Kanya-Forstner 1976).  
 
After the French had established a Protectorate over Cambodia in 1863 
more regional studies were undertaken by colonial officials such as Yves 
Henry (1932) and Deloche de Campocasso (1923) to investigate the 
possibilities of sericulture in Indochina. These officials explored the 
Southern parts of Indochina and observed an already flourishing silk 
industry along the riverbanks of the Tonle Sap, Bassac and the Mekong. 
From their reports we know that native sericulturists in Cambodia could 
Weaving into Cambodia 
 
 100
be found in the provinces of Takeo, Kampong Cham, Prey Veng, Kandal 
and Kampot. As Jean Delvert (1961: 283) observed in the 1950s;  
 
‘Les khum sériciculteurs sont situés dans Takeo et le Sud de Kandal à la frontière 
de la Cochinchine. Les Cambodgiens n’élèvent plus le ver à soie sur les berges du 
Mékong. Le long des berges les cultivateurs sont vietnamiens ou parfois métis 
sino-cambodgiens, très sinisés’29.  
 
The most specific account about the origin of the weavers comes from 
Yves Henry (1932: 432), who refers to the sampot hol as ‘dessins chinois 
originaux’. This is only partly true because, as said before, the Chinese 
did not introduce the weft ikat technique (the primary technique used to 
decorate the sampot hol) in Cambodia (cf. Howard 1999). Adopting the 
weft ikat techniques from Tai speaking people the Chinese silk weavers 
did manufacture a silken sarong that became very popular among the 
Cambodian elite, the sampot hol.       
 
Buddhists do not kill silk worms 
To explain the absence of the Khmers in the Cambodian silk industry the 
French surveyors argued that their Buddhist religion prohibited the 
Khmers from killing any animals, including silk worms. As Jean Delvert 
(1961:282) wrote:  
 
‘Le Cambodgien répugne a élever le ver à soie: la religion bouddhique interdit en 
effet de tuer et il faut tuer le ver pour recueillir le cocon’.  
  
                                                 
29
 
This dissertation focusses predominantly on ethnic Chinese involvement in the Cambodian silk weaving 
industry. It would be interesting to examine the history of Vietnamese involvement in the Cambodian silk 
industry, too. The Vietnamese scholar Tuan Hoang Anh (2007) already published about silk production in 
Tonkin and the trade of Tonkinese silk to Cochinchina and Cambodia as well.   
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Although it was not the labor force the French agronomists expected to 
see reeling silk, the possibilities to set up sericulture farms were 
propitious, as most minority groups, such as the Chinese, Vietnamese, 
Cham and to a lesser extent the Javanese cultivated mulberry trees in 
their backyard and reeled silk yarn under their house. Having such good 
future prospects in sight, many French planters decided to pack their 
bags and travel to Indochina to set up a mulberry plantation there. As for 
the procurement of credit, the largest bank in Lyon, Le Crédit Lyonnais, 
introduced so-called ‘silk accounts’ for these businessmen to set up 
mulberry plantations in the colony (Frederico 1997: 166-7).  
 
However, the dream of the French colonialists to start a new silk 
enterprise in Indochina became a disillusion due to their inability to 
compete with the already ruling Cantonese merchant class in Cambodia, 
and, oddly enough, also because of resistance at home. With regard to 
the latter, Indochina, like many other Southeast Asian nations, has 
always been a relatively under-populated area and for this reason labor 
was a scarce commodity. To complicate the labor scarcity problem even 
more, French agronomists experienced that Khmer women did not boil 
silk worms and that it was impossible to subcontract female spinners 
from Southwest China, as Chinese immigration laws did not allow 
women to migrate to Southeast Asia. Not being able to attract skilled 
spinners from the overpopulated Southern Chinese areas, French 
planters had no choice but to ease the pre-colonially established silk 
spinners from their patrons, in this case the Cantonese gentry and 
merchant guilds (cong hongs). To accomplish this goal governor-general 
Jean Marie De Lanessan realized he had to make it very attractive for the 
‘Cantonese’ silk spinners to ‘betray’ their fellow ethnic patrons, and thus 
introduced a bonus system in 1894 (Thompson 1968: 137).  
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However, the Lyon Silk Throwing Unions themselves did not accept any 
bonus systems in the colony as they were anxious to preserve the 
colonies as private markets for themselves and not to upgrade them as 
another business competitor (Andrew and Kanya-Forstner 1976: 981). 
The most ardent advocate of this point of view was the director of the 
Association of French Industry and Agriculture, Martial Merlin, who 
warned that colonial production must be limited to supplying the mother 
country with non-competitive products whereas otherwise it would 
become a dangerous opponent (Robequain 1944: 129). Next to the 
introduction of a bonus system the French planters also suggested the 
Indochinese government to lower the 1892-established ‘Meline’ tariffs, 
based on the belief that these were damaging colonial development and 
prevented native peasants from working for them (Andrew and Kanya-
Forstner 1976: 985). Supporting the tax reduction idea, the French 
merchant Jules Blancsube (1886), cited in Gantes (2004: 231), also 
warned the French government at home:  
 
‘Free trade gave Saigon prosperity; customs may ruin it’.  
 
However, such a ‘free trade spirit’ annoyed the French government as 
well, which complained that the Indochinese colony had already become 
too expensive and should earn itself back. Therefore Paul Doumer (1902) 
rolled back De Lanessan’s liberal tax measures and, just like the Chinese 
moneylenders, imposed great burdens on the Cambodian peasants, 
converting the colony again into a profitable tax enterprise (in: Thompson 
1968: 76-80). During Paul Doumer’s reign (1897-1902) the Cambodian 
peasants even paid the highest poll taxes in Indochina, supporting not 
only the French colonial budget but also the privileges of the Cambodian 
elite and aristocracy (ibid.).                                                                                                                          
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Competing hegemonies 
In other words, the successful attempts of the Lyon silk associations at 
home to prevent the implementation of colonial bonus systems and a 
relaxation of the 1892 ‘Meline’ Tariff system made it difficult for the 
French merchants in Indochina to compete with the Chinese merchants, 
who did provide ‘bonuses’ in the form of opium and gambling facilities 
and other kinds of lucrative credits. To make things worse, even those 
French planters who were able to attract native silk spinners, were 
confronted with ‘barbaric’ reeling methods and witnessed to their disgust 
how the Chinese spinners touched silkworms with their bare hands, and 
were living in rickety straw huts often filled with poultry and cattle.  
 
To protect the silk worms against flies, insects and diseases such as the 
‘pebrine’, the French were convinced they had to modernize the 
Cambodian sericulture methods ‘Pasteur style’.30 With the pebrine 
epidemic still fresh in mind, the French mulberry planters were 
convinced that the success of a silk planter depended on his or her 
ability to supply disease-free silk worms’ eggs, which again depended on 
the race of the silk worm and the mating system (Frederico 1997: 88). In 
line with their feelings of superiority over the ‘barbaric Orientals’ there 
was no doubt that the ‘Pasteur’ (cellular) mating system was far superior 
to any other native one. To improve the quality of the Indochinese 
silkworm-eggs and to satisfy the silk merchants in Lyon, the Pasteur 
method was introduced to the Cantonese silk breeders by Artistide 
Fabris, director of the French experimental school ‘la station sericole du 
Petit Takeo’ (Henry 1932: 432).  
 
In the same period Yves Henry (ibid.: 443) also observed how financial 
support finally turned into favoring the French planters and how Lyon 
                                                 
30 Louis Pasteur identified the organism responsible for the pebrine, isolated it and developed methods of 
treatment. However, for the French sericulture industry his efforts came too late.    
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investments rose significantly in Cambodia from 8,350 piasters in 1922 
to 55,000 piasters in 1923 (table 3). Another thing that had a positive 
effect for the French silk industrials, was the uniform hiring procedure 
introduced by governor-general Varenne, the so-called contract system, 
that was to regulate the obligations between coolies and planters 
(Thompson 1968: 95). The contract system and the improved working 
conditions for the coolies had the aim to provide the French silk company 
in Cambodia and Cochinchina, La Compagnie Des Soie du Cambodge et 
de la Cochinchine, with a stable working force and, in theory at least, to 
compete with the Chinese planters in attracting labor.31  
 
Table 3: French sericulture investments in Indochina (in piasters)32  
Source: Yves Henry (1932:443)  
 
Luck turned even more in favor of the French when China ‘officially’ 
opened up its borders for female emigrants in 1911.33 Taking advantage 
                                                 
31 Before the labor-improving methods of Sarraut and Varenne many coolies were job-hoppers and deserted to 
other planters regularly or migrated to plantations in neighboring countries.  
32 Indochinese coin value. Twenty-five piasters equals one dollar of value. 
33 Shortly after the 1911 Revolution - when urban intellectuals in China abandoned traditional ways of 
thinking, such as Confucianism, and adopted a Western style of governance, ideology and social structure 
instead - and undoubtedly triggered by a growing demand for female laborers all over Southeast Asia, the 
Year       Tonkin Annam Cochinchina Cambodia 
1920 39,991 34,240 636 8,606 
1921 39,487 38,200 664 8,350 
1922 46,560 40,300 646 55,000 
1923 40,541 40,500 1,482 57,100 
1924 39,001 42,500 63,096 51,500 
1925 38,367 54,300 67,655 56,500 
1926 43,564 54,920 69,685 47,510 
1927 48,584 59,132 82,548 30,707 
1928 48,050 55,932 71,200 28,600 
1929 44,772 54,276 77,477 25,600 
1930 75,793 54,300 87,410 23,800 
Total 503,530 528,600 522,535 393,273 
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of the changing gender moralities in China French planters were finally 
able to encourage the immigration of Chinese women to their 
plantations. This again led to another, now legal outflow of Cantonese 
silk spinners and weavers to Cambodia, who, contrary to the pre-colonial 
flow, were strictly hired to work for French planters (Edwards 2003; 
Robequain 1944). As Charles Robequain (1944: 40) has illustrated, in 
1923 alone 23,777 Chinese women and 41,963 men entered Indochina, 
most of them settling in the Tonkinese, Cochinchinese and Cambodian 
river deltas. 
 
But despite the financial impetus of the Lyon silk associations, the 
improved labor conditions, and China opening up its borders for female 
migration, La Compagnie De Soie du Cambodge et de la Cochinchine could 
still not compete with the Cantonese merchant guilds with regard to 
attracting laborers and silk yarn production. The reason for this was that 
the French lacked historical trade connections in the South China Sea 
and thus, like the ‘contract spinners’, came to depend heavily on the 
networks of the Cantonese silk elites, who had already established ‘a 
foothold’ in Cambodia decades earlier (Gantes 2004: 227). As a 
consequence, the Cantonese silk merchants in Cambodia, basically the 
competitors of La Compagnie De Soie du Cambodge et de la Cochinchine, 
controlled the influx of silk spinners and carefully checked the balance 
between their own working force and the French one. The French were 
only able to subcontract some 1,000 silk spinners in 1925, while another 
4,817 reeled silk yarn for the Cantonese silk merchants (Henry 1932: 
400). This might also explain why the French silk spinnery Chag Angre in 
Phnom Penh was only able to spin 4,000 kilograms of raw silk yarn for 
the Lyon silk merchants (ibid.), while the Chinese could produce about 
four times as much.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Qing government in China eventually changed its emigration policies, unleashing an enormous flow of female 
coolies to Cochinchina and Cambodia. 
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Moreover, the ‘coolie spinners’ could not afford the overseas journey to 
Cambodia and the Cantonese silk merchants paid the trip in advance 
(Thompson 1968; Robequain 1944). Hence, it was not La Compagnie De 
Soie du Cambodge et de la Cochinchine that became the ‘patron’ of the 
immigrant spinners, but the Cantonese silk merchants annex ‘coolie 
brokers’, who held extensive power over them before they had ever reeled 
one kilogram of silk yarn for the French. And precisely because the silk 
spinners ‘belonged’ to the Cantonese silk merchants, they could forbid 
them to participate in the French experimental stations and prevent the 
planters from producing better silk yarn than their own spinneries in 
Phnom Penh did. This to the great frustration of the director of the 
French experimental station ‘Petit Takéo’, Artistide Fabris (1926), who 
saw his efforts to implement the Pasteur cellular mating system fail. Like 
his colleagues elsewhere in the colony, Artistide Fabris experienced how 
the organization of sericulture development programs, quality checks 
and silk egg inspections was already in hands of the Cantonese silk 
merchants and how they forbade ‘their’ fellow-ethnic silk reelers to 
participate in the French sericulture program (Thompson 1968: 137).    
 
Also, unlike the Indochinese pepper and rubber industry, La Compagnie 
De Soie du Cambodge et de la Cochinchine did not possess large mulberry 
plantations itself, but depended on some 1,000 private plots spread over 
235 villages in the Cambodian districts of Lovea, Kampong Speu, 
Kampong Thom, Taug Krasang, Soairieng, Samrong, Pursat, and Prey 
Veng, and the Cochinchinese districts around Tan Chau, Tri Ton, Mytho, 
An Hoa and Batri (Henry 1932: 400). This in turn ‘forced’ La Compagnie 
to subcontract Cantonese traders (‘compradors’) to distribute the silk 
yarn from the rural villages to the steam vessel Messageries Fluviales in 
Phnom Penh. These ‘compradors’, however played dubious multiple roles, 
as they were often co-villagers and moneylenders of the ‘French’ 
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subcontracted silk spinners and lineage members of the Cantonese 
merchants and silk spinnery owners in Phnom Penh, too.  
 
To make things worse, La Compagnie des Messageries Fluviales could not 
compete with the pre-eminence of the Chinese junks in the South 
Chinese Sea, either. In this period Chinese junks represented more than 
56 per cent of the total traffic in Indochina and even much stronger 
maritime powers such as the Portuguese, the British and the Dutch were 
completely dependent upon Chinese traders for commerce with China, 
Singapore or Siam (Gantes 2004: 227). Lacking maritime power, 
historical trade connections in the South China Sea and access to the 
Southern Chinese silk regions for the attraction of labor (ibid.), the 
French colonizers depended heavily on the long-lasting and far-flung 
networks of the Cantonese coolie brokers annex silk merchants annex 
compradors annex exporters, which logically resulted in the fact that the 
Cambodian yarn harvest did not end up in Lyon warehouses, but mainly 
in courtyard houses in Canton, Bangkok  and Singapore (Forest 1980: 
304).  
 
The 1930 economic depression 
In the late 1920s, tragedy struck the Cambodian sericulture industry, 
due to the great economic depression and the Pacific war (1941-5), 
cutting off Cambodia from Western and Southeast Asian economies. Just 
when the French planters had arranged a foothold in the Indochinese 
sericulture industry in the late 1920s, it crashed through the combined 
effects of the late 1920s silk cocoon crisis and the Japanese monopoly on 
silk yarn import after the Franco-Japanese pact in 1941. To start with 
the great depression, the worldwide fall of the cocoon prices in the late 
1920s led to the bankruptcies and liquidations of many Chinese and 
French silk merchants and the closure of French silk plantations, 
development schools and spinning mills in Indochina. Most experts 
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blamed the extremely low cocoon price for the popularity of specific 
competing crops such as wine in France, tobacco in Spain, and jute, 
mango and rice in Bengal, while others thought the silk crisis had been 
caused by high rents, insufficient technical progress, diseases, change of 
tenure arrangements, and so on (Frederico 1997).  
 
Whatever the reason might have been, the worldwide fall of the cocoon 
prices burdened the colonial budgets and as a consequence French 
planters were not able to pay their mortgages and laborers anymore and 
had to close their spinning workshops and mulberry farms. To make 
things worse, the regional budgets fell sharpest in Cambodia, followed by 
Cochinchina, Tonkin, Annam and Laos (Norlund 2000: 208). The French 
government entrusted the task to restructure the colonial economy to the 
most powerful colonial institution, the Bank of Indochina, which closed 
all unprofitable enterprises and seized every plantation it could 
(Brocheux 2000: 265).  
 
But far more dramatic for the sericulture industry was the fact that the 
1929 silk depression also decimated the presence of the Cantonese 
traders and wholesalers in Indochina, who, for lack of profitable business 
opportunities in Indochina, returned to their families at home in China. 
As Charles Robequain (1944: 43) illustrated, during the great depression 
the majority of the Chinese in Indochina left the colony, which crashed 
basically every industry in Cambodia, indicating once more who oiled the 
economic wheels in this kingdom. As a consequence, the Cambodian silk 
spinners who were tied to their landlords and felt the impact of their 
landlord’s difficulties as well, were no longer in demand. During the great 
crisis the production of Cambodian silk yarn decreased from 500 tons in 
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1925 to merely 25 tons in the 1940s (Delvert 1961: 282)34 and the trade 
balance of silk eggs showed a negative spiral from the end of the 1920s 
onwards as well (Henry 1932: 438-444) (table 4 and 5). 
 
Table 4:  Cocoon and silk yarn production  
in Cambodia, 1921-1930 (in kg) 
 
Year Cocoon Silk yarn 
1922 13.245 500 
1923 31.088 1036 
1924 46.455 1434 
1925 86.027 3077 
1926 96.614 4152 
1927 80.400 3232 
1928 118.984 3670 
1929 133.123 8360 
1930 123.579 5113 
Source: Henry, Y. (1932:438) 
 
Table 5: Trade balance Indochinese silk eggs (in 100kg)          
Year Import Export Balance 
1921 53 151 98 
1922 77 179 102 
1923 103 643 540 
1924 236 562 326 
1925 342 617 275 
1926 300 680 380 
1927 157 384 227 
1928 215 317 102 
1929 237 177 -60 
 Source: Henry, Y. (1932: 444) 
 
The 1940 Pacific war 
The living conditions of the silk spinners and weavers deteriorated even 
further after Hitler’s occupation of France. The completeness of the 
German occupation of France left Indochina virtually helpless to resist 
the Japanese troops, who mainly used it as a rice basket to feed their 
                                                 
34 Pierre Brocheux (2000: 257) has shown how the production of silk yarn in Tonkin and Annam also came to 
a halt, and that the export of silk yarn to the Metropole and China decreased significantly.  
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military troops in China and as a military base to attack other Southeast 
Asian nations from during the Pacific war (Andrus and Greene 1944: 
351-88). On 22 May 1941, the Vichy administration in Hanoi had to 
recognize Tokyo’s protection over Indochina and was forced to hand over 
its trade autonomy to Japan (ibid.: 367).  
 
The 1941 Franco-Japanese agreements not only led to the decline of 
Indochina’s trade with France, but also of other ‘traditional’ Asian trade 
partners (ibid.). Moreover, Japanese troops not only used Indochina as a 
military base but also disrupted French shipping lines, important 
Indochinese trade entrepots such as Shanghai, Hong Kong, Singapore 
and Manila, the river trade between Phnom Penh and Saigon, and the 
Haiphong-Kunming Railway line (ibid.: 364). As a consequence, with 
imports from China, Europe and America cut off and with Japan failing 
to send sufficient quantities of consumer and manufactured goods back 
to the colony, Cambodians experienced an era of high inflation, food 
shortages and extremely poor living conditions.  
 
Still worse, after the German seizure of France and the subsequent 
shortage of clothes in the Metropole, French factory managers sold all 
their textile supply to their fellow countrymen at home, which in turn led 
to an enormous shortage of clothes in the colony itself (cf. Brocheux 
2000). Silk weavers in Cambodia remembered this era as ‘the era of 
wearing the water jar’ (Muan and Daravuth 2003: 8), illustrating that 
incomes were so low and products so scarce during the Pacific war that 
they could afford only one set of clothing for all family members to share. 
Thus if visitors came to the house of the weavers the folk story goes that 
many family members had to hide naked in the house or use a water jar 
to hide their nudity (ibid.).  
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Living conditions improved for the Cambodians after the Japanese 
government finally started to import consumer goods, clothes and raw 
materials to satisfy the civilian demand in Indochina (Andrus and Greene 
1944). Jean Delvert (1961: 83) observed how Japanese merchants had 
taken over the silk trade positions of the Chinese in Cambodia, importing 
forty tons of silk yarn in the 1940s. And on a global scale Giovanni 
Frederico (1997: 163) noted how Japanese silk yarn merchants from 
Yokohama had taken over power from the Chinese silk yarn merchants 
and catered many Southeast Asian and European markets with silk 
yarn.  
 
The revival of the ‘sampot hol’ 
Although initially not as strongly as in neighboring Cochin-China and 
other Vietnamese territories of Indochina, national consciousness was 
rising in Cambodia, especially among a handful of educated ‘Khmer 
Kroms’ 35 such as Son Ngoc Thanh, the future Prime Minister of the 
Khmer Republic from 1970 to 1975, Lon Nol, and politically active 
Buddhist monks such as Hem Chieu (Chandler 1992). In Khmer 
newspapers such as the Nagaravatta (Angkor Wat) a growing urban 
Khmer elite began to condemn French colonial policies, especially the 
favored treatment they gave to Vietnamese to fill Cambodian civil service 
and other administrative posts (Chanda 1986: 56). In the same 
newspapers elite Khmers also ‘re-introduced’ the sampot as a marker of 
Khmer nationality and stimulated Khmers to wear it again as an 
expression of their own indigenous identity (Edwards 2001). Protesting 
against decades of French colonial rule and the French suit as a symbol 
of oppression, a young Lon Nol dressed himself in a checkered sampot 
hol.  
 
                                                 
35
 
Khmer Kroms are indigenous ethnic Khmer minorities living in Southern Vietnam
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In accordance with the 1940 Japanese adagio ‘Asia for the Asians’ a 
plethora of national movements appeared on the scene in Cambodia in 
the aftermath of the Pacific war, all bidding for independence, political 
reforms and the re-invention of an indigenous identity (Chanda 1986; 
Chandler 1992). Khmer Issarak revolutionaries were loyal to Son Ngoc 
Thanh and consisted mainly of indigenous leftists, Vietnamese leftists 
(especially Viet Minh), antimonarchical nationalists and ordinary bandit 
groups terrorizing villages in the Cambodian Vietnamese borderlands 
(ibid.). Supporters of the Democratic Party led by Prince Sisowath 
Yuthevong were mostly teachers, civil servants and politically active 
Buddhists (ibid.). A third group was formed by the liberals led by Prince 
Norodom Norindeth, representing the interests of the old rural elite, 
including large landowners, who were often still loyal to France (ibid.).  
 
In the slipstream of these three national movements and the subsequent 
search for a postcolonial indigenous identity, a large handloom weaving 
industry came into existence in Cambodia catering to the increasing 
demand for indigenous clothing. In the late 1940s Jean Delvert (1961) 
not only observed the fall of the Cambodian sericulture industry, but also 
the re-birth of a growing indigenous handloom industry. Whereas in 
1917 the French art scholar George Groslier found only sixty active silk 
weavers in Takeo (in: Edwards 2001: 394), Jean Delvert (1961: 282-284) 
came up with a number of 1850 hand weavers in Takeo and another 
thousand in Prey Veng and Kampong Cham manufacturing 32,000 
sampot varying from hol and phamung to sarong.36  
 
To meet the ‘re-newed’ demand for sampot hol the Cantonese silk 
merchants returned to Cambodia and established business ties with 
                                                 
36 This number is probably higher, as Delvert did not survey Kandal province. In Kandal province William 
Willmott counted ‘many’ Chinese handloom weavers, all manufacturing silk clothes on the verandas of their 
houses.  
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fellow ethnic silk spinnery owners for the procurement of silk yarn. These 
joint ventures were possible because after the ‘1955 Bandung Agreement’ 
Sihanouk allowed Chinese silk merchants to set up silk spinning 
factories on the outskirts of Phnom Penh. Against the colonial image of 
the greedy Chinese merchant we must surmise that without the 
ambitions and networks of these ‘greedy’ merchants there would have 
been no more sampot hol at all after the devastating period of the 1930s 
and ‘40s. In fact, their financial means and business contacts across the 
Cambodian borders were the factors that accounted for a revival of the 
silk industry in the 1950s.     
 
The silk weaving industry continued to flourish after prince Norodom 
Sihanouk took over power in 1955, backed by the last French governor-
general Decheux (cf. Osborne 1994). The flamboyant and eccentric king, 
however, took a more pragmatic position towards the sampot hol than the 
1940 nationalists had done. In contrast to the 1940 nationalists 
Sihanouk re-defined the sampot hol as a female marker of nationalism, 
while he urged Khmer men, especially the urban elite, to wear trousers 
and suits in the French style. This way Sihanouk, a devout Buddhist and 
Francophile (ibid.), combined the female origin myth of the sampot and 
the French gender restrictions that had crystallized around this clothing 
style. Sihanouk legitimized his Janus-faced policy regarding the sampot 
arguing that western suits and pants were much more comfortable to 
wear at the office or in the factory, while the native sampot was more 
convenient to wear in the pagoda.  
 
Sihanouk, however, not only stimulated the weaving of sampot for 
ceremonial purposes, but also in order to keep the weavers in their 
villages. After several rice crop failures millions of rural Cambodians 
migrated to Phnom Penh in the 1960s and upgraded the urbanization 
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level to its all-time peak of 12,5 per cent (Desbarats 1995: 143). To feed a 
growing urban population Sihanouk started to modernize his rural 
hinterlands and stimulate peasants to stay there (Sotharith 2000). Under 
Sihanouk’s Sangkum Reastr Niyum (‘Popular Community’) regime, 
farmers, in theory at least, were free to till their plot and to sell their 
products at the markets. To protect the peasants against Chinese 
moneylenders Sihanouk organized them in cooperatives and set up 
several dozens of large state-owned enterprises as well, to process 
rubber, paper, sugar, palm oil, cars, textiles and wood for the 
international market (ibid.).  
 
Another reason why Prince Norodom Sihanouk wanted to boost the 
domestic silk weaving industry was to adjust the economy to one of the 
first global flows ever to arrive in Cambodia: tourists. In the 1960s the 
mysterious Angkor Wat temple complex attracted upper class people from 
all over the world (Osborne 1994). In luxurious hotels such as ‘Le Grand 
Hotel d’Angkor’ in Siem Reap, the ‘Independence hotel’ in Sihanoukville, 
‘Hotel Casino’ in Bokor and the ‘Royal Palace’ hotel in Phnom Penh, the 
cosmopolitan elite enjoyed themselves with poker games, Johnny Walker 
whiskey and Khmer Apsara dances, filling their suitcases with silk 
scarves and sampot hol that were considered ‘authentic’ Khmer souvenirs 
(Challard 1966: 211). To meet the domestic and global demand for 
sampot hol, however, Sihanouk only stimulated the silk weaving industry 
and not the sericulture. Based on a ‘1955 Bandung Agreement’ with his 
Chinese political friend Zhou Enlai, he allowed Chinese foreign direct 
investors to set up silk spinning factories at the outskirts of Phnom 
Penh, and Chinese merchants to provide the Cambodian silk weavers 
with silk yarn from China, Japan and Vietnam.  
This flirt with the communist Chinese leadership, and allowing the 
import of products such as Vietnamese raw silk yarn annoyed 
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nationalists such as Lon Nol and Saloth Sar (alias Pol Pot), who accused 
Sihanouk of being in league with the colonial enemies (Chanda 1986; 
Osborne 1994). Also, the cold war was raging next-door between the 
communist Vietnamese in the north and the non-communist ones in the 
South, and in particular when the Vietcong started to use areas inside 
Cambodia as a sanctuary from which to launch guerrilla attacks into 
Southern Vietnam, Sihanouk’s position became precarious (ibid.). In 
March 1970, while Sihanouk was absent from Cambodia, his right-wing 
opponent General Lon Nol mounted a coup d’état and overthrew the 
Sangkum Reastr Niyum regime (ibid.).         
                                    
The ‘sampot hol’: a trauma symbol 
Sadly, the 1970 coup d’état ushered a decade of bitter political upheaval 
and finally gave rise to an extremely violent peasant revolution (1975-
1978) under the leadership of Paris-educated student Saloth Sar, alias 
Pol Pot. Between 1975 and 1978 about 1.7 to 2.2 million died in the 
rural labor zones due to intentional killing, starvation or sickness 
(Becker 1986; Chandler 1992; Kiernan 1985). Though proclaiming the 
elimination of class distinctions, the Khmer Rouge regime constructed 
new value-laden socio-political distinctions between the ‘good’ base 
people (lower class peasants) and the ‘new’ people (the urban 
intelligentsia), with the latter group being in constant danger. Hence, 
numerous traditional customers of the sampot hol got killed in the Pol 
Pot working zones. Others escaped this cruel destiny by fleeing to refugee 
camps in Thailand or to overseas nations such as Australia, Europe and 
the United States. As Cathryn Aileen Poethig (1997) notes, more than 
250,000 Cambodians fled to overseas nations and another 360,000 
Cambodians to refugee camps in neighboring Thailand and Vietnam.  
After the Khmer Rouge regime was over in 1979 the sampot hol made its 
return in the Cambodian landscape and again the flexibility and far-flung 
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character of the Chinese business networks accounted for its return as a 
national symbol. Establishing business ties with the Tan Chau 
spinneries in Vietnam thousands of silk weavers could continue their 
weaving enterprise in the 1980s and manufacture sampot hol again. In 
the 1980s some 5,000 looms were already clacking again (Pujebet and 
Peyre 2001) and wholesalers remembered very clearly how traders from 
Cambodian border towns such as Poipet, Pursat and Battambang walked 
or biked to Phnom Penh, catered their shops with Thai and Lao 
handicrafts and asked for indigenous woven sampot hol, krama and 
sarong for their return missions. Some traders even spoke of ‘a rush on’ 
and remembered that even second-hand sampot could be bartered 
lucratively against gold in these days. As the owner of La Maison de la 
Soie recalled37:  
‘After the Pol Pot war was over I bought handicrafts from Laos and 
Thailand and sold them to Russian aid workers. In the beginning nobody 
sold sampot, only later when traders asked me if I had sampot for sale I 
started to look around for them …These traders were Cambodians from 
Poipet, Pursat and Battambang and came by bike or some even walked to 
Phnom Penh …I do not know why, but these traders bought even second-
hand sampot and paid good money for them …During UNTAC the sampot 
business became very lucrative …no, not because of the UN workers, they 
did not like our sampot, they only liked scarves from Lao and Burma, like 
the Russians …During UNTAC especially Khmer Americans bought a lot, 
they were working as translators for the UN, like me, I also worked for the 
UN as a translator … and when the Khmer Americans went home they 
bought a lot of sampot from my wife’s silk shop …Later when Sihanouk 
returned to Cambodia Cambodian women started to buy sampot hol again, 
too, this because the king ordered them to wear a sampot hol on national 
                                                 
37 Interview February 2005  
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television …When UNTAC disappeared I became a sampot dealer as well 
and assisted my wife in her shop …’    
Traders from Pursat, Poipet and Battambang asked after the ‘sampot’ 
because Cambodian refugees, among them many elite people, and thus 
the main ‘sampot’’ customers, lived in the Thai border camps, and were 
desperately looking for sampot hol to dress themselves in the pre-Pol Pot 
style again. As Haing Ngor (1987) noted, the largest of the three Thai 
refugee camps, Khao I Dang, was a city inhabited for seventy per cent by 
the old Cambodian elite and a relatively normal town with hospitals, 
schools, workshops, markets, soccer fields, cafés, Buddhist temples and 
tailor shops (in: Poethig 1997: 59). Michael Vickery (1990) also qualified 
Khao I Dang as a relatively ‘normal’ middle class town, where life, 
including all the religious ceremonies such as Phcum Ben and Khmer 
New year, continued as usual (ibid.).  
Interestingly, from the Thai border camps the Cambodian silk weaving 
industry also integrated into the global market by means of Cambodian 
Americans working for United Nations NGOs there. As Cathlyn Poethig 
(1997) has shown, the Thai refugee camps were open for Cambodian 
refugees who had successfully sought asylum in the US and gained 
American citizenship.38 After the fall of Democratic Kampuchea these 
naturalized Cambodian Americans, including monks, regularly traveled 
between the United States and the Thai refugee camps to work as aid 
workers, as translators for the UN, as political activists or simply to 
gather information about their relatives (Poethig 1997: 101). Once they 
had arrived in Khao I Dang, these Cambodian Americans could easily fill 
their suitcases with silken sampot, which again was great news for the 
Cambodian diaspora community at home, who had just organized 
                                                 
38 During and after the Democratic Kampuchea regime more than 250,000 Cambodians sought asylum in the 
US, Australia and France.   
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themselves in hundreds of ‘mutual assistance associations’ and 
desperately needed sampot and other religious artifacts to fulfill the 
cultural and religious needs of their communities (ibid.). In this regard 
Poethig (1997) also observed how these associations, and Buddhist 
temples, became the liveliest sites of the recovery of traditional Khmer 
arts, ceremonies and language in the United States. In her important 
book ‘Khmer American. Identity and Moral in a Diasporic community’, 
Nancy J. Smith-Hefner (1999) shows how Khmer American women wore 
silken sampot, while visiting weddings, Buddhist temples and Phcum Ben 
ceremonies in the United States. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have attempted to answer the first research question: 
What were the historical conditions under which the silk entrepreneurs 
transplanted their businesses into Cambodia? In order to answer this 
question I first deconstructed the grand Khmer narrative about the origin 
of silk weaving. In the dominant discourse the ‘hol’ silk weaving 
techniques are a Khmer invention, and sericulture techniques have been 
passed down within Khmer families from the ancient Angkor empire 
onwards. Early trade reports, however, articulated the non-existence of 
silk yarn in Cambodia and indicated that the ‘contemporary’ silk weaving 
industry is not a remnant of the Angkor kingdom, but a relatively young 
craft industry having its roots in Cantonese chain migration and a 
French desire to overcome the ‘pebrine’ silk worm crisis in Indochina two 
decades later. As for the origin of the silk weaving techniques in 
Cambodia, academic research (cf. Howard 1999) has shown that Tai 
speaking people probably introduced the ikat silk weaving techniques 
and the Chinese adopted these techniques from the Tai.  
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This chapter has shown, however, that the silk weavers accompanied 
Cantonese gentry-merchants, who had found a lucrative market niche in 
Cambodia: silk-making and weaving. The Cantonese gentry-merchants, 
confronted with Red Turban rebels in their previous silk districts (So 
1986) recognized this market niche and deployed ambitions to start over 
again in the lower Mekong river deltas. Luck turned heavily in their 
favor, because after centuries of foreign domination the Khmer 
aristocracy was looking for a silk elite dress to celebrate their 
independence and distinguish themselves from the cotton sarong-
wearing peasants (Edwards 2001). Since the Khmers did not possess 
sericulture and ikat silk weaving techniques the Khmer elite borrowed 
the Chinese sampot hol and traced their genealogy back to the courts of 
Angkor this way. This way the Khmer elite, as customers, got their 
much-wanted identity and the economic Cantonese elite, as producers, 
the opportunity to continue their silk businesses again.  
 
Although the role of the Chinese in the Cambodian economy is widely 
accepted, Chinese involvement in the construction of its Khmer 
authenticity has been denied so far. Penny Edwards (1999) and Ingrid 
Muan (2001) argued that the sampot hol, and in a broader sense also 
Khmer culture, were invented by French colonial institutions and were 
adopted by the postcolonial Khmer elite as authentic Khmer. In their 
opinion, the French-managed ‘School of Cambodian Art’ (1918) framed 
silk weaving as an authentic art form that could be traced back to the 
courts of Angkor (Muan 2001).  
 
Yet, going against the popular adagio that French colonialism was an 
important pull factor for Chinese migration, this chapter has shown the 
Cantonese gentry merchants out-competed the French silk industrials 
and had very good business reasons to sell the sampot hol as a marker of 
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Khmer authenticity. In fact, it was the continuous consumer demand for 
Khmer authenticity that made the Cantonese silk weavers decide to settle 
permanently in Cambodia. This was because after the Pacific war and the 
Khmer Rouge regime a demand for ‘authentic’ woven sampot hol came 
into existence again. This demand for authenticity worked well for the 
silk entrepreneurs because a Royal-supported silk dress guaranteed 
them a large clientele in Cambodia. Crucial in this regard was mostly the 
diasporic demand for sampot hol of the Khmer elite in the United States, 
France and Australia. Re-establishing trade contacts with their ‘old’ 
customers the silk entrepreneurs transplanted their silk businesses even 
further across the borders into overseas Diaspora communities.  
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Photograph: Cambodian silk weaver dressed in a black farmer pants (1921).  
Source : Agence economigue de la France d’Outre-Mer (FR CAOM 30fi104/78)Ag 
 
 
 
Photograph: Two weavers preparing the loom in Kampong Cham (1921) 
Source : Agence economigue de la France d’Outre-Mer (FR CAOM 30fi126/22)Ag 
encécoAgence économique de la France d'outre-mernomique de la F 
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Photograph: Cambodian silk weaver working in front of her house (1931) 
Source: Agence economigue de la France d’Outre-Mer (FR CAOM 30fi126/28)Ag 
enc 
 
 
Photograph: Mulberry plantation (1920) Source : Agence  
economigue de la France d’Outre-Mer (FR CAOM 30fi116/49)A 
GencécoAgenceéconomique  de la France d'outre-mernomique de la F 
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Photograph: silk weaver spinning yarn on a wheel (1949)  
Source: Agence economigue de la  
France d’Outre-Mer (FR CAOM   30fi126/31).Agen 
cécoAgenceéconomiqu 
  
 
Photograph: Three children preparing the ‘hol’ frame  
(1949).Source: Agence economigue de la France  
d’Outre-Mer (FR CAOM 30fi126/32)A 
gencécoAgenceéconomique   
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Photograph: silk weaver tying ‘hol’ patterns (1949)  
Source: Agence economigue de la France d’Outre-Mer  
(FR CAOM 30fi126/34)A 
gencécoAge 
 
 
Photograph: a ‘hol’ woven sampot (1949)  
Source: Agence economigue de la France  
d’Outre-Mer (FR CAOM 30fi126/35)A 
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Chapter 4 
From Worm to Sampot: Silk producers and traders in 
Cambodia 
      
 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter I discussed the conditions under which 
Cantonese silk weavers and traders transplanted their silk businesses to 
the Cambodian riverbanks. The current chapter will provide an answer to 
the second research question: how is the contemporary network of silk 
weavers and traders organized in terms of producer and trader 
relationships? Following the production and trade process from ‘worm to 
sampot’ this chapter will show that the Cambodian silk weaving industry 
is not a village-based household industry anymore, but instead a 
transnational business network that starts as a ‘silk worm’ in Vietnam 
and ends up as a sampot in the United States.  
 
My approach to locate the various silk producers and traders spatially is 
based on the concept of ‘trade’ and ‘traders’ (Geertz 1963, 1978). The 
‘trade’ conceptualization captures the silk weaving network as a 
production process, examining the geographical route of the silk threads 
from worm to sampot. Switching to the trader perspective I will illustrate 
how the different types of silk traders are linked by institutionalized 
vertical relationships that are both economic and social (cf. Dongelmans, 
Seng and Ter Horst 2005). Finally, this chapter has the ambition to
update a 2001 French-conducted census of the silk industry. Having 
surveyed the silk industry from worm to sampot this chapter offer
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insights about the modernization of the silk weaving industry from the 
1980s onwards. The reason for this is that national and global
stakeholders offer a lot of ‘text’ about the authenticity of the sampot hol, 
but fail to give data on for example the number of silk weavers, their 
monthly incomes, why they prefer a position along the Mekong 
riverbanks, how labor–intensive it is to weave a sampot, and so on. But 
for a start, I will explain more about the ‘hol’ silk weaving techniques first 
and illustrate how labor–intensive it is to mold silk yarn into a finished 
sampot hol.  
 
The labor-process 
Although the ‘hol’ weaving technique suggests an indigenous style of 
weaving, it is in fact an ikat weaving technique, which refers to a resist 
dying process during which the weft threads (the vertical threads on the 
loom) are patterned before weaving. In their important surveys of 
Southeast Asian textiles Sylvia Fraser Lu (1988) and Robyn Maxwell 
(1990) indicate that ikat weaving is of great antiquity in the Southeast 
Asian region (cf. Howard 1999: 127). It has also been argued that the 
origin of ikat weaving techniques is still extremely diffuse. As Alfred 
Buhler (in: Howard 1999: 127), already said about ikat weaving:  
‘The method has fallen completely into disuse in many places during the last 
few decades’.  
Buhler also noted the possibility of multiple independent places of origin 
of ikat weaving, stating that the most likely places of origin are ‘China, 
India, British India and perhaps even western Asia’ (ibid.). In ‘The Dyer’s 
Art’, Jack Larsen (1979) re-analyzes the problem of the origin of ikat silk 
weaving, noting that there are old Chinese reports indicating that ikat 
weaving techniques were not used by the Chinese themselves but by 
various non-Chinese tribes of present-day South and Southwest China 
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(Szechwan province) and probably of the northern parts of mainland 
Southeast Asia (ibid.: 128). Larsen then hypothesizes that ikat weaving 
techniques were being practiced in southern China by the sixth century 
AD, and that the technique spread south from these tribal cultures into 
other ethno-linguistic groups such as the Tai-speaking groups of 
northern Vietnam, Laos and northern Thailand and perhaps also the 
Khmer of Cambodia and Thailand, with India serving as a secondary 
center for this diffusion (ibid.: 129).  
With regard to ikat weaving in Kanchipuram (India), Yvonne Arterburn 
(1982: 18) wrote:  
‘Much of a weaver’s life, where he lives, with whom he lives, how he manages 
and deals with his family, house, household and friends is arranged so as to 
keep the shuttle and loom ever working’.  
Handloom weaving, in particular ikat weaving, is an extremely technical 
and labor-intensive affair, and one needs a lot of productive hands 
around to finish the sampot in time. After the silk weavers receive the 
batches of silk yarn from their middlemen they must wash them in a clay 
pot full of boiled soda water and remove a gummy substance called 
sericin. They do this because the protean glue (sericin) that covers the 
yarn does not have a crystalline structure but an amorphous one, which 
causes the silk yarn to remain rough, stiff and dull. Usually, the weavers 
wash one ‘koli’ (two kg) of silk yarn at a time, which requires half a day of 
work (Pujebet and Peyre 2001). As You Hou, an elder silk weaver from 
Veal village, explained39:  
‘In earlier days silk weaving was very intensive. We got up at four o’clock 
and searched for dye-stuff all day. My grandmother often looked after the 
                                                 
39
 
I interviewed You Hou two times in November 2004
 
 
From Worm to Sampot 
 
 128
silk eggs, my mother prepared the loom, my sister the hol frames and I 
had to wash the yarn to give it a bright color. I did not like that job because 
it took a lot of time. Today we buy silk yarn from a middleman, but the 
pressure is also much bigger now. Middlemen are very demanding and we 
have to finish our sampot in time, otherwise we lose our jobs. We work 
together with the whole family to accomplish that, sometimes even at night 
with candle lights. Yes, that is very tiring and after a busy period we are 
often sick’.    
Coloring the yarn is another difficult and time-consuming job for the You 
Hou weaving family, as silk yarn (especially poor-quality-yarn) does not 
absorb the color easily, due to its dense protean composition. As You 
Hou already explained, in earlier days silk weavers roamed through 
forests to find their own dye-stuff, but today they use dye-stuff imported 
from Thailand. The whole dying operation depends on the required color 
intensity, but in general it will take four hours to color one ‘koli’ of yarn 
and another three hours to dry it (ibid.). You Hou remembered the 
following vividly40:  
‘I was very glad we did not have to reel our own silk yarn and find our 
own dye-stuff anymore. Silk weaving has become much easier that way 
and I could also learn silk weaving that way. In the Sihanouk era many 
silk weavers stopped growing their own mulberry trees and started to buy 
Vietnamese silk yarn. Some silk weavers made their own dye-stuff from 
leaves of the indigo tree and I bought it from them. Nowadays I buy 
chemical dye-stuff from my middlemen..…No, it is not true that the quality 
of the dye-stuff is bad. I do not see the difference’.      
After the silk yarn is colored You Hou must twist it on bobbins, which is 
necessary to arrange the yarn for the following weaving operations. This 
                                                 
40 Interview November 2004 
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is an extremely slow work as well, because of the rotation speed of the 
winder, mostly an old bicycle tire, and it takes more than sixty hours (see 
table 6).   
Table 6: Time schedule of the weaving process  
 
  Source: Pujebet and Peyre (2001) 
In You Hou’s words41: 
‘Often elder people like me wind the yarn on bobbins. This is because our 
eyes are very bad and we cannot weave patterns anymore. My father also 
wound silk yarn on bobbins, but that was because he was wounded in the 
Pol Pot war. He could not work in the fields anymore and helped the family 
at home’.   
After the silk yarn has been wind on bobbins silk weavers must transfer 
the silk yarn onto a warp table consisting of two parallel sets of fifteen 
wooden sticks. To twist the yarn from the bobbins onto the warp table 
requires about two days of work, depending on the length and density of 
                                                 
41
 
Interview November 2004 
Division of labor Quantity 1 
Kben 
Duration 
(hours) 
Degumming warp 
Winding warp 
Warping 1 
Dyeing 
Warping 2 – drawing 
reed 
Warping 2 –  
Degumming weft 
Winding 
Tying dyeing 
Winding on spools 
Loom setting 
Weaving 
2 kg 
2 kg 
2 kg 
2 kg 
Warp 1m 
Width 
Warp 1m 
Width 
2 kg 
0.4 kg 
1 color 
18 spools 
1 warp 
 
0.20 
3.33 
0.60 
0.23 
0.40 
1.20 
0.20 
4.50 
24.00 
2.33 
0.10 
 
4 
66.5 
12 
4.5 
8 
24 
4 
4.5 
8 
1 
2 
8 
 
Total 
   
122.80 
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the warp (Pujebet and Peyre 2001). But the most time-consuming job is 
yet to come for silk weavers: preparing the heddle system for weaving. 
The raising and lowering of a portion of silk yarn by means of a heddle 
system, called warp yarn, is crucial because it creates an opening that 
permits the passage of a shuttle containing ‘weft’ silk thread (ibid.). To 
insert the warp yarn into the heddle system takes another two days and 
is often outsourced to non-kin members (ibid.). About this outsourcing 
job You Hou said42: 
‘Only the poorest of the poor like to do this job, youngsters do not like it 
anymore. In earlier days we had to do it ourselves, but nowadays 
youngsters go to school. That is why we hire poor people from surrounding 
villages’.   
As mentioned before, the ‘hol’ technique concerns a resist dying process 
in which the warp threads are patterned by a portion of weft threads tied 
to a beater above the weaver’s head (Green 2003: 83-86). These weft 
threads are different from the warp threads and are knotted and resist-
dyed in bamboo tying frames before weaving. To resist the penetration of 
dye colors into the weft threads the weavers make use of strips of plastic 
tape (Pujebet and Peyre 2001). To create colored ‘hol’ patterns such as 
flowers, animals or Buddha’s, the weavers must continually knot and 
un-knot the plastic tape between the subsequent dye baths, allowing the 
background color to appear in those places that have not been knotted at 
all (Pujebet and Peyre 2001). You Hou explained the importance of this 
crucial weaving job as follows43: 
‘Every family has its own design specialty. We are specialized in temple 
motifs based on stone carvings of old temples. Other families again in 
flower-motifs. It is important to have a specialty because the middleman 
                                                 
42 Interview November 2004 
43 Interview November 2004
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expects good quality from us. That is why I teach my grandchildren how to 
create temple patterns in the hol frame at a very young age’. 
Silk weaving regions in Cambodia 
The first scholar who mapped the silk weaving regions in post-war 
Cambodia was the Japanese textile expert Kikuo Morimoto. In 1995, 
after having worked for fifteen years in a Thai refugee camp,44 Morimoto 
was commissioned by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to investigate whether there were still 
any weavers left in Cambodia who were skilled in reeling and dying 
techniques. Traveling through eight provinces and fifty villages, Morimoto 
reported that some weaving villages had become active in the industry 
again, but that only seventeen ikat weavers deserved the title of master-
weaver (Morimoto 1995). Six years later, two French agronomists 
surveyed the silk weaving industry again and found it to be much more 
active, including some ten thousand silk weavers producing all kinds of 
sampot in more than three hundred villages (Pujebet and Peyre 2001). In 
the year 2005 a third research team, of which I also formed part, 
witnessed how the number of looms had almost doubled to 20,000 
(Dongelmans, Seng and Ter Horst 2005).45 
 
The Cambodian silk weaving villages are an amalgam of craft 
communities situated along the banks of the rivers Tonle Sap, Mekong 
and Bassac in the lower Mekong delta. This is not coincidental, as most 
of the present day silk weavers are descendents of silk cultivators from 
the Red River and Pearl River deltas (see chapter three). Arriving in 
Cambodia these early silk cultivators preferred a river farm in Cambodia, 
                                                 
44 Morimoto set up workshops in the refugee camps and taught Cambodian refugees dye and weaving  
techniques.  
45 However, to finish the sampot in time silk weavers divide their labor and outsource most preparation jobs 
to other family members, neighbors or villagers, which means that in total around 100,000 Cambodians are 
industrious in the production of hand-woven silk clothes. 
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because river deltas consist of natural levees that are formed by silt 
depositions and are extremely fertile grounds to cultivate crops such as 
mulberries (So 1986:18). A position near a river combined with profound 
irrigation skills guarantees access to water all year long, which gives 
these farmers the possibility to harvest mulberry leaves in the dry season 
and double or even triple their production (ibid.). Finally, the Mekong 
delta is situated on the northern margin of the tropical monsoon zone 
and is therefore affected by dry and cold northeasterly winds in the 
winter and subtropical heat in the summer, weather conditions that are 
favorable for growing mulberries and for sericulture (ibid.: 19).   
 
The Cambodian river basin has a total population of ten million, which 
makes it an extremely densely populated area with ninety per cent of 
Cambodian population living in only one-third of its total land area 
(around 180,000 km2). The heavily populated lowland plains around the 
weaving villages are occupied largely by rice paddies and dry crops such 
as corn and tobacco, and cultivated by farmers who practice a 
subsistence style of farming (cf. Mekong River Commission 2003). In the 
past, weaving families in Cambodia, like other river basin weaving 
communes, practiced a mixed economy in which agriculture was 
supplemented with small-scale handloom woven silk clothes during slack 
periods of the agricultural cycle. Initially most of the silk clothes were 
manufactured for daily and ceremonial use and sold at a small scale by 
weaving women at nearby provincial markets. As said, after the Khmer 
Rouge regime was halted by the Vietnamese in 1979, the hand-woven 
sampot hol became a popular dress for the growing middle class living 
both in Cambodia and abroad, and this resulted in a booming sampot 
industry consisting of 20,000 silk weavers (Dongelmans et al. 2005: 47).  
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Silk weaving regions and their specialties 
Takeo province, forty miles Southeast of Phnom Penh, is considered the 
cradle of silk weaving in Cambodia. Some ten thousand of the 20,000 
(Dongelmans et al. 2005: 47) silk weavers are active there in a cluster of 
seventy-seven villages in Northern Takeo, a province forty kilometers 
South of Phnom Penh. The most densely populated silk weaving 
communes in Takeo province are Tang Yam, Kdanh and Tnaot, bordering 
Prey Kabas and Bati districts (Pujebet and Peyre 2001). Most weaving 
households in Takeo possess one or two looms (average 1.32) dedicated 
(94 per cent) to manufacture sampot hol (Dongelmans et al. 2005: 27).46 
The looms are always placed in the shadow under the house, a space the 
weavers share with their cattle, poultry and all kinds of agricultural 
equipment. The Takeo silk weavers are known for their high quality 
sampot hol due to their ability to hammer the weft more than twice into 
the warp (ibid.: 22). Using this special weaving technique the sampot 
production in ‘kaben’ is relative low, although the sales price per sampot  
is considerably higher (ibid.). The Takeo silk weavers, like all Cambodian 
weavers, use wooden shaft frame looms (kei thbanh) that belong to the 
class of Southeast Asian looms classified as Malay or ‘western’ looms, 
referring to their origin in the western end of the Indonesian archipelago. 
Other areas where these looms can be found are Kelantan and 
Trengganu, the two northeastern coastal areas of the Malay Peninsula, 
and the Minangkabau region of central Sumatra (Green 2003: 65).  
 
In general, the silk weaving process in Takeo is a women’s affair, while 
men cultivate crops in the gardens behind their house and take care of 
the cattle. In line with the relatively young post-Pol Pot population figure, 
                                                 
46 Although the Takeo weavers mainly manufacture sampot hol, the term‘hol’ does not exist in the Khmer 
lexicon. This gives textile scholar Gillian Green (2003) reason to believe, following Zoetmulder’s old Javanese 
dictionary, that ‘hol’ is a Malay word meaning ‘embracing’, ‘grasping’ or ‘clasping’, in this case the weft 
threads with a tie prior to weaving. 
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sixty-five per cent of the silk weavers are between the age of 15 and 25, 
while forty per cent of the Takeo silk weavers is widow, unmarried or 
divorced (Dongelmans et al. 2005: 27). The head of the household is the 
master weaver and another woman, often the eldest daughter, will 
accompany her as a junior weaver. Because silk weaving is extremely 
labor-intensive Takeo weavers need a lot of productive hands to get the 
job done. Ninety per cent of the preparation jobs, such as washing the 
yarn, winding it on bobbins and tie-dying it in hol  frames is outsourced 
to members of the natal compound (ibid.: 28-29). The only preparation 
jobs Takeo silk weavers outsource to non-kin members are extremely 
labor-intensive jobs such as the preparation of the warp table and the 
preparation of the heddles for weaving (ibid.: 35-36). 
 
The Takeo silk weavers are relatively well-off and in case a weaver has 
enough productive hands around to help, and possesses profound 
weaving skills, she can manufacture four kaben of sampot hol per month 
and earn around forty dollars.47 Four per cent of the Takeo looms were 
inactive, mainly due to health reasons, in line with the observation that 
five per cent of the Takeo weavers has reached the age of 55 (ibid.: 2005: 
38).48 According to Poree-Maspero (1938), the Takeo silk weavers are also 
known for the production of the black farmer pants (kho kansaen). These 
farmer’s pants are said to have been developed in the rural hinterlands of 
Southwest China (cf. Muan and Daravuth 2003) and were probably 
introduced in Cambodia somewhere in the 1930s. In the 1950s achar, 
elders of the Buddhist laity, wore white, collarless shirts and black 
pants, still the correct male dress for a Buddhist festival (Green 2003: 
204). In the past, Takeo province, in particular the village Ang Kep Bok 
                                                 
47 Depending on her weaving qualities and bargaining skills, a weaver earns ten to twelve dollar per kaben 
(four meters) sampot hol.  
48 Other reasons mentioned were lack of credit, school-going children and out-migration to the textile 
factories in Phnom Penh. 
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(Green 2003: 329), was also known for its production of ikat woven 
religious wall hangers, with episodes of the life of Lord Buddha. Today 
some six hundred weavers in Takeo manufacture silk pidans for the 
tourist markets, a relatively low figure given the many efforts of NGOs to 
increase this number in the 1990s (Dongelmans et al. 2005).49 
 
Kandal Province 
In Kandal province, another six thousand silk weavers can be found in 
the communes of Koh Dach, Prek Luong, Prek Takov and Koh Ounhatey, 
although ninety per cent of the Kandal sampot production comes from 
the Koh Dach ‘silk islands’ (ibid: 22). Unlike the Takeo weavers, the Koh 
Dach silk weavers lack ‘ikat’ weaving skills and only manufacture plain-
woven phamung serving the taste of young female Cambodians in Phnom 
Penh for this dress (ibid.). The background of the Koh Dach weavers is 
rather diffuse, although the housing style and the name of the weaving 
style itself refer to Thai ancestry.50 Most of these silk weavers are internal 
migrants from other provinces and took up full-time silk weaving only 
during the last decade (ibid.). The phamung industry is not only a 
relatively young industry, but also the fastest growing one in Cambodia. 
In the slipstream of the phamung hype among young urban women in 
Phnom Penh, the Koh Dach island group experienced a spectacular 
growth in looms of almost three hundred per cent (ibid.). In line with the 
young age of the industry, the Koh Dach silk weavers are by far the 
youngest weaver group in Cambodia with 45 per cent of the weavers aged 
between 16 and 25 (ibid.: 27). On the Koh Dach islands even more 
                                                 
49 Most noteworthy is the UNESCO project that started in the mid-1990s, introducing among other things the 
use of natural dyes. Despite UNESCO’s effort to stimulate the local economy by tapping weavers into the 
tourist market, Dongelmans, Seng and Ter Horst (2005) counted only 1113 silk krama weavers in the whole 
of Cambodia.  
50  I did not study this region closely enough to be one hundred per cent sure of this. I did recognize a Thai 
housing style, and from the Japanese textile scholar Kikuo Morimoto I learned that the word phamung comes 
from the Thai lexicon. In Thai language Pha means ‘fabric’ and Mung means ‘purple’.  
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weaving enterprises are female-headed than in Takeo province, as 53 per 
cent of the weavers are divorced or unmarried. However, in case the 
weavers are married, husbands are not restricted to participate in the 
weaving process, as twenty per cent of the Koh Dach weavers are males 
(ibid.:28). Contrary to the Takeo weavers, men and women cooperate like 
an assembly line system working sixteen hours a day,51 which also 
explains the above average number of looms per family on Koh Dach 
(1.92). Since they are dedicating all their time to phamung weaving, most 
weaving households have leased or sold their agricultural land to wealthy 
city dwellers (ibid.: 32). Although the Koh Dach silk islands are an 
attractive tourist destination, only 401 of the 5973 weavers (7 per cent) 
are producing silken krama for tourists. The other 94 per cent 
manufactures phamung for the domestic and diasporic market, 
indicating once more the ‘indigenous’ character of this industry (ibid.: 
22). Around ten per cent of the Koh Dach looms appear inactive due to 
various reasons such as health conditions, lack of credit, outward 
migration to the Phnom Penh textile factories, competition of other 
economic activities, technical problems of the loom, or difficulties in 
hiring a junior weaver from within the natal compound (ibid.: 38).   
 
In ‘mainland’ Kandal province, Cham and Javanese weaving villages can 
be found, manufacturing all kinds of silk clothes such as the sarong52, 
the charobab53 and the kiet54. These silk clothes call to mind the arrival 
                                                 
51 The Koh Dach silk weavers also explained that men produce two kaben phamung (around eight meters) 
thirty per cent faster than women.    
52  An ikat woven sampot made of silk yarn dyed in different colors. In particular middle class men like to 
wear this silk sarong at home as a casual dress. Silk sarong are also worn in ritual dances such as the 
Kansaeng Snae (Love Scarf dance), Ka-ngak Pailin (Pailin Peacock dance) and the Pouthau dance.      
53  An ikat woven sampot with silver and golden metal threads. In the past this was the favorite dress of Kings 
and Queens. The Charabab was worn by royal dancers in all kinds of ritual dancings such as the Apsara 
dancing, the Money dancing and the Mekhala dancing. Today the Charabab is mainly worn during wedding 
ceremonies.    
54 Red, purple or indigo colored silk head clothes worn by Cham/Malay women. 
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of two Austronesian groups in the fourteenth and fifteenth century 
respectively, and the tremendous influence they had on the Cambodian 
fashion system (Collins 1996)55. It has been argued that Malaysian 
Muslims influenced the Cambodian fashion system heavily after Khmer 
king Ramadhipati I married a Muslim woman and converted to Islam, 
adopting the Muslim name Ibrahim (cf. Kersten 2006). As the story goes, 
the converted Khmer king Ibrahim also employed Cham ikat weavers to 
work for him at the royal palace and to manufacture silk sampot for his 
staff to wear at court functions, consisting of a long tunic and a Malay 
ceremonial dagger, the keris (Uemera 2003). Allegedly these Cham court 
weavers were also responsible for the introduction of the ikat technology 
in other regions such as Takeo province and the most densely populated 
Cham region, Kampong Cham (ibid.). 
 
Prey Veng/Kampong Cham 
Thirty miles north of Phnom Penh, in a riverbank area overlapping 
Kampong Cham and Prey Veng province, another two thousand silk 
weavers can be found. Experiencing a spectacular economic growth of 
more than one hundred per cent, this region is the second-best silk 
climber after Kandal province. However, for various reasons, the Prey 
Veng weaving region can be considered the odd one out. Firstly, the 
                                                 
55 It goes beyond the scope of this thesis to examine which of these two early Muslim diasporas spread ikat 
weaving techniques into Cambodia, but it certainly deserves more scholarly attention. In his essay ‘The 
Chams of Cambodia’ (Phnom Penh, Center for Advanced Studies), William Collins (1996) clearly stated that 
Javanese Muslim traders came to Cambodia as early as the fourteenth century to set up commercial farms 
along river junctions such as Kleang Sbek. However, very little is known about this Muslim group, let alone 
their role in spreading ikat weaving techniques, compared to the other Cambodian Austronesian Muslim 
group, the Chams from Vietnam. The seafaring Cham, who settled at river junctions in Cambodia as well, 
have received much more scholarly attention, and are said to have introduced ikat weaving to the Khmers. 
Unlike the Javanese Muslims they did not come for trade and commercial farming but were forced to seek 
asylum after the Tonkinese king Le Thanh Tong (1477) had subjugated their kingdom into the larger 
Annamese Cochinchina territory. Unlike the Javanese Muslim, Cham Muslim established good political 
connections with the Khmer king, providing him with firearms technology and trade networks in the region in 
return for good ranks and land in Cambodia to settle.  
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Phnom Penh wholesalers identify Prey Veng as a black sheep, because 
middlemen do not buy silk yarn from them but directly from Vietnamese 
traders. For this reason wholesalers are skeptical about the Prey Veng 
middlemen and do not establish long-lasting credit relationships with 
them.56 Secondly, Prey Veng is also the cradle of a relatively new silk 
product, ‘the silk per meter’57, monopolized by the owner of La Maison de 
la Soie, a new wholesale shop situated next to the Russian market. 
Dongelmans et al. (2005: ) observed that the production of ‘silk per 
meter’ has spread across five villages concentrated in the communes of 
Prek Anteak, Prek Chhey and Prek Runteas, and is providing work to 716 
looms. Thirdly, although the number of looms doubled between 2001 and 
2005, the Prey Veng households possess the lowest average number of 
looms per household (1.29) and about seven per cent of the ‘second’ 
looms have been subcontracted to non-kin weavers (ibid.: 29). The 
reason for this is that after the 2001 floods the Prey Veng youngsters left 
their natal compound in masses to find a job in the Phnom Penh textile 
industries, and it became very hard for the silk weavers to attract kin 
laborers58. Fourthly, the out-migration of young kin-members to the 
textile factories in Phnom Penh has made the region a kind of old 
people’s home, with high age ratios (average 36) and many looms (twenty 
per cent) not clacking at all (ibid.: 27-28). An old people’s home or not, 
the Prey Veng weavers, contrary to the weavers in the other two silk 
weaving regions, manufacture sampot hol, phamung, sarong, krama, and 
‘silk per meter’.  
 
                                                 
56 For this insight I am indebted to Mr. Seng Bunly, who joined me on my fieldtrip to Prey Veng and came 
across middlemen telling him about their smuggling activities.    
57 ‘Silk per meter’ products are phamung woven curtains, pillows and table clothes, and cater for the taste of 
western entrepreneurs (Dongelmans, Seng and Ter Horst 2005). 
58 Based on my own interviews 
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In Kampong Cham province, just across the Bassac river, the most 
famous weaving commune of Cambodia, Prek Changkran, is situated. 
The French art scholar Eveline Poree-Maspero (1938) observed that silk 
sampot from Prek Changkran were reputed for their superior qualities by 
the Cambodian Royal family and other elite, and still are today (Green 
2003: 192). This opinion, according to Green, is confirmed by Bernard 
Dupaigne (1984) and Kikuo Morimoto (1995), and by Cambodians in 
diaspora favoring sampot from Prek Changkran over sampot from Takeo 
(in: Green 2003).59 In the same area, on the koh Sutin island group in the 
river Bassac, red or blue-checkered krama are manufactured, which can 
be seen all over Cambodia and that are worn in particular by the 
peasantry as a head cover, a loincloth (for bathing) or as a carrying bag 
(Morimoto 1995). In the past Khmer Rouge soldiers wore the cotton 
krama as an expression of their pure Khmerness, and for this reason 
krama weaving was the only weaving activity permitted during the Pol Pot 
regime (Green 2003; Muan and Daravuth 2003). In a rather diffuse way, 
the bulk of Cham weavers manufacturing sarong in this region 
disappeared.60 The typical Muslim sampot, the sarong, is still woven by 
ten per cent of the silk weavers in this region, but nowadays also by 
Cambodian women who identify themselves as Khmers, Vietnamese and 
Chinese. According to them, Cham weavers died or fled the country 
during the Pol Pot regime, or are too poor nowadays to set up silk 
weaving enterprises like they do.61 The few Cham weavers who are still 
active in the cotton krama industry came up with a different story and 
complained that they were excluded from the more expensive and labor-
                                                 
59 Gillian Green (2003) mentions this, and silk  vendors from the Central Market confirmed this to me.  
60 Under the reign of king Ibrahim and his conversion to the Islam, the province kampong Cham was named 
after the following dominant appearance of the Chams in Cambodia.  
61  There is a scholarly debate going on in Cambodia about the causal relationship between Khmer Rouge 
ethnic politics and the high death toll among Muslim Chams. In ‘How Pol Pot Came to Power’  Kiernan (1985) 
argues that the massacre of Chams in the 1970s was a conscious ethnic act, while Michael Vickery (1984) takes 
a moderate position, arguing that Chams happen to live in the highest death toll working zones where most 
Khmers, Vietnamese and Chinese also died. 
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intensive ‘hol’ silk weaving industry by Chinese middlemen unwilling to 
provide them with credit and sell their silk clothes on the Phnom Penh 
markets.  
 
Table 7: Demographic figures of the silk weavers per region  
 
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Source: Dongelmans et al (2005: 43)  
 
Phnom Srok 
Although it has been argued in popular and academic writings that the 
Cambodian silk weaving industry boomed in the 1990s due to efforts of 
NGOs and tourists’ taste for authentic Khmer products (Morimoto 1995; 
Dahles and Zwart 2003), the 2001 silk survey indicated that the industry 
already boomed in the 1980s, and the 2005 loom census I participated in 
revealed that only ten per cent of the sampot production was 
manufactured for tourist use. Most of the tourist production took place 
in a commune called Phnom Srok near Siem Reap, a popular tourist 
destination. The Phnom Srok silk makers and silk weavers are all 
subcontracted by western NGOs to manufacture high-quality silk pidan 
and silk scarves, catering for wealthy Angkor tourists’ taste for 
 
Weaving regions 
 
Takeo               
 
Kandal                                                                                           
 
K.Cham/P.Veng
Total number of weaving looms 
  
10,486                        6,365          2,461    
Looms per household (average) 
 
1.32              1,95 1.28 
Age of the weavers (average) 
 
33 25 36 
Female headed household 
(perc.) 
 
40 53 40 
Gender division of labor (in 
females) 
 
95,9 75,8 99,3 
Inactive weaving looms (perc.) 
 
4,1 10,4 20,9 
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indigenous souvenirs.62 Especially the French NGO Projet d’Appui au 
Secteur de la Soie (PASS) has persuaded many farmers in the Thmar 
Puok, Chongkal and Samrong districts to cultivate mulberry plants and 
reel their own silk yarn again (PASS 2004). Although PASS trained some 
1,000 women in sericulture, their net production of only five tons of 
‘golden’ silk yarn in the year 2004 remains rather marginal, especially 
compared to the 300 tons used by the indigenous industry in eastern 
Cambodia.63  
 
Initially, most of the ‘golden’ Phnom Srok silk yarn was sold to another 
French NGO, the handicraft giant ‘Artisans d’Angkor’, owning five 
souvenir shops in Phnom Penh and Siem Reap (Miedema 2005). To 
manufacture silken scarves, pillows and wall-hangers (pidan) for wealthy 
Angkor tourists and galleries all over the world, Artisans d’Angkor 
subcontracted some eight hundred silk weavers organized in twenty-two 
workshops (ibid.). However, to serve the growing demand for Khmer 
handicrafts worldwide, the five tons of Phnom Srok silk yarn were no 
longer sufficient, and therefore Artisans d’Angkor established business 
ties with ‘regular’ wholesalers in Phnom Penh for the procurement of 
Vietnamese silk yarn (ibid.). This integration into the indigenous Chinese 
business networks and the use of Vietnamese silk yarn led to some 
consternation in the NGO handicraft world: how can one sell authentic 
Khmer products with Vietnamese imported silk yarn (ibid.)? Even more 
concern arose in the NGO world when the Silk Farm, the official 
government body meant to regulate the silk weaving industry in 
Cambodia, became the main shareholder64 of Artisans d’Angkor under 
                                                 
62 In the mid-1990s the Japanese textile expert Kikuo Morimoto subcontracted some sixty skilled weavers 
from a former flourishing weaving region, Tani, in Kampot Province.  
63 To put the five tons into perspective, the wholesalers in Phnom Penh import some 400 tons that are 
necessary to cater for the silk weavers in Eastern Cambodia. 
64 This also means that Artisans d’Angkor cannot be considered an NGO anymore, but a normal business 
organization.  
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the name Apsara and ended the cooperation with the other silk NGOs 
(ibid.). 
 
To assemble their power and business interests against this ‘obscure’ 
business alliance, ten smaller NGOs in Siem Reap and Phnom Penh have 
clustered themselves under another umbrella organization called ‘The 
Silk Forum’, led by Cambodian expatriate Nina You. Though 
disappointed by the ‘Silk Farm-Artisan d’Angkor’ alliance this NGO group 
has the same mission, namely to offer jobs to the war-stricken 
Cambodians and to give them back their sense of pride and identity at 
the same time. Among the members of the ‘Silk Forum’ the most famous 
silk reviver, at least from an international point of view, is the Japanese 
NGO Institute for Khmer Traditional Textiles (IKTT), led by the 
charismatic textile expert Kikuo Morimoto. Nearby the Angkor Wat 
temple complex, this former UN worker has cultivated an additional five 
hectares of mulberry plants on his ‘Forest Of Wisdom’, and reels another 
ton of silk yarn per year. Like his French counterpart Artisans d’Angkor, 
Morimoto subcontracts some two hundred silk weavers, many of them 
migrants from the eastern Cambodian weaving regions 65. Following the 
organizational principles of the American silk reviver Jim Thompson in 
Thailand,66 Kikuo Morimoto has positioned his yarn spinners and silk 
weavers under his house in Siem Reap town in an attempt to restore the 
image of silk weaving as a monolithic rural household activity. In terms 
of discourses, it is this relatively humble and foreign-led Phnom Srok silk 
industry that crystallizes a Khmer ideology around the Cambodian silk 
                                                 
65 In the mid-1990s the Japanese textile expert Kikuo Morimoto subcontracted some sixty skilled weavers 
from a former flourishing weaving region, Tani, in Kampot Province. 
66 Jim Thompson was an American businessman who came to Thailand in 1945 and set up a weaving 
enterprise in Bangkok with the help of Cham weavers from Thailand. The international media still considers 
him as the main reviver of silk weaving in Thailand. In 1967 Jim Thompson suddenly disappeared during a 
holiday in the Malaysian Cameroon mountains, leaving many unanswered questions about the how and why 
of his death.     
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weaving industry and links the 20,000 Cambodian weavers back to the 
12th century temple complex of Angkor.  
 
The Tan Chau spinnery 
Besides crystallizing Khmer discourses around the identity of the 
weavers and tracing the origin of the silk weaving techniques back to the 
temples of Angkor, the Phnom Srok stakeholders also framed stories 
around the downfall of the silk industry during the communist 1970 
revolution. According to the official ‘downfall story’ Pol Pot soldiers were 
the ones who cut the mulberry trees and destroyed the looms in a kind of 
iconoclastic fury against the elite character of the hand-woven sampot 
hol. Supposedly, Khmer women could not reel their own silk yarn 
anymore and came to be dependent on the much-hated Vietnamese for 
the procurement of silk yarn. Hence, to map the Cambodian silk weaving 
industry correctly, I had to cross the border and search for the silk 
worms in the Vietnamese highlands. The reason for this is that when 
Cambodia was at war in the 1970s, the Vietnamese government 
cultivated 200,000 hectares of land in the Western Highlands suitable for 
the growth of long-term industrial plants such as tea, coffee and 
mulberries (cf. Salemink 2000).  
In an attempt to change their economy from a bureaucratically 
centralized state company into a more decentralized market economy the 
Vietnamese administration handed over one million hectares of farmland 
from landlords to peasants in the Central Highlands and the Mekong 
River delta67. In the 1970s the Vietnamese government considered 
mulberry plants as a long-term industrial plant with the potential to 
develop the agricultural product processing industry in Lam Dong 
(Braun 2000). To stimulate skilled mulberry planters and silk yarn 
producers (mainly Kinh) from the overpopulated Red River Delta to 
                                                 
67 For a historical ethnography of the Vietnamese highlanders, see:  Salemink (2003b). 
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migrate to the western Highlands, the Vietnamese government offered 
these mulberry planters one hectare of land, a fixed state income, free 
silk eggs and the possibility to sell surpluses to private markets (ibid.). In 
line with the socialist statecraft principles of the Vietnamese government, 
the silk farmers came to operate under close supervision of a state 
company called ‘Vietnam Sericulture Corporation’ (VISERI), which 
created jobs for 40,000 rural laborers and produced 2,000 tons of silk 
yarn each year. 
But when I arrived in the western highlands in January 2004 I observed 
how the once-flourishing Vietnamese silk industry was in sharp 
decline.68 Although Lam Dong province was still VISERI’s largest 
producer of silk cocoons, the smell of tea and the sight of coffee beans 
drying on the pavement were signs that many farmers had already 
stopped reeling silk yarn many years ago and diversified into more 
lucrative crops such as coffee, tea and sunflowers.69 It appeared that in 
earlier years most farmers in the region were stimulated by VISERI to 
cultivate their land with mulberries, being offered them eight kilograms 
of free silk eggs every year. But three years ago ‘The Company’ suddenly 
stopped this practice and paid only a few hundred peasants to cultivate 
mulberries. Ten kilometers downtown, in Bao Loc city, a textile 
wholesaler complained that whereas VISERI stopped paying these 
farmers, they invested state money in roads, hotels and restaurants to 
attract tourists to the nearby Dambri Falls.  
 
                                                 
68 I am indebted to Frank Duong, who was my guide and translator for a week. 
69 This information is based on an interview I had with Nguyet Hoang (30), a silk breeder from Lam Dong who 
was taught how to plant mulberries from her mother, a Kinh  silk breeder from a town called Hau Tau near 
Hanoi. In 1975 her parents came to Bao Loc to start a farm there as they were offered three hectares of land. 
She took over the farm of her parents in the 1990s.  
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A young manager of the 2nd September silk70 filature in Bao Loc, one of 
VISERI’s eleven filatures, confirmed the decline of the sericulture 
industry in Bao Loc, but denied that most state money was used to 
stimulate tourism. According to him, VISERI did not stimulate farmers to 
reel silk yarn anymore because of the tough competition they faced with 
cheaper silk producing areas such as China and Uzbekistan. To prove 
his point the factory manager, dressed in a green army uniform, gave me 
a tour around his factory, pointed at the rickety reeling machines 
smelling of oil, and explained that the Vietnamese technology was too 
old-fashioned to compete with the modern silk reeling factories in China, 
Japan and Russia. While we were drinking coffee in his office the 
manager was very surprised to hear about the existence of a Cambodian 
handloom industry and admitted he had never heard of it. Perhaps 
caught by my disappointment he suggested to ask the same question to 
the owners of private filatures in Tan Chau, a border town in the lower 
Mekong region.  
The filature owners in Tan Chau knew very well about the existence of a 
Cambodian handloom weaving industry, because from the 1920s 
onwards this region was supervised by the French filature ‘La Compagnie 
de Soie du Cambodge et du Cochinchine’ (Henry 1932). For more than a 
decade French steamliners of ‘La Compagnie des Messageries Fluviales’ 
ran between filatures in Phnom Penh and Tan Chau and redistributed 
their cocoons, mulberry leaves and silk eggs to French export companies 
around Saigon. In the narrow streets of this charming, multi-cultural 
transit town, an elder woman with an impressive silk trade career owns 
three filatures. Although the filature owner was very busy and on her 
way to a family meeting in Saigon when I visited her, she agreed to talk 
with me about her trading past, because I had come from far away to 
meet her.  
                                                 
70 Named after the date 2 September when Vietnam declared independence. 
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Once we were sitting comfortably on brown leather couches and were 
drinking coffee, the ‘Silk Lady’ introduced herself as Mrs. Kieu (62) and 
explained how she had often joined her father on trade trips as a young 
kid. Her father, a Chinese immigrant, used to buy silk yarn from silk 
breeders in Mytho, Cho Moi and Lam Dong, and sold it to private 
companies and silk weavers all over the Mekong. At the age of fifteen she 
followed in her father’s footsteps and she knew practically every silk 
breeder, trader and market in the region. For more than thirty years she 
traded silk yarn to markets as far as the Thailand-Lao border town 
Sovanapaneth and the Vietnamese-Chinese border town Dong Dang. At 
the age of forty-eight Mrs. Kieu decided to invest her savings in a private 
silk-reeling factory in her hometown Tan Chau. Having good connections 
all over the Mekong delta and a good nose for business she became even 
more successful than the other legendary silk brand in Tan Chau, ‘Mi-
A’.71   
An important factor in her decision to open up a silk factory in Tan Chau 
was a growing demand for silk yarn from Thailand in the 1980s.72 
Because of this Cambodia became an interesting ‘transit hub’ in the 
1980s, as its post-war borders were extremely porous and the route to 
Bangkok a short one. Out of fear for the anti-Vietnamese attitude of the 
war-traumatized Cambodians, Mrs. Kieu did not dare to peddle the yarn 
to Bangkok herself but established trade relationships with fellow ethnic 
middlemen in Phnom Penh. To her own surprise - and she still feels 
lucky about this - these middlemen became huge silk yarn wholesalers 
themselves in the 1990s and to meet their demand for silk yarn she 
decided to open up two more silk-reeling factories in the mid-1990s. Like 
the manager of the 2nd September factory in Bao Loc, Mrs. Kieu also 
                                                 
71 Again, I had some difficulties translating this name. Interestingly, Dr. Philip Taylor, an expert in 
Vietnamese culture, confirmed that ‘Mi-A’ was a famous colonial silk brand name in the colonial and 
postcolonial era.   
72 As I already explained, allegedly Jim Thompson revived the Thai industry into a flourishing silk industry.  
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confirmed that most silk yarn nowadays no longer comes from Vietnam 
but from filatures in Uzbekistan and China. For her, however, this was a 
matter of rational reasoning which had nothing to do with her affection 
and passion for Vietnamese silk. Or, as she puts it herself:  ‘Vietnamese 
silk is very expensive. It costs 19 dollar per kilo. Uzbekistan silk is only 
13 dollar per kilo that is why I buy silk yarn from there’.   
 Map 2: silk weaving regions in Cambodia 
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The wholesalers and ‘their’ middlemen 
In the beginning of the 1980s the Tan Chau filatures established 
business ties with co-ethnic wholesalers in Phnom Penh, who in turn 
were subcontracted as brokers in a wider Vietnam-Thailand silk yarn 
trade. Female silk yarn traders from the weaving regions of Takeo and 
Prey Veng stepped into this trade niche and opened their shops near one 
of the four main markets in Phnom Penh. Today three of these silk 
pioneers operate from the Central Market (Banteay Srey, Neary Khmer 
and Heng Sourkia), one from the Old Market (Meng Kong) and one from 
the Olympic market (Kim). The wholesalers operate from Chinese 
courtyard houses, built in an urban housing style that can be found all 
over Southeast Asia. This housing style offers the wholesalers not only 
ventilation against the vicissitudes of the monsoon climate, but also 
enough space to store their batches of silk yarn. Characterized by 
Chinese symbols such as ancestral shrines, black and white photos of 
deceased family members and red lampions at the entrance door, they 
also symbolize which culture dominates the Cambodian business arena. 
Although two silk yarn wholesalers also market high quality sampot 
(Banteay Srey and Neary Khmer) the core business of all five wholesalers 
is the import of silk yarn from Vietnam. Although it is hard to find out 
how much silk yarn the wholesalers have in stock and who dominates 
this trade,73 some 300 tons, exceeding a market value of six million 
dollar, are necessary to cater for the 20,000 silk weavers annually.74 
What can be said though is that the five wholesalers control the silk yarn 
                                                 
73 The wholesalers were extremely cautious about showing me their silk yarn stock. Moreover, they might 
have stocked their silk yarn elsewhere as well, of course. However, the story goes that the Meng Kong 
wholesale shop has by far the largest silk yarn stock and that Meng Kong is a true millionaire.   
74 I reached this number by doubling the figure of 150 tons that Pujebet and Peyre estimated to cater the 
10,000 silk weavers in 2001. However, it is virtually impossible to get a grip on this trade, as official numbers 
do not exist.  
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trade in a conglomerate (see chapter five) and have filled their pockets 
very well through the silk yarn trade.  
 
To provide the weavers with silk yarn the wholesalers have subcontracted 
middlemen from the weaving regions to act as intermediaries between the 
rural weavers and themselves. At least from the colonial days onwards, 
French agronomists have observed the essential role middlemen play for 
peasants and craftswomen in the rural hinterlands, supplying them with 
a variety of services such as bulking, storing, transporting and crediting 
(cf. Delvert 1961). Middlemen have always bridged ‘rural-urban’ gaps for 
the silk weavers and have constantly provided them with silk yarn, dye-
stuff and loom materials such as frames, heddles, reeds, beams and 
rods. Another important task of middlemen is their role as ‘design-
brokers’ between the marketers in Phnom Penh and the silk weavers in 
the rural areas. Like in traditional supplier networks, the design 
relationships between the marketers (wholesalers and retailers) in Phnom 
Penh and the middlemen in the rural areas are characterized by large 
power asymmetries. The marketers, who know about the taste of the 
customers, give the middlemen blueprints of the kind of sampot their 
customers like (tjool tjut). The middlemen in turn enhance the blueprints 
to the weavers, who have to execute the sampot order in accordance with 
correct colors, weaving patterns and yarn thickness, within the arranged 
time period.               
 
Although it is hard to say how many middlemen are active in the silk 
weaving industry, Pujebet and Peyre (2001) came up with a number of 
several hundreds. Recently, however, Dongelmans et al. (2005:39-42) 
observed that a distinction has to be made between small and large 
middlemen and that the silk weaving industry is in fact dominated by 
some thirty to fifty large middlemen, each providing silk yarn to some 
400 silk weavers. The only region that seemed to lack such institutional 
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conditions is the Prey Veng/Kampong Cham silk weaving region, where 
many ‘loose’ middlemen arranged trade contacts with independent 
Vietnamese silk yarn traders, they referred to as smugglers. This is also a 
region in which middlemen do not become ‘petty capitalists’ such as in 
Takeo and Kandal provinces, but become agrarian industrials hiring 
hundreds of weavers and some sub-middlemen to work for them as 
factory workers. With regard to this dependence on smugglers, one 
middleman75 from the Kampong Cham/Prey Veng region told us76:  
 
‘I do not buy silk yarn from the bosses (the wholesalers) anymore, but I 
buy it directly from Vietnamese smugglers. First they came to my village, 
but now they sell their silk yarn at the central market. We work with 
mobile phones and they call me when they are in Phnom Penh. That is 
much cheaper, because one koli (two kilogram) of silk yarn costs 42 dollar, 
while the bosses ask 50 dollar or even more. The bosses do not like that of 
course and do not want to do business with me anymore’.   
 
The large number of small middlemen that Pujebet and Peyre (2001) 
counted, were probably silk weavers or humble traders who tried to 
peddle silk sampot for their family members in the Phnom Penh markets. 
Being used to focus only on their household, most of these sub-
middlemen had a limited understanding of the market and lacked social 
networks to trade their silks. This led Dongelmans et al. (2005: 39-42) to 
conclude that the strength of the middlemen as key players in the silk 
industry not only derives from the fact that they are willing to take a risk, 
providing silk on credit, and to look after the logistics of the weavers, nor 
solely from their management skills, but mostly from their social 
relations and skills to occupy a central position in the network of 
wholesalers, traders, middlemen, weavers and vendors. It is important to 
                                                 
 
76 Interview January 2005 
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note that only a few middlemen know how to use their social capital and 
how to gain trust with one of the five wholesalers for the procurement of 
credit (ibid.).  
 
As a result of this a trend is visible in which production areas are 
guarded by a few big middlemen, whether as petty producers or agrarian 
capitalists, which makes it possible for them to operate as monopolists 
and strengthen their position in relation to the weavers, due to their 
distribution networks with the wholesalers (ibid.). Both qualitative and 
quantitative research shows that the wholesalers-middlemen guilds 
control close to 75 per cent of the production in the large silk weaving 
areas of Kandal and Takeo, providing yarn on credit. As a consequence 
only 19 per cent of the silk weavers can afford to pay directly for the silk 
yarn, which means that almost all weavers are in constant debt to their 
middlemen, indicating once more the firm grip the wholesalers-
middlemen guilds have over the industry (ibid.). This also means that the 
wholesalers-middlemen guilds have transformed the silk sector into a 
closed system, which one can only enter on the basis of a social 
relationship. Another implication of this is that a weaver needs to be 
introduced to a middleman and a middleman again needs a wholesaler 
who is willing to provide him with credit (ibid.).  
 
The retailers 
Although the sampot marketing system is an amalgam of numerous 
selling sites77 rather than a single market, by far most sampot are sold at 
government- and private-owned markets in the capital city of Phnom 
Penh. In what Anthony Reid (1988) famously dubbed ‘the Age of 
Commerce’ (1450-1680), Cambodia shifted its capital from inland Angkor 
towards the river-based Phnom Penh. Due to its development as an 
                                                 
77 There is a large number of selling points in many market places in Cambodia, such as Battambang, 
Kampong Cham and Siem Reap. 
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entrepôt, Phnom Penh has always been a rare exception in the rural 
Cambodian landscape, because of its multi-ethnic, multicultural and 
cosmopolitan character. Although Cambodia did not urbanize as heavily 
as most other Southeast Asian nations, around 1.5 million Cambodians 
are nowadays living in Phnom Penh.78 Since 2001 the number of retail 
outlets in Phnom Penh has almost doubled due to the growth of the city 
as an urban economy. This doubling of silk outlets corresponds with the 
growth of the nationwide industry in its rural hinterlands, and the 
doubling of silk weavers from 10,000 (Pujebet and Peyre 2001) to more 
than 20,000 (Dongelmans et al. 2005) over the past four to five years.  
Although the silk vendors I interviewed found it hard to give exact 
information about customers, most estimated that some sixty per cent of 
their respective stock was sold to Cambodians living in diaspora. These 
‘foreigners’, like regular tourists, visit their motherland during holidays 
and fill their suitcases with sampot every year. It would certainly be 
interesting to investigate whether this trade must be seen as a tourist 
trade or a business trade.79                  
By far the most popular silk clothes market for Cambodian women is the 
Olympic Market, owned by the notoriously rich and highly controversial 
Cambodian business tycoon Theng Bunma. Besides being the owner of 
Cambodia’s biggest company Thai Boon Roong, the Intercontinental 
Hotel, Rasmei Kampuchea (Phnom Penh’s biggest newspaper) and head 
of the chamber of Commerce, Bunma is also suspected by the United 
States to be a powerful drug runner (Edwards 2004) and is mentioned in 
one breath with other Asian business tycoons such as Stanley Ho and 
                                                 
78 According to the CIA World Factbook (2005) the total Cambodian population is 13,607,069.  
79 Many diaspora customers told me that the sampot were distributed in their respective communities by a 
kind of Tupperware party system. Others told me there were regular silk shops in the US as well, owned by 
Cambodians. It would be fascinating to investigate how this silk trade has extended itself into the different 
diaspora communities and if these entrepreneurs are somehow related to the wholesalers and silk vendors in 
Cambodia.      
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Aw Boon Haw. Because of his controversial background Bunma is a close 
associate of prime minister Hun Sen and claims to have sponsored Hun 
Sen’s 1997 coup d’état against the Funcinpec troops. For the 
international press Bunma's biggest claim to international fame was the 
airplane-shooting incident in April 1997. Annoyed at the perceived 
rudeness of the airplane personnel he ordered his bodyguard to get him a 
gun. Once outside he shot at the airplane tires bragging that if this 
would be his staff he would have shot at them (ibid.). Backed by Prime 
Minister Hun Sen he was never convicted and continued to strengthen 
his position as Cambodia’s leading business tycoon.  
In the 1990s Theng Bunma bought the Olympic Market and used it as a 
transit hub for a wider and more lucrative Thailand-Vietnam trade. At 
the second floor of his extremely busy wholesale market, around fifty-
four retailers80 offer a wide variety of high quality sampot hol, phamung 
and sarong for sale. Having an average of 75,000 dollar of silk clothes in 
stock, the turnovers of these silk retailers are sky-high and their profits, 
exceeding seven hundred dollars per month, are skyrocketing for 
Cambodian standards. Without exception all silk retailers at the Olympic 
Market lack a background in the silk industry. A typical story is that of 
Kim Ry (45)81: 
 ‘I came to Phnom Penh in 1993 and bought this silk shop for 4000 dollar. I 
borrowed the money from my parents who owned a wholesale food shop 
in Kampong Cham. Our family diversified into the silk business, because 
my father thought that was a good business for a female. This is because 
most customers are females. Before I came here I did not know much 
about the silk trade at all. I started to buy sampot hol from a middleman in 
Veal village. Now I have many middlemen from Takeo, Koh Dach, Kandal 
                                                 
80 I counted them myself in March 2005, but there could easily be more stalls by now.  
81 Interview February 2005 
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province, and Prey Veng. My parents are Chinese, but also celebrate 
Khmer festivals such as Phcum Ben and Khmer New Year. But at home we 
follow the Chinese calendar and not the Khmer one and celebrate Chinese 
ceremonies such as saen kbal tuk, Chinese New Year and Cheng Ming. I 
consider Khmer to be my mother language and I also feel Khmer. But I 
want my children to learn Mandarin, too, because that is important on the 
market. Just listen, everybody speaks Mandarin here’.       
A second silk market where Cambodian women buy sampot is the Old 
Market, owned by a Taiwanese business group called ‘Jiayun 
International Group’. This group transformed the Old market from a 
humble food and fruit market into a large three-story white wholesale 
block in the mid-1990s. In general Taiwanese investment became clearly 
noticeable in Cambodia after the Taiwan Straits crisis in 1996 when 
China fired missiles in the vicinity of Taiwan. From that moment 
onwards the Taiwanese government actively promoted a ‘go-south policy’, 
encouraging Taiwanese to invest in Southeast Asian countries (Chan and 
Wang 2003), and in the same year around 4,000 Taiwanese businessmen 
invested huge sums of money in Cambodian garment and shoe factories 
(ibid.).  
With the arrival of the Taiwanese business group, the Old Market became 
a dump store for second-hand clothing from China, Taiwan and Korea. 
On the second floor of this dirty, shadowy and narrow market, some 
twenty-five retailers offer all kinds of sampot against fairly good prices. 
Having around 25,000 dollars’ worth of sampot in stock, their assortment 
is less varied and considered to be of lower quality than the sampot 
offered for sale at the Olympic market. Consequently the turnovers and 
the profits of the vendors are lower as well. Most of the silk vendors at 
the Old Market are again ethnic Chinese, and often the daughters of 
experienced retailers who already peddled silverware, handicrafts and 
From Worm to Sampot 
 
 155
sampot in the 1980s. As the silk clothes retailer Suy Chan Sitha (52)82 
explains: 
‘My father was professor at the University and could speak French and 
English. He was a koncen (Chinese-Cambodian). We were wealthy people 
and lived in a big apartment. My mother had a shop in silverware and also 
sold handicrafts from Laos and Thailand. She was also a koncen 
(laughing). After the war was over we bought a shop for eighty dollars 
worth of gold at the Old Market. The market was not so big as it is now, it 
was basically a food and vegetable market. We bought handicrafts from 
ambassador women my father knew. They often traveled to Laos and 
Thailand and sold handicrafts to us. Especially the Russians liked these 
handicrafts. It was a good business. Later we also sold sampot from 
Takeo province. In the beginning that was not such a good business and 
we had to sell handicrafts and silverware as well. After UNTAC came the 
silk business grew enormously and many Cambodian women bought 
sampot hol. I do not know why. I think because the king told them on 
television’.        
The sellers at the Old Market complained heavily about the bad smell, 
the muddy floors, the leaking roofs of the market and the high rents they 
had to pay to the managers of the Taiwanese business group. In the 
words of Um Chanboth (32):83 
‘Customers like the Olympic Market much better than the Old Market, 
because it is cleaner and does not smell fishy. In the rainy season the 
roofs here are also leaking and I have to cover my sampot with plastic 
bags. The Taiwanese company promised to solve this problem, but they do 
nothing. But they do ask high rents and offer only a small stall. If I want to 
expand my business I have to buy two shops. But that is too expensive. 
                                                 
82 Interview February 2005 
83 Interview January 2005  
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They also raised the price of electricity. Before the Taiwanese came I paid 
600 riel for one kilowatt, now 1200 riel ... But still, it is better to have a 
shop here than at the Central Market, because this market is not popular 
among Cambodians at all. Only tourists come there, but what if these 
tourists stay away?    
Although it is not popular among local Cambodians the Central Market 
(psah Thmei) is by far the longest standing and architectonically most 
impressive market in Phnom Penh. The Central Market dates from a 
1937 idea of the French town planner Ernest Hebrard, and became an 
important transit market for Chinese and Vietnamese entrepreneurs 
(Igout 1993). Because of its architectural beauty and its prominent 
position in all kinds of travel guides, the market attracts mainly Western 
expats and tourists. At the entrance of the Central Market some forty silk 
vendors try to draw tourists and Khmer expatriates to their stalls piled 
up with machine-made silk handicrafts and table clothes from Thailand, 
Laos and Burma, and, to a small extent, with sampot hol. ‘You want 
Khmer silk mister, good scarf for you mister, I give you good price, come 
to my shop, sit down here, Sir’. Most of the silk vendors at the Central 
Market are former weavers from Takeo and Prey Veng provinces who 
migrated to Phnom Penh in the 1990s. In the words of Chheang Chhun 
Eng (45):84   
‘My mother was a silk weaver from Takeo province and I learned silk 
weaving from her. Yes, she was koncen, but my father was Khmer. We 
only spoke Khmer at home, never Chinese. My mother sometimes went to a 
Chinese fortune teller. My father died during the Pol Pot regime and my 
husband did not like to work in the farm, because he is a dentist. So we 
decided to leave Takeo and I tried my luck as a silk vendor in Phnom Penh. 
                                                 
84  Interview January 2005 
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In the 1990s we sold our land and now I live here with my mother and two 
sisters’.     
The Central Market is also ‘the place to be’ for Cambodian expatriates to 
stroll around, to chat with each other and buy sampot for their family 
members and friends at home. Like the other ‘foreigners’, they visit the 
Central Market in the rainy ‘tourist season’ (June-September) and vendor 
profits can easily climb to four hundred dollars per month during this 
season. The downside of this, however, is that silk vendors at the Central 
Market need these profits desperately to bridge the ‘ploughing season’, 
ironically the most profitable selling months for their colleagues at the 
‘local’ market. As the handicraft retailer and former silk weaver Simon 
Tha (28)85 complained:  
‘It is much better to have a shop at the Old Market, because they can sell 
sampot all year. But a shop at the Old Market is too expensive. Therefore I 
sell sampot to tourists, but what if they do not come anymore? Last year 
[2002] during the bird flu tourists did not come to Cambodia and I did not 
earn much that year. But customers at the local market do not care about 
the bird flu. The government is also very bad for us. The only want tourists 
to visit Angkor. Really, tourists do not come to Phnom Penh anymore, they 
all go to Angkor. And what can we do? Give up our business?’  
The second ‘tourist market’ is the Russian Market (Psah Toul Tom Poung) 
owing its name to the shopping behavior of Russian Technical Assistance 
forces (RTA) in the 1980s. After the Vietnamese army defeated the Khmer 
Rouge in 1978, the Soviet Union became Cambodia’s single largest 
donor, supplying the country with vehicles, tractors, chemical fertilizers, 
and machinery, but also providing assistance with medicine, higher 
education and technicians for the restoration of the country’s 
                                                 
85 Interview January 2005 
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infrastructure (Desbarats 1995). Later on, in 1986, the Russians signed 
a trade agreement for a five-year period and at that time their economic 
aid, trade and cooperation with Cambodia was worth as much as $130 
million a year, representing eighty per cent of revenues for the national 
budget (ibid.).  
Today, the Russian Market is valued in the ‘Lonely Planet’ backpackers 
guide as the most popular handicraft market in Phnom Penh and 
attracts new handicraft vendors from all over the country every year. 
Every morning, tourist operators park their busses in front of the market 
to give tourists with well-filled pockets and zooming cameras the 
opportunity to buy authentic ‘Khmer’ silk handicrafts. At the Russian 
market some fifty vendors offer a wide variety of Laos and Thai silk 
handicrafts to these tourist groups, but contrary to the Central Market 
no sampot can be found at this market anymore.86  
Because of the extremely high mark-ups in the silk yarn trade (see 
chapter five) only three wholesalers sell a wide range of sampot, the most 
famous and illustrious of them being the Banteay Srey silk shop situated 
close to the Central Market. The Banteay Srey silk shop was already an 
icon in the French colonial period and is a family enterprise passed on 
from generation to generation (see chapter five). The sampot stocks of the 
wholesalers are diverse, impressive, and easily exceed 250,000 dollars. A 
remarkable social climber is La Maison de la Soie, which is by far the 
largest sampot dealer in Cambodia operating from the Russian Market. 
Unlike the Chinese-oriented wholesalers Banteay Srey and Neary Khmer, 
this wholesaler has crystallized a French colonial identity around his 
                                                 
86 When I arrived in Cambodia for the first time in November 2003, I saw many vendors selling Cambodian 
sampot at this market. However, when I departed in May 2005 no sampot could be found at this market 
anymore. Traders told me that after the Tsunami many vendors started to market cheap Lao and Thai silks 
due to lack of tourists in Thailand. These silks are sold as typical Khmer to tourists,  which also explains why 
only eight per cent of the weavers’ fabrics are produced for the tourist markets (Dongelmans et al 2005).       
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shop and attracts mostly foreign silk entrepreneurs buying ‘silk per 
meter’.87 The owner of La Maison de la Soie also differs from the ‘Chinese’ 
wholesalers88 in that he is easy to approach, illustrated perhaps most 
clearly by his characteristic morning greeting: 
‘Bonjour professeur, you want coffee, sit down, where do you want to talk 
about today’. 
Table 8: Retailers, stock and customers per market  
Markets 
 
Stalls Stock  Stock 
value($) 
Customers 
Psah Thmei 41 Sampot/handicraft
s 
10,000 Diaspora/tourists 
Psah Toul Tom 
Poung 
49 Handicrafts      - Tourists 
Psah Olympic 54 Sampot 75,000 Domestic/diaspora 
Psah O’Russey 25 Sampot 25,000 Domestic/diaspora 
 
The customers 
Although development agencies, academic scholars and the international 
media widely accept the idea that NGOs and tourists revived the silk 
weaving industry, Dongelmans et al. (2005) observed that the spectacular 
growth was in fact due to the increase of national and diasporic demand 
for traditional silk clothes, and only to a lesser extent to the interplay 
between NGO programs and tourists’ desire for authentic Khmer 
                                                 
87
 
The ‘silk per meter’ can be typified as a variety of phamung, but it is used for other purposes than dress-
making, for example furniture, curtains and other applications. The ‘silk per meter’ production in Prey Veng 
province is the result of foreign silk entrepreneurs operating their business in Cambodia since it became a 
member of ASEAN in 1999. 
88 This wholesaler was koncen as well. His father was a Chinese farmer from Kandal province and his mother 
a Khmer.  
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handicrafts (ibid.).89 Counting the number of looms and investigating 
production lines and consumer behavior showed that only eight per cent 
of the total production of silk sampot and handicrafts was manufactured 
for the tourist markets. By far the majority of sampot are sold to 
Cambodians themselves, in particular to the ‘new’ urban elite in Phnom 
Penh and the ‘old’ cultural bourgeoisie in diaspora. Although it is hard to 
estimate how many silk clothes are exported abroad, retailers and 
wholesalers in Phnom Penh mention figures that range between sixty and 
seventy per cent of their respective stock.  
 
The role of Cambodian American entrepreneurs, acting as intermediaries 
between home and host markets calls to mind the observations of Robin 
Cohen (1997), who points at Indochinese refugee minorities in the United 
States generating exports of their crafts to the Western world. Dahles and 
Zwart (2003) also rightly observed that American Cambodians came to 
visit their fatherland again after peace had been restored and acted as 
ambassadors for the export of craft products to the western world. Most 
Cambodian Americans buy their sampot in the ‘tourist season’ (June- 
September) and often combine their trade missions with family visits and 
sentimental journeys to the Angkor Wat temple complex. Although more 
specific research should be conducted on this trade issue, the few 
Cambodian Americans I chatted with told me that they filled their 
suitcases with sampot hol and re-distributed these to community 
members in the United States by means of ‘sampot parties’. Un Bunna, a 
Cambodian American silk ‘entrepreneur’ from Boston said the 
following90:  
‘I was a soldier during the war but asked asylum in Thailand after I lost a 
leg. For more than twenty years I have lived in Boston now and I have 
                                                 
89 In the 2005 silk survey we found out that only eight per cent of the total production of silk clothes are sold 
as handicrafts on the tourist market.  
90 Interview March 2005 
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married a Khmer woman there. Since the 1990s I visit my family in 
Cambodia and do a little business as well. I buy sampot for the Khmer 
community in Boston. In the US sampot hol are popular, because elderly 
ladies like them. Young Khmer women do not like to wear Khmer sampot, 
but dress themselves in the American style. The sampot hol business is not 
good enough for a living, but I can pay my airplane ticket and visit my 
friends and relatives here. I just got divorced and in the future I hope to 
return to Cambodia, because life is much better here now. From my 1000 
dollar pension in the US I can live more comfortably here’.         
As this Cambodian American silk dealer confirmed, the recent 
spectacular demand for sampot phamung in Phnom Penh is due to the 
taste of a fast-growing female middle-class in Cambodia and not to the 
US-based clientele. Like the elderly sampot hol customers, young 
Cambodian women stroll around the Phnom Penh markets between May 
and December, the so-called ‘Royal Ploughing season’. The ‘Royal 
Ploughing Ceremony’ inaugurates the planting season and dates back to 
the times when the reigning king traced the first furrows in the capital's 
sacred rice field. Today the ritual is performed at the start of the rainy 
season in late May each year, with representatives of the king taking on 
the role of King Meakh, who leads the yoke and plough, and Queen 
Mehour, who sows the seeds. Besides inaugurating the planting season, 
the Royal Ploughing Ceremony also symbolizes the start of an impressive 
religious, cultural and party season. Between March and December 
Cambodians plan their weddings,91 celebrate Khmer New Year, Labor 
                                                 
91 In Cambodia it is a custom for young couples to marry in the ‘ploughing season’. It is still common in 
Cambodia that families decide whether a partner is suitable or not. Each family appoints a representative to 
investigate the other family who makes sure that the other family is honest and, hopefully, wealthy. Once the 
two families agree to the wedding, they exchange gifts and consult an astrologer who chooses a lucky date for 
the ceremony. In line with the matrifocal kinship system the wedding ceremony takes place at the bride's 
house.  
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Day, the birth of the Buddha, Constitution Day, Pchum Ben92, Bon 
Kathen93, the birthday of king Sihanouk, Independence Day, the Water 
Festival (Bonn Um Tuk),94 Chinese New Year, farewell parties, 
housewarming parties, and so on. At all these religious and cultural 
occasions it is extremely important for Cambodian women to arrive in a 
correct silk sampot. Elder women normally wear a sampot hol while 
younger women usually arrive in a plain-woven flashily colored sampot 
phamung.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have attempted to answer my second research question: 
How is the contemporary silk weaving industry organized in terms of 
production and trade relationships? The ‘grand narrative’ about the 
Cambodian silk weaving industry has always celebrated its bounded and 
disconnected character and suggests that silk weavers still search for 
their own dye-stuff, plant their own mulberry trees and reel their own 
silk yarn. However, far from being disconnected from the outside world I 
have shown that the silk producers are members of multi-layered 
transnational business networks that ‘start as a worm’ in the Vietnamese 
borderlands and end up as a sampot in the United States of America.  
 
                                                 
92 Pchum Ben  is a religious ceremony in September when everyone commemorates the spirit of dead 
relatives. For fifteen days, people bring food to the temples or pagodas of their birthplace. On the fifteenth and 
final day, everyone dresses in their finest clothes and says prayers to help their ancestors pass on to a better 
life. It is a strong belief among Cambodians that those who do not attend the Pchum Ben  ceremony will be 
cursed by their angry ancestors.   
93 This ceremony lasts for 29 days, generally starting at the beginning of October, brings spiritual merit to 
the donors and affirms the vital bond between the sangha, the monastic brotherhood of Buddhism, and the 
community within which it exists.   
94 This festival takes place in late October or early November and marks the reversal of the Tonle Sap Lake 
into the Mekong River. The highlight of the three-day festival is formed by the boat races held in Phnom Penh 
where village representatives row against each other with their own canoes.  At the end of the festival, 
supposedly, the river will be happy, the fish will be plentiful and rice crops will flourish. 
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Mapping the main producers and traders from ‘worm to sampot’ this 
study has shown that the silk yarn used by the Cambodian weavers 
comes from private silk spinneries in Tan Chau, just across the 
Vietnamese border. The Tan Chau filatures import their silk yarn again 
from cheaper silk yarn-producing countries such as China and 
Uzbekistan. In the 1980s they established business ties with five 
wholesalers in Cambodia, situated around the Central, Russian, Olympic 
and Old Markets in the capital city of Phnom Penh. Initially the 
wholesalers functioned as intermediaries for a bigger Vietnam-Thailand 
silk yarn trade. Gradually however, they started to provide silk yarn to 
the Cambodian market and control the lucrative cross border silk yarn 
trade. To provide the silk weavers with raw materials the wholesalers 
subcontracted some twenty middlemen each, who again sell a large part 
of the finished silk clothes to the same wholesalers, and a remaining 
bulk to retailers in the main markets of Phnom Penh (ibid.).  
 
The Cambodian silk weaving villages are an amalgam of four craft 
communities situated along the banks of the rivers Tonle Sap, Mekong 
and Bassac in the lower Mekong delta. All four weaving areas have their 
own weaving specialties, which they consider ‘family secrets’. Over the 
last five years the amount of silk weavers has doubled from 10,000 to 
20,000 due to a growing middle class in Cambodia and the demand of 
overseas Cambodians for silk sampot. The booming tourist market does 
not affect the number of silk weavers significantly because most silk 
handicrafts are machine-made in neighboring countries such as 
Thailand and Vietnam. Although there are NGO initiatives to ‘revive’ 
sericulture techniques, they only provide jobs to some 1,000 silk 
weavers, four per cent of the total silk weaving force.   
 
Switching to the trader perspective, the exchange relationships between 
the silk traders and weavers are institutionalized in a hierarchical 
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patron-client system, in which the debtor at one level becomes the 
creditor of numerous other producers and smaller traders. This financial 
system has a pyramid structure, in which five powerful merchants 
manage some one hundred middlemen and 20,000 silk weavers by 
means of their cross-border connections and credit schemes. The 
hierarchical structure of the silk weaving industry also calls to mind the 
‘colonial’ revenue farm managed by a small number of wealthy 
merchants, who in turn control a much larger number of traders and 
manufacturers who again are bound to them by means of kinship ties, 
loyalty and obligation (Wilson 2004: 66). 
 
The hierarchical organizational structure of the silk weaving industry 
jeopardizes the neo-liberal argument that free-market based networks 
have replaced the command-based socialist ones in Southeast Asia 
(Zeleny 1999: 274). According to capitalist believers globalization, mass 
production and its requisite specialization of labor, task and knowledge 
has ‘forced’ Chinese enterprises to give up their ethnic boundaries and 
flatten their network structures (Gomez 1999). The reason for this is that 
global competition is forcing companies to increase their flexibility, 
responsiveness, timing and innovation and to do that they must diminish 
the need for hierarchical coordination (Zeleny 1999: 274).  
 
This chapter, however, has shown that the Cambodian silk weaving 
industry is still organized as a vertical hierarchy of command, in which a 
small wholesalers group dictates the cross-border silk yarn trade and the 
quantity and quality of production and trade of sampot. Both the 
middlemen and the silk weavers cannot act as autonomous and 
innovative entrepreneurs, because they live under the strict patronage of 
a wholesalers conglomerate. That is also why the cultural argument 
euphemizing ethnic Chinese business networks as harmonious 
Confucian-based family-systems does not match the vertical structure of 
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the Cambodian silk weaving industry. Its hierarchical command-based 
structure, on the other hand, gives credit to Gary Hamilton’s often-cited 
‘embeddedness’ theory (1996, 2000). This is because the institutional 
structure of the silk weaving industry still reflects an internal structure 
of socialism, an ideology prevalent in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. As 
indicated in chapter two, from their independence onwards Cambodians 
have lived under the command of socialist state paternalism, a command 
structure that still exists in the market arena. There is one difference 
though. After the failed Khmer Rouge revolution the commander of the 
silk weavers is no longer the Cambodian state, but has become a group 
of Pol Pot harrowed mostly, ethnic Chinese wholesalers.                  
  
Graph 1: Command pyramid structure of the Cambodian production and 
silk trade  
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Silk spinnery in Tan Chau. Photograph taken by the author. 
 
 
 
Tan Chau women spinning silk yarn inside the factory.  
Photograph taken by the author. 
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From Tan Chau silk yarn is transported over the Mekong river to  
wholesale shops in Phnom Penh. Photograph taken by the author. 
 
 
 
The Meng Kong wholesale shop in Phnom Penh.  
Photograph taken by the author. 
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The owner of the wholesaleshop ‘La Maison de la Soie’ .  
Photograph taken by the author. 
 
 
 
Middleman in Takeo province checking the quality of a sampot hol.  
Photograph taken by the author. 
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Middleman at the Saiwaa market (Takeo province) weighing silk yarn  
in front of her shop. Photograph taken by the author. 
 
 
 
Road in a weaving village in Takeo province.  
Photograph taken by the author. 
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Silk weaver winding yarn on a wheel.  
Photograph taken by the author. 
 
 
Silk weaver preparing her loom.  
Photograph taken by the author. 
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Silk weaver in Koh Dach working behind her loom.  
Photograph taken by the author. 
 
 
 
Grandma spinning yarn on a wheel. Granddaughter  
prepares the ‘hol’ frame. Photograph taken by the author. 
 
 
 
From Worm to Sampot 
 
 172
Husband of a silk weaver building up the loom.  
Photograph taken by the  author. 
 
 
 
 
Villageleader standing in front of his house.  
Photograph taken by the author.   
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Entrance of the Old Market in Phnom Penh.  
Photograph taken by the author. 
 
 
 
Retailer inside the Old Market paying a sampot  trader.  
Photograph taken by the author. 
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A young retailer selling krama to tourists at  
the Central Market. Photograph taken by the  
author. 
 
 
 
 
Cambodian-American entrepreneur buying ‘sampot hol’  
at the Central Market. Photograph taken by the author. 
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Cambodian men and women wearing a ‘sampot hol’  
during their  wedding ceremony. Photograph collected. 
http://www.cambodiaadoptionconnection.com/Overvi1.jpg 
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Chapter 5 
Dragons United: Ethnicity and trade relationships 
           
 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I want to answer my third research question: How do 
silk producers and traders negotiate their identities within the 
economic domain of the silk weaving industry? In so doing I will 
conceptualize the silk weaving industry as a flow of culturally 
grounded capitals and examine how the silk producers and traders 
use their identity symbolically to establish trust relationships, to 
obtain rents from the officialdom or to legitimize patron-client 
relationships. In the early colonial era the silk industry was still a 
myriad of connections that kept all the silk migrants, whether weavers 
or traders, embedded in a Chinese identity. After the introduction of 
the 1920 Civil Code, however, many ethnic Chinese gained citizenship 
and identified themselves as Sino-Cambodians (Edwards 2003). In 
1954 many Sino-Cambodians and ethnic Chinese became Khmers (col 
khmae) under a dubious citizenship law. Today, conversely, the 
wholesalers and middlemen present themselves as ethnic Chinese and 
the silk weavers and silk vendors say that they are ethnic Khmer. How 
can this shift of ethnic presentation be explained? 
Addressing the core theme of this thesis - how the Khmer 
modernization claim of the silk weaving industry relates to the 
network organization and diverging identities of the silk entrepreneurs 
- I will illustrate in the following two chapters that exhibiting a Khmer 
or Chinese identity must not be seen as a given fact, as a primordial 
affiliation or as state bio-politics, but as a form of symbolic capital 
(Bourdieu 1986) that marks powerful and unequal trade positions in 
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the silk network. I will present two case-studies in this chapter, one of 
a retired wholesaler and another one of a middlemen couple, in an 
attempt to understand why trade ventures in the Cambodian silk 
weaving industry still operate within the boundaries of Chinese 
ethnicity and why the silk producers refer to themselves as Khmer.  
Case study 
At the entrance door of the Banteay Srey silk shop two armed guards 
watched my steps with great suspicion. There were no customers inside and 
two young sellers watched a popular Thai soap, not showing any interest in 
me. The silk shop was shadowy and decorated ‘Chinese style’ with red 
lampions, a shrine filled with the deities ‘red face’, Mi-Lo Flo and Kuan Shih, 
and black and white photographs of ancestors. Carefully locked behind 
glass, huge vitrines were filled with particular kinds of sampot weaving 
techniques and place of origin. At the right wall vitrines were filled with 
phamung from Koh Dach and sarong from Prey Veng, and in the back of the 
shop behind the counter I recognized sampot hol from Takeo, while around 
the corner at the left wall red and white checkered krama and sampot hol 
from Prey Veng were for sale. Impressed by the huge stock of sampot my 
translator nudged me in the arm and whispered, ‘There she is, John, there is 
Mrs. Bun, can you see how nasty she is, she will never talk to us, shall we 
go, ok?’, pointing at an elderly lady taking a mid-day nap, lying on a red 
stretcher. To be honest I was a bit surprised. Was this elderly lady the 
notorious Silk Legend everybody had warned me for? Silk weavers and 
traders had praised Mrs. Bun for her excellent nose for the silk trade and 
her impressive clientele, including the Royal family, but had also told me 
how they feared her nasty, short-tempered character and her good 
connections with high-ranked government officials. They depicted Mrs. Bun 
as an inapproachable person, and as someone who would never speak to me 
about her business. Even the charming and charismatic Japanese silk 
expert Kikuo Morimoto had warned me about her bad temper and seriously 
doubted whether she would speak to me. To cut a long story short, the 
legendary Silk Lady indeed appeared to have a nervous, scary and introvert 
character and did not show any interest in me at all, complaining about how 
sick she was and how impossible it was to speak about her trading career. In 
fact, of all my fieldwork interviewees Mrs. Bun was by far the most difficult 
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personality I came across and I had great difficulties to stimulate her to let a 
few cats out of her bag and analyze her stocks, profits and 
business relationships.95 It took me another six months to collect stories 
together about her trade career and find out how Mrs. Bun could ever have 
become the Silk Legend she is considered now. Only at the end of my 
fieldwork period Mrs. Bun allowed me to interview her, on the condition that 
she would tell nothing about her business tactics, because these were ‘a 
secret in her heart’.       
 
Mrs. Bun did tell me that she was born in 1933 in Phnum Chambak, a small 
weaving town at the foot of Chiso Mountain (Takeo province) and that her 
father was a Chinese silk yarn merchant, who had migrated to Cambodia 
somewhere in the beginning of the twentieth century. As a child, Mrs. Bun 
often accompanied her father on trade trips to silk breeders in Tani and Prek 
Chang Kran and to sampot dealers in Phnom Penh. Her mother, a Chinese 
Vietnamese immigrant weaver, taught her how to judge high quality silk 
yarn and how to distinguish thick or thin woven sampot. Hence, being 
socialized and educated in a well-respected silk family, Mrs. Bun came to 
know the industry ‘as well as her own skin’. At the age of fifteen, like many 
other descendents of wealthy compradors, she went to a Cantonese school in 
Phnom Penh and learned the Cantonese language and other Chinese 
traditions. Because of her Chinese education she never celebrated Khmer 
New Year or Phcum Ben; only Chinese New Year and Chinese festivals such 
as the mooncake festival and the grave month (Cheng Ming). From her 
mother she also inherited a passion to worship Kuan Yin, a female deity she 
still loves very much today. Every day after she wakes up Mrs. Bun burns 
incenses and worships Kuan Yin on a little shrine placed underneath black 
and white photographs of her ancestors. Like many other ethnic Chinese 
Mrs. Bun visits the ‘achaa’ (lay priest) to ask for business advice, good 
health and protection from bad visitors.  
 
                                                 
95 When I visited the Banteay Srey silk shop one week later Mrs. Bun and her daughter were again 
extremely hostile to me and yelled that they could not speak to me because they had had an extremely 
bad trading day after I left the shop. In their opinion I was the bad visitor who had brought bad luck to 
the shop and for that reason I was not welcome anymore. In the end, it took me six months to shake off 
my identity as an angry ghost, but eventually we were on speaking terms again.  
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As a young woman Mrs. Bun often stayed at her uncle’s home, the Banteay 
Srey silk shop,96 and learned a lot about the silk business from him. Her 
uncle was even richer than her father and imported silk yarn from filatures 
in Vietnam, China and Japan. In the 1950s she returned to Phum Chambak 
where she married a state cadre and took over her parents’ business. She 
did not buy silk yarn from traders in Tani or Phnom Penh anymore, but 
directly from Vietnamese traders. In those days Mrs. Bun provided some one 
hundred silk weavers with silk yarn and distributed their finished sampot to 
wholesalers in Phnom Penh, Battambang, Kampong Cham and Kratie. 
During Sihanouk’s Sangum Reastr Reyum regime her business grew steadily 
and she became the ‘Thaoke’ (Boss) of some three hundred weavers. Mrs. 
Bun ‘confessed’ that these silk weavers were not ‘real’ Khmers, but that they 
‘col khmae’ (‘entered’) Cambodia, like her father. However, unlike her, the 
weavers became Khmer and adopted the Cambodian culture ‘in their heart’. 
Or, as she formulated it, ‘they (weavers] are people with Chinese skins and a 
Khmer heart’.  
 
In the 1970s the Khmer Rouge peasant revolution interrupted Mrs. Bun’s 
business career brutally, and she was transferred to a working zone around 
Angkor Borey together with her only daughter. Her husband was transferred 
to another working zone and was killed by Pol Pot soldiers. After the war was 
over she returned to her hometown and tried to pick up her old trade 
profession. However, the weaving villages were destroyed and many silk 
weavers had been killed during the war. Moreover, there were no more 
customers, as most of the Khmer and Chinese bourgeoisie, traditionally the 
wearers of the sampot had either died or fled the country. Hence, she 
decided to move to Phnom Penh to start a career in the flourishing black 
market as a contraband trader. Luckily she met some old trade friends from 
Vietnam in Phnom Penh, who approached her to fill a vacancy as a broker in 
a wider Vietnam-Thailand silk yarn trade. She decided to step into this trade 
                                                 
96 Some misunderstanding exists about the connection between the old and new Banteay Srey silk shop. 
In a personal conversation Kikuo Morimoto explained to me that there is no family connection between 
the ‘colonial’ silk shop and the contemporary one, however, Mrs. Bun explained to me that Banteay Srey 
was owned by a rich uncle of hers. What is clear is that Mrs. Bun’s father traded sampot to a familial 
wholesaler in Phnom Penh and all together I assume that this wholesaler was indeed the owner of 
Banteay Srey silk store who disappeared after the war.   
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niche and moved into one of the many empty courtyard houses around the 
Central Market, which she later named Banteay Srey.  
Being a war widow she managed the silk shop ‘matriarchal style’ and started 
to rebuild her silk empire again. To protect her business interests in the 
politically turbulent anti-Chinese 1980s Mrs. Bun co-operated with female 
silk yarn traders from Takeo province ‘to get bulk discount from the 
Vietnamese silk yarn merchants’. Mrs. Bun ‘admitted’ that she filled her 
pockets well thanks to the lively contraband trade between Vietnam and 
Thailand in the 1980s, mainly due to the extreme porous postwar border 
system.97 To her own satisfaction however, cross-border traders, working in 
the Thai borderlands, started to ask for hand-woven sampot again in the 
early 1980s, which made her decide to re-establish business relationships 
with silk weavers in Takeo. Based in Phnom Penh she could not sell the silk 
yarn directly to the weavers anymore, hence she decided to subcontract 
brokers, fellow-villagers, as intermediaries to cater the silk weavers with silk 
yarn, to guard the speed of production and the quality of the sampot and to 
distribute the sampot to her shop. Initially she worked with many 
middlemen, but gradually she established business relationships with only a 
few of them. Mrs. Bun clearly remembered ‘the sampot rush’ in the 1980s 
and still smiled when recollecting how traders offered her high prices in 
those days, even for second-hand sampot. Although she had no clue where 
the sampot went to, she did know for sure that hers is the most popular 
shop among members of the Cambodian Royal House, commoners and 
Cambodians living abroad nowadays. Although she considers it a trade 
secret how many sampot she peddles to ‘foreign’ Cambodians, she did 
mention relatives in the United States and other ‘Khmer Americans’ who 
come to her shop to buy sampot. Talking about her relatives in the United 
States she also revealed that her grandson wants to go to study at the 
university there and open a business later. In the beginning of the 1990s her 
daughter took over the silk shop because she herself was ‘sick in the head’ 
after the atrocities of the Pol Pot working camps’.98 Luckily her daughter, 
                                                 
97 Other silk traders remember very vividly how silk yarn in the 1980s was smuggled into Cambodia tied 
under speedboats a trade system, which stopped when border patrols. 
98 Many Pol Pot camp survivors suffer from post-traumatic stress syndrome and have similar complaints 
about their psychological and physiological well-being.   
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who had just married a high-ranked state cadre from the People's Republic 
of Kampuchea (PRK) Commerce Department, wanted to take over her shop 
and run the business together. Although Mrs. Bun has retired a long time 
ago she is still a highly-respected trader among the middlemen, as they 
always bend benevolently for her and call her ‘ama’ (elderly lady). Today, 
after a turbulent trade career, she enjoys her well-deserved elder age period 
and makes holiday trips to Macau, Shanghai and Hong Kong. Not to do 
business, she said laughing, but as a tourist.     
A feminized business 
The powerful trade position of Mrs. Bun demystifies the adagio that 
Chinese women are good at weaving, but lack cultural skills, social 
mobility and political connections to steer the marketplace themselves 
(Bell 1999: 119-120). Although most silk weaving regions in China 
and Southeast Asia are gendered on a production level it is widely 
accepted that the storing, bulking and peddling part is still in men’s 
hands (ibid.). The story goes that Confucian doctrines have placed 
Chinese women stiffly behind their looms forbidding them to peddle 
woven clothes on the markets themselves. Recently Linda Bell (1999), 
while studying the Southeastern Chinese silk regions, did not find 
evidence that women personally benefited from their looms and 
observed that earnings were collected at the market place by their 
fathers, husbands and brothers (ibid.).  
Marjorie Topley (1975) and Andrea Sankar (1978) observed, though, 
how some of the ancestors of the Cambodian silk weavers in Shunde 
County had organized themselves in ‘sister organizations’, which stood 
up against the traditional foot-binding practices and subordination to 
men. In Southern China these weaving women came to be known as 
lesbians who refused ‘to go down’ to another family (pu-lo-chia), a 
gender-consciousness that derived from female role models such as 
the Goddess of Mercy, Kuan Yin (ibid.:123). In contrast to the 
Confucian gender ideology the life history of Kuan Yin glorifies the fact 
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that she was a princess who became a nun and thus had no husband 
to claim her devotion (ibid.: 124). Believing in this folk tradition silk 
weavers in Shunde County considered non-marriage not only natural 
but also desirable to protect their businesses, and for this reason did 
not move into the natal compound of men (ibid.).99 Although it was not 
possible for the Shunde County silk weavers to steer the market place, 
the silk industry did have a feminist streak in Southwest China.   
Once in Cambodia gender moralities around production and trade 
professions changed in favor of female ethnic Chinese immigrants. 
Similar to the Chinese emissary Zhou Daguan in the twelfth century, 
they witnessed how Khmer women accompanied Chinese men on 
trade missions, and must have noticed the absence of Khmer men in 
the market place. Scholars have often wondered why Southeast Asian 
women peddle at market places and why their husbands see 
moneymaking, in the words of Robert Hefner (1998: 24), as an 
unflattering trait. One argument goes that Khmer men, as devoted 
Buddhists, like to hand over their salary to their wives, afraid as they 
are that their material desires might affect their karma negatively.100 
Another argument holds that upon marriage Khmer husbands often 
go to live with the family of the bride and, in contrast with the Chinese 
kinship system, are considered a loss to their natal compound. 
Although in theory Khmer men have equal rights through marriage, in 
practice the house, land and other kinds of material properties often 
become ‘ancestral property’ of the wife’s lineage.101 Similar to Negeri-
Sembilan Malay men (Peletz 1998:173-200), Khmer men prefer jobs in 
the political, religious and administrative domain, providing 
themselves with a separate base for social identity and self-esteem. As 
                                                 
99 In Cambodia an exceptionally large number of silk weavers were unmarried too (Dongelmans et.al. 
2005), because they regarded men as a danger to their businesses because men would spend their last 
pennies on drinking.  
100 Although the Buddha does not prohibit his followers to accumulate material wealth, this is not highly 
valued in discourse, and men, afraid to spoil their karma, rather take non-commercial jobs as teachers or 
monks or serve the administration as state cadres.  
101 At least this is what Cambodian men told me personally. 
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a consequence, they have never learned how to handle the money pot 
at home. Thus, if we embed female ownership of the Banteay Srey silk 
shop into the Khmer habitus crystallized around male religious 
behavior and professions, female ownership is no longer an anomaly. 
This is also why the five wholesalers Mrs. Bun, Mrs. Heng, Mrs. Kim, 
Mrs. Kong, and Mrs. Mong in Phnom Penh could inherit the business 
from their fathers, giving the industry an indispensably feminist 
streak from the postcolonial period onwards.  
In the 1960s Mrs. Bun had a well-running silk business, but tragedy 
struck her personal and professional life as Pol Pot soldiers forced her 
to move to another region in the mid-1970s and killed her husband 
and many other relatives. Only after Vietnamese troops had defeated 
the Khmer Rouge regime could she return to her village, which had 
become, as any other town, nothing more than a ghost town. It was in 
this period of total chaos and destruction that she rediscovered her 
old trading partners in Phnom Penh, who asked her to function as a 
broker in a wider Vietnam-Thailand silk yarn trade. But Mrs. Bun was 
not the only one who stepped into the lucrative cross border silk yarn 
trade and admitted she combined her business interests in a female 
conglomerate with her fellow silk yarn traders from Takeo Province, 
Mrs. Kim, Mrs. Heng, Mrs. Meng and Mrs. Sourkia. As the latter 
wholesaler explained102: 
‘Before the war I was a merchant in Takeo province. The silk industry 
was only small and only rich people bought sampot in my shop. They 
were governors, professors, businessmen. In these days some weavers 
had their own mulberry gardens and reeled their own silk, but most silk 
yarn already came from Vietnam and China. The Chinese even had 
their own reeling factories in Phnom Penh. Sihanouk did not care about 
this, because he did not invest in mulberry plantations but only in 
cotton. Most of the Vietnamese silk yarn was redistributed to Thailand, 
                                                 
102 Interview March 2005  
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which was a much bigger market. In the Sihanouk era my father bought 
silk yarn from traders in Phnom Penh, Tan Chau and Hanoi and sold it 
to weavers in Cambodia and Thailand. After the war was over I 
continued his silk business and bought silk yarn from Vietnamese 
traders. I knew them very well because of my father of course. For the 
distribution to Thailand I first subcontracted Thai traders, but they 
cheated on me and that is why I subcontracted Khmer traders from 
Poipet. Today I am still a wholesaler for some twenty middlemen, but I 
am also a hotel owner now and bought this hotel in 2004. It is true I 
work together with other wholesalers for the procurement of yarn. We 
have been working together already for twenty years. I know them very 
well, because they are from Takeo as well. We are all middlemen there’.   
 
This raises the question why these former silk yarn brokers, obviously 
each other’s competitors before the war, would bundle their forces in a 
closely-knit female sister-organization103 after the war, which took the 
form of a conglomerate. Let us continue Mrs. Bun’s trade career and 
see if we can find out why a shared Chineseness was so important for 
Mrs. Bun in the aftermath of the war.    
 
A female conglomerate 
After the war Mrs. Bun, now a widow with only one daughter left, 
returned to the village of Chambak in Takeo province to pick up her 
former profession as a silk yarn trader. However, she only found a 
desolate village, as many weavers had been killed or had fled the 
country during the Pol Pot war. For Mrs. Bun, like most Cambodians, 
survival became a matter of personal initiative and she went to Phnom 
Penh to find a job as a petty trader. In Phnom Penh she observed how 
everything was for sale on the roadsides ranging from vegetables, fruit, 
meat, fish, and shoes, to radios, guns, old clothes and so on. Most of 
the commodities came from Thailand and were smuggled in by tens of 
                                                 
103 I deliberately use the term ‘sister organization’ to emphasize the feminist character of the 
conglomerate structure.  
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thousands of cross border traders, all Chinese Cambodians or ethnic 
Chinese (Gottesman 2003: 88-89).  
 
It was in the crowded street side around Phnom Penh that Mrs.Bun 
discovered her old trading partners who asked her to host in the 
Vietnam-Thailand silk yarn trade. Mrs. Bun’s immediate decision to 
grasp this trade opportunity calls to mind the ‘gold rush’ mentality 
Chinese entrepreneurs are praised for, as well as their ability to 
deploy opportunity networks in politically and economically turbulent 
times. In Cambodia two rumors circled around Mrs. Bun’s early 
success; the first one being that she was financially backed by wealthy 
family members in the United States, and the second that she had 
hidden all her gold under her house and had only had to dig it up 
once the war was over.104  
 
But whether or not Mrs. Bun was a ‘gold digger’, or had a rich sugar 
uncle in the United States, the ‘new’ PRK leadership, most of them 
disillusioned Khmer Rouge cadres, harbored deep worries about the 
re-emergence of the Chinese opportunity networks between Bangkok, 
Phnom Penh and Ho Chi Minh city (Gottesman 2003:175-176). Just 
like the Khmer Rouge regime, the ‘newly’ established ‘People’s 
Republic of Kampuchea’ (PRK) developed an extremely hostile attitude 
against its Chinese businessmen and stigmatized them as communist 
spies, sponsors of the Pol Pot regime and greedy merchants destroying 
the domestic economy (Edwards 2003). The PRK Party congress, again 
like the Khmer Rouge regime, was obsessed with the growth of a 
renewed urban Chinese middle class, and accused them of 
antagonizing the Khmers from trade positions and of disturbing the 
domestic economy (Gottesmann 2003:173).  
 
                                                 
104 I am not sure whether this story is a myth, but many traders told me about Cambodians digging for 
gold under the houses of wealthy Chinese after the war was over.     
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To break the Chinese class dominance the PRK regime wanted to 
gather information on the nature of the postwar Chinese business 
networks and established an extremely anti-Chinese committee, ‘the 
Central Committee to Examine and Research and Guide 
Implementation of the Policy Regarding the Chinese in Cambodia’ 
(ibid.). In an attempt to uncover the nature of the Chinese business 
networks, a guide line, called ‘Circular 351’, gave instructions to state 
cadres to inquire into Chinese people’s citizenship status, geographic 
origins, their families, their length of stay in Cambodia, their overseas 
connections, language abilities, political leanings, and past affiliations, 
including whether they had worked for the police, the military or the 
courts of Sihanouk, Lon Nol or Pol Pot regimes (ibid.).  
 
Penny Edwards (2003) has qualified ‘circular 351’ as a racial policy 
and a political pawn against the PRK support of the Khmer Rouge 
regime. She argues that many Chinese, afraid of being labeled ‘351’, 
assumed an overtly Khmer identity, bribed their way into a Khmer 
name, darkened their skin or stopped speaking Chinese in public. 
However, Edwards fails to mention that circular ‘351’, like the DK 
policies, was not directed ‘against the Chinese race’, but mainly 
‘against the Chinese gentry class’ that had been dominating the 
Cambodian economy and officialdom from the nineteenth century 
onwards. She also omits the discrepancy between the ideology behind 
‘351’ and the actual implementation of it by poorly educated and ill-
paid state cadres. To the frustration of the PRK party congress, the 
implementation of ‘351’ failed dramatically because the ethnic Chinese 
merchants simply bribed the ill-paid state cadres and gave false 
information about their enterprise and lineage background. Hence, 
Chinese merchants may have stopped speaking Chinese and 
worshipping their deities in public, but backstage they successfully 
resisted the ‘351’ label and organized themselves in conglomerates. 
 
Dragons United 
 
 188
To oppose the assimilationist measures of the PRK government and to 
protect her business interests at the same time, Mrs. Bun organized 
herself in a female conglomerate based on a Shunde County native 
place of origin, Kuan Yin ancestral worship rituals, fellow provincial 
ties and comprador class membership. She did not use her Chinese 
identity as a means to impress lower-ranked weavers this time, but as 
an ideology of solidarity in reaction to the alien status the ethnic 
Chinese had in the 1980s. That is also why Light and Rosenstein 
(1995:19) describe this form of ethnicity as a reactive response in 
order to establish boundaries, and hence solidarity among fellow 
ethnics. Building identities vis-à-vis an enemy, in this case the Khmer 
state, also builds on Laclau’s (1990) notion of social antagonisms, and 
illustrates the strategic and political character of hybrid identities. 
This is because to become accepted as a conglomerate member in the 
hostile 1980s Mrs. Bun had to silence her Khmer identity and use her 
Chineseness as symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1986) to transnationalize 
her silk enterprise across the Vietnamese and Thai borders in the 
1980s.      
 
However, as Mrs. Bun explained, not only merchants from Vietnam 
approached her to function as a broker; Cambodian traders from the 
Thai borderlands asked for silken sampot as well. To cater to the 
demand for hand-woven sampot Mrs. Bun decided to re-establish 
business ties with middlemen from her own weaving villages in Takeo. 
Mrs. Bun preferred long-term credit relationships (tjumpah) with some 
ten middlemen over short-term ones with hundreds of them. To reveal 
what role Chinese ethnicity, as social, cultural and symbolic capital 
(Bourdieu 1986), plays in the patronage-based credit relationships 
between the wholesalers and the middlemen I have included another 
case study, this time the trade career of a young middlemen couple, 
Mr. Mong and Mrs. Heang, as the situational use of their Chinese 
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background appears symptomatic for most middlemen couples I came 
across.105  
 
Another case-study 
Mr. Mong (42) and Mrs. Heang (38) are the proud owners of a large rural silk 
enterprise in Kpam village, which is perhaps the most productive weaving 
region in Takeo Province with some 183 active looms. As usual in weaving 
villages the main road of Kpam village is relatively empty with only a few 
chickens, pigs, dogs and monks strolling around looking for food. Perhaps 
Mr. Mong is the most active user of this road, as he drives around all day on 
his Honda motorbike to check if the weavers spend his investments and 
credit wisely. Mr. Mong does this because he is afraid that the weavers do 
not manufacture the correct color or patterns and that he will lose his forty-
five dollar silk yarn investment that way. Among the Kpam villagers Mr. 
Mong is not only considered handsome, but also a well-respected figure, 
perhaps even more than the village leader, because he is the Thaoke (boss) of 
all Kpam weavers, the main sponsor of the local school and has good 
connections with the officialdom. Villagers also look up to Mr. Mong because 
he finished his studies of economics at the university of Kampong Som106 
just before the beginning of the Pol Pot war and is considered a true 
intellectual for this reason. During the Pol Pot war Mr. Mong stayed in 
Kdanh commune and was ordered to work on the surrounding rice fields by 
Pol Pot soldiers. Although he did not like to work on the rice fields, life 
continued relatively normally in Kdanh commune and Pol Pot soldiers were 
not hard on him. After the war was over Mr. Mong married a weaver from a 
neighboring village and moved into her natal compound. Unlike many other 
Kpam men he did not want to cultivate rice and walk behind an ox all day 
but wanted to find a trade job in Phnom Penh. Although he was a degree 
holder in economics he knew he lacked connections to find a job in the PRK 
administration, whereas he also considered this a low-paid job. Hence he 
tried to get a foothold as a petty trader in the post-Pol Pot war economy 
selling all kinds of things in Phnom Penh such as lemon grass, wine, fruit, 
and the sampot of his family in law. For years he carefully re-invested profits 
                                                 
105 I often met the powerful middlemen in the wholesale shops and made appointments there to meet 
them in their weaving villages later and talk to them about their trade careers. 
106 Kampong Som is the old name of Sihanoukville. 
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of other trades in batches of silk yarn and after a few trading years he was 
able to buy silk yarn cash and become a middleman for some five weaving 
families in Kpam village. His business grew very slowly and initially he found 
it very hard to obtain silk yarn on credit from wholesale shops such as 
Banteay Srey, Neary Khmer and Heng Sourkia. In fact it took him five 
trading years before wholesalers started to kchey (lend) silk yarn to him and 
considered him a trustworthy business partner. Mr. Mong knew he had 
become a good customer of Mrs. Bun when she invited him and his wife to 
attend a dragon dance she had organized in her shop during Chinese New 
Year and attended a housewarming party of the young couple a few months 
later. For Mr. Mong this was a huge step forward in his trading career 
because in Cambodia visiting each other’s house is considered crucial to 
become a trustworthy trading partner. And once he was a trustworthy 
trading partner and could obtain silk yarn on credit Mr. Mong could become 
a middleman for hundreds of weavers and transform his humble petty 
enterprise into one of the largest rural silk enterprises in Cambodia. To 
modernize and professionalize his small silk yarn enterprise Mr. Mong 
decided to leave his wife’s natal compound and build a courtyard house at 
the outskirts of Kpam village with the financial help of friends and family 
members. The young couple decided to run the silk business together and 
his wife gave up her weaving enterprise to manage the money pot for her 
husband. This in turn gave Mr. Mong the opportunity to make more trade 
trips to Phnom Penh and bond with the local officialdom. Separated from her 
natal compound Mrs. Heang was often alone in her courtyard house and had 
to get used to her new role as Thaoke (boss) of the weavers. Suddenly she 
was not one of the girls anymore, but a credit provider and a quality checker 
who had to bargain with former colleagues. Suddenly she did not have to ask 
for credit lines anymore but note them in a notebook. Suddenly she did not 
have to tie yarn into hol frames anymore, but weigh them carefully to ensure 
that she did not give too much silk yarn on credit. And suddenly she did not 
have to sit for hours behind a loom anymore, but search finished sampot for 
weaving mistakes with her finger tops. The weavers however did not bother 
about her role change at all and respected Mrs. Heang very much, precisely 
because she was ‘one of them’, because she had woven sampot for more than 
ten years and had climbed socially to the position of a well-respected silk 
lady. The weavers also consider Mrs. Heang a nice person, because she is a 
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calm bargainer, lives to the rules of the chbab srei107 and serves coffee and 
rice while they have to wait for her judgment outside her shop. Mr. Mong 
likes his wife very much for this reason and once joked, ‘her beautiful face, 
good character and happy smile are why Mr. Meng Kong [the wholesaler] 
likes my shop so much and gives me credit’.     
 
The image of the lazy Khmer 
As the above case study shows, the ancestral roots of Mr. Mong and 
Mrs. Heang, like those of Mrs. Bun herself, lie in the Southern 
Chinese weaving districts, and they were born in a weaving village 
only a few miles away from her own birth place. Although Mr. Mong 
introduced himself as a co-ethnic, co-villager and co-worshipper to 
Mrs. Bun, he only received credit after Mrs. Bun had visited his house 
a few trading years later. Other middlemen also complained about the 
impossibility to obtain credit from a wholesaler within in a short 
period of time, and without him/her attending a wedding, ‘tweu bon’ 
ceremony or funeral first. As one middleman from Tra Peang Ta village 
recalled108: 
 
 ‘I remember very well I invited Mr. Meng Kong to my house for the 
wedding of my daughter. I was very nervous because if he would not 
come he did not like me as a regular customer. Luckily he showed up 
and gave me an envelope with money’.   
 
There is nothing new about searching for long-lasting credit 
relationships, because long-term continuous transactions have been 
recognized by anthropologists and sociologists as being effective in 
forging mutual trust and cooperation (cf. Burt 2005). In what Clifford 
Geertz (1978) calls a process of clientelization, mutual trust created by 
long-term continuous transactions is often reinforced by multiple 
interlinked transactions. Mayfair Yang (1994) also indicates that the 
                                                 
107
 
The traditional code of conduct for Cambodian women. This code of conduct tells Cambodian women 
how to be demure, respectful, caring, moral and discreet persons.  
108 Interview October 2004 
Dragons United 
 
 192
psychological basis of mutual trust can further be strengthened by 
incorporating personal elements into business transactions, such as 
exchanging gifts and attending weddings and funerals. This process of 
forming ethnic partnerships through continuous and multiple 
interactions has been referred to by Kotkin (1993) as the ‘ethnic 
advantage’ by which he means that a shared ethnic identity forms the 
basis of the success of Chinese traders in modern Southeast Asia.  
 
To understand why the wholesalers Mrs. Bun and Mr. Meng Kong 
want to see the village, the family and the homes of their business 
partners it is important to know that, unlike in the western world, 
business transactions in Cambodia are not backed by a well-
functioning legal system. In particular traders introducing a new 
commodity on the market such as silk clothes must be careful when 
looking for reliable and trustworthy business partners. For Mrs. Bun, 
a shared ethnic Chinese identity, fictive or not, gives her confidence 
that the middleman couple will not become nervous of credit lines and 
will not cheat on her in the lawless Cambodian business arena. This 
also means that the middlemen couple Mr. Mong and Mrs. Heang, 
socialized as ethnic Khmers, had to eclipse their Khmer identity vis-à-
vis Mrs. Bun and present themselves as ethnic Chinese to her. 
Illustrative for his strategic and negotiated use of Chinese identity Mr. 
Mong once said to me109;  
 
‘if I am in my shop in Takeo I feel Khmer. Then I wear a sarong and I 
walk around on bare feet. But when I am in Phnom Penh I always wear 
pants and white trousers. The wholesalers like that’.   
 
Mr. Mong cannot wear a sarong in Phnom Penh because that would 
make him, rightly or not, a not-to-be trusted Khmer in the midst of 
                                                 
109 Interview November 2004 
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the wholesalers. As the wholesaler Mr. Kong once said about the 
Khmer110;  
 
’Khmer do not know how to kchey [borrow], they only know how to give 
away (aawie) money to their relatives. So how can they pay me back in 
time?’  
 
Mr. Heng Sourkia, another wholesaler, was even more outspoken in 
his distrust of the credit qualities of the Khmers111:  
 
‘Khmers are lazy people, do not know how to work hard and spend 
their money drinking beer in bars’.  
 
The same wholesaler also told me112,  
 
‘I have been betrayed many times when people came into my shop and 
told me they were middlemen. Once I gave them the silk yarn, they left 
and never came back. I know these were Khmer people because they 
were black’.  
 
The moral judgment about the lazy and non-commercial Khmer is an 
echo of the French administrators, who favored the Confucian-trained 
ethnic Chinese and Vietnamese immigrants for their commercial and 
officialdom qualities (Osborne 1994). However, we cannot see the 
distrust of Mr. Heng Sourkia against the Khmers separately from past 
Khmer hostility against him and his family. It is widely accepted in 
Cambodia that the Chinese comprador class was hit hard during the 
Khmer Rouge revolution for their colonially inherited trade positions. It 
is well documented that between 1975 and 1978 dark-skinned, 
uneducated Khmer youngsters, often from humble backgrounds, 
                                                 
110 Interview June 2004 
111 Interview March 2005 
112 Interview March 2005 
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humiliated, tortured and brutally murdered family members of the 
wholesalers. After the war the Khmers continued to humiliate the 
Chinese population. To put it bluntly, perhaps drawing overtly sharp 
ethnic boundaries between the Khmers and the Chinese, the following 
question can be raised: Why would a wholesaler give a Khmer tenant 
the opportunity to climb socially if Khmer soldiers killed their family 
members in the Pol Pot working zones and/or made distasteful jokes 
about them in the 1980s?  
 
Against the background of this stereotype of the lazy, unproductive 
and unreliable Khmer we must analyze the wholesaler’s wish to visit a 
middlemen’s house and his satisfaction to see couples living in a 
Chinese courtyard house. During the house visits the wholesaler is 
evaluating the way the middleman has presented himself in Phnom 
Penh and testing his reputation113 as a creditworthy businessman. 
Once the wholesaler has reached the spot, many questions go through 
his mind: how is the house of the middlemen couple decorated, does 
he have expensive furniture, are his children well dressed, is he able 
to store the silk yarn safely? The wholesaler is also there to find out if 
the middleman is well-respected in his community, if he is a hard 
worker, a good patron for the weavers, if he pays his debts in time, if 
he is on speaking terms with the local officialdom, whether he has 
family or lineage members that support him financially, etc. The 
wholesaler thus attends a middleman’s wedding or birthday party to 
chat, or better, to gossip, with ‘third’ parties about the creditability of 
the middleman and his membership of local credit-rotating 
associations, and to find out if there are any bad stories circulating 
about him.  
 
                                                 
113 Ronald Burt (2005: 100) writes that reputation is fueled in part by people getting to know one 
another so that they can better predict probable behavior. This is because in economic theory reputation 
is typically defined with an eye towards the future: the reputations accumulated in a relationship can be 
lost if either party behaves so as to erode the relationship.  
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Ethnic saving clubs 
Most middlemen assured me that they were backed by lineage-based 
credit institutions such as procham and chang kar luy114 for the 
procurement of their start-up capital. At the Saiwaa market in Takeo 
province I once met a young middlemen couple who borrowed money 
‘procham style’ from an inner circle of lineage members to build a 
brand new courtyard house.115 Procham is a credit-rotating system, in 
which the borrower lends money or gold in exchange for a mortgage, 
which could be jewelry, a house or land with a high monthly interest 
(Leang, Socheat and Khemrin 1999). In case one cannot pay back 
one’s debts in time, one looses one’s assets and sometimes even the 
company.  
 
Like many Chinese saving clubs procham members are linked by 
personal trustrelationships (guanxi) and norms of reciprocity (huibao) 
(cf. Hamilton 1996, 2000) and there are no formal laws and 
administrative agencies to enforce the obligations of the procham 
members. In this case the procham members lived all over Cambodia 
and met each other once a year to commemorate their deceased 
lineage members during the grave month (Cheng Ming). The Cheng 
Ming ancestor worship ceremony is still widely practiced by the ethnic 
Chinese communities in the weaving regions and takes place at their 
family cemeteries just before Khmer New Year.116 Although it is not a 
one-month celebration anymore, the young middlemen couple still 
honors their ancestors with a banquet consisting of roasted pigs, fried 
shrimp, tofu, boiled chicken, pork and mushrooms at the family 
cemetery outside their village.117 While worshipping their ancestors 
and enjoying a nice family banquet the young middlemen couple will 
                                                 
114 See for an excellent study on Chinese Cambodian credit system in Cambodia; Leang, P, Socheat, S. 
and Khemrin, K. (1999).  
115 During a field visit in August 2004. 
116 In the paddies around the weaving villages one can find hundreds of ancestral graves pinpointing 
again the Chinese origin of the weaving regions. 
117 See for more on the Cheng Ming ceremony:  Thom, W.C. (1985)  
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naturally also chat with lineage members about their business plans 
and make appointments for the repayment of loans, or ask if they can 
borrow some more investment capital.  
 
With respect to class, middlemen couples assured me that not every 
lineage member could borrow money ‘procham style’, only those who 
had paid for the family cemetery and who were considered creditable 
enough.118 Those lineage members who belonged to a lower class 
could not invest in the family grave and were excluded from the high-
value borrow systems. That is also why humble lineage members, 
excluded from the procham lending system, only have access to 
humble credit-rotating systems such as bol srov or bandak where 
small loans can be repaid in commodities such as paddy rice, sugar 
palm, corn or sampot. Silk weavers, often humble lineage members, 
borrow money bandak style and pay back their loans in sampot. For 
instance, when asked about the height of their debts silk weavers will 
explain they owe their middlemen three or four kaben (around sixteen 
meters) sampot instead of the actual ‘street value’ of two or three 
hundred dollars119.   
 
However, even for a big middleman procham is an extremely risky 
credit system, because in case of bankruptcy he will not only lose his 
house or land, but also his reputation towards the lineage. But the 
young couple was confident and assured me they only needed one 
more year to pay back their debts to the procham members. However, 
they also admitted that they dared to borrow start-up capital procham 
style because they had established long-term credit relationships 
kchey style with the mighty wholesalers in Phnom Penh for the 
procurement of silk yarn. Backed by this vertical credit system the 
young middlemen couple was able to obtain much more silk yarn in 
                                                 
118 In Phnom Penh undertakers told me that some family graves cost over 10,000 dollar and are usually 
paid by four or five family members.  
119 I am indebted to Seng Bunly for this insight.  
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stock than they could finance themselves and hence could persuade a 
large group of weavers to work for them. This again guaranteed them 
a regular cash flow, turnover and monthly profit and thus enough 
prestige and trust to borrow a large sum of money procham style from 
their lineage members.   
 
Patron-client relationships 
Contrary to the horizontal procham lending system, the kchey credit 
system is governed by vertical class relationships connecting 
wholesalers, middlemen and weavers into a tightly knit vertical guild 
system that evokes the structure of the colonial revenue farm system. 
With five wholesalers at the top and some sixty ‘silk brokers’ in the 
middle, the wholesalers-middlemen guilds supply seventy-five per cent 
of the weaving force with raw materials and indebt them by means of 
‘normal’ patron-client relationships. Although labor value theorists 
would measure the vertical kchey relationships as exploitative, the 
subordinated middlemen in Cambodia approach the vertical loan 
conditions of the wholesalers as a relatively ‘normal’ affair, because 
they have much more power and connections than they themselves 
do. As a middleman from Tnot village (Takeo province) recalled120: 
 
‘I cannot buy silk yarn myself in Vietnam, because I do not have a 
passport. It is also very dangerous to cross the border. Vietnamese 
officials do not allow me to enter Vietnam. I have never tried it, but that 
is what I heard. The wholesalers have a strong back and have good 
connections in Vietnam. They have family there ... Of course they cheat 
on us, rich people always do that. Last year the silk price was 15 dollar 
per kilo, this year the silk yarn is very expensive, 21 dollar per kilo, and 
the quality is very poor’.   
 
Another middleman from Veal village (Takeo Province) complained121: 
                                                 
120 Interview July 2004  
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‘Since 1997 [the Asian economic crisis] everything went wrong. The 
Vietnamese are coming to Cambodia and we cannot do anything about 
it. It is very easy for them, they just come in by taxi. The Vietnamese 
have many children and need a lot of space, that is why they come to 
Cambodia. We are cold [he means left alone] by the government and 
cannot trade with Vietnam ourselves. Only the wholesalers can trade 
with Vietnam. I worry about my children and I am very afraid the yuon 
[Vietnamese] will rule our country again. If I think about that my hart 
cries. But what can we do, I only hope that things will turn out for the 
better in the future’.         
In Cambodia the vertical kchey relationships are seen as ‘normal’ 
borrowing systems because differences in status and class, like in 
India and China, have always guided social relationships in the 
business arena. Already in ancient times vertical moral codes existed 
among Khmer kings, who spoke of ‘men of unequal souls’ (Kirsch 
1974), or ‘men of prowess’ (Wolters 1982). Within the family social 
rankings are also based upon birth order and sex; those outside the 
family are often based on a combination of factors including age, 
wealth, political position and religious piety (Ledgerwood 1990). The 
Khmer language reflects this hierarchical patterning, as the words for 
‘eating’ for example vary for the king, a monk, an older respected 
person, a person of similar status, a person of lesser status, a child, 
an animal and so on (ibid.). Finally, the moral underpinnings of the 
kchey credit system reflect Buddhist notions of merit, karma and 
dharma, as in Theravada Buddhist texts a leader is born into his 
advantageous position because of meritorious actions in previous lives 
(karma) and should fulfill his dharma by acting as a generous and 
righteous leader (ibid.).  
Mimicry Chinese 
Although much has been written about patron-client relationships in 
Cambodia, there is no commonly accepted Khmer word to describe 
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this relationship (O’Leary and Nee 2001: 53). There is a Khmer 
proverb that perhaps best captures this vertical relationship, saying, 
‘neak mean reaksa ksot doch sampot poit pi krao’ (‘the rich can take 
the poor as the sarong surrounds the body’) (ibid.). To become the 
sarong of the wholesalers middlemen couples had some identity 
construction work to do, because, as descendents of the weavers’ 
class, they were mainly socialized as ethnic Khmers. In a classical act 
of mimicry many ambitious middlemen couples started to copy the 
lifestyle of the wholesalers and built a new courtyard house outside 
the village. Often the wooden structure of their former home was still 
visible and betrayed that it had once, like the weavers’ homes, stood 
on wooden poles. The middlemen couples literally downplayed their 
Khmer identity and filled this void with a ‘new’ courtyard house, red 
lampions, good-luck stickers, a Chinese shrine, Chinese newspapers, 
a Chinese calendar and Chinese brand goods. This void was filled by 
mimicry symbols because the middlemen lacked knowledge of the 
Chinese language, could not read the Chinese newspapers and 
calendars and also had no clue who the deities on their shrines were, 
and what position they had in the Chinese pantheon of gods. Chinese 
ethnicity in this case was thus purely an imitation of a wholesalers’ 
lifestyle and had nothing to do with primordial affiliation or a desire 
after a lost homeland. 
 
I once chatted about the Chinese identity of the middleman couples 
with a silk weaver, who turned out to be a kin member of one of these 
middlemen couples. She said the following about the house-style 
conversion and the lack of command of the Chinese language of a 
middlemen couple122:  
 
‘No, of course they are not Chinese, she was a weaver just like me and 
knows nothing about the Chinese culture. But now she is a middleman, 
she must be a Chen [Chinese]’.  
                                                 
122 Interview September 2004 
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Processes of ethnicization 
But how is this possible? How can the same family have two lifestyles?  
To understand and appreciate the existence of diverging lifestyles 
within one weaving family we must recognize that identities in 
Cambodia are multi-layered (see chapter two) and that power 
positions between silk weavers and middlemen are unequal. As Eric 
Wolf (1969) noted, relationships between peasants and merchants are 
always relationships of tactical power and patron-client relationships 
cannot occur between people who are each other’s equals. Processes 
of ethnicization have emerged under such unequal power conditions 
in Cambodia, because middlemen, once equal in rank, employed a 
Chinese lifestyle. The reason for this was that in Cambodia, the 
acceptance of exploitation as part and parcel of an essentially ethnic 
difference is reinforced by the fact that rural Chinese merchants are 
foremost undeniably Chinese, no matter how long they have lived in 
Cambodia (Conway 1993: 110). To become accepted as a moneylender 
by the silk weavers middlemen couples could not continue their 
Khmer lifestyle as a silk weaver, but had to employ a lifestyle 
associated with business power, and thus live in a Chinese courtyard 
house, celebrate Chinese New Year and buy a Toyota Camry.  
 
Although the weavers are aware that the rate of returns for their 
sampot, in labor value terms, is far too low, they have also internalized 
the idea that they are ‘just’ workers and depend on the credit of ethnic 
Chinese middlemen for their survival. As a middle-age silk weaver 
from Sla village (Takeo Province) recalled123:  
 
‘I produce two kaben (four meters) of phtei muk phi (high quality sampot 
hol) per month and earn 20 dollars. That is not much, but what can I 
do? I am divorced and I have to raise two sons. I must borrow money 
from my middlemen to obtain silk yarn or to restore my loom. I do not 
                                                 
123 Interview September 2004 
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have the time and money to go to Phnom Penh and sell my textiles 
myself. But I am not poor, I do not have to cut stones or beg for money 
as other people do’.      
 
In Prek Chakkran (Prey Veng province) a silk weaver in her forties 
legitimized her humble position as follows124: 
 
‘ I produce two kaben of sampot hol per month and earn 17,000 riel 
(around 10 dollars) per kaben.  I subcontract the loom and half of the 
profit goes to my middleman, who owns the loom. I do not sell my 
textiles myself in Phnom Penh. The middleman always sells my textiles. 
But why should I sell my own textiles? I am a weaver and not a trader. 
In the future I hope I can buy my own loom and earn more money with 
my textiles’.     
 
And in Kdanh village (Takeo) an elderly silk weaver complained125:  
 
‘I once tried to buy silk yarn myself from the ‘loak thoms’ in Phnom 
Penh, but they sent me home with the message that I could only buy 
silk yarn from my own middlemen. I am sad about it, but it is very 
important for my family to weave sampot hol. It is good money’.  
 
The above quotes of the silk weavers call to mind the work of James 
Scott, who placed the critical problem of the peasant household - 
subsistence - at the center of his study (1976). According to Scott 
(1976) the subsistence attitude of the peasants makes them 
technologically conservative and entangles them in a reciprocal web of 
social obligations, but must also be seen as a rational strategy, which 
guarantees them a life-long safety net. In his view, it may thus be fully 
rational for silk weavers to choose to become exploited as ‘Khmer’ 
workers, if they think they are materially better off being exploited by 
                                                 
124 Interview September 2004 
125
 
Interview September 2004 
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a middleman than trying to find a job themselves outside their 
network. As May Ebihara (1971) noted, Khmers do think that debt is a 
burden, but they accept the loan conditions without complaint 
because they know of no other resources and no other system to gain 
start-up capital. This is also why Polly Hill (1986) and Oscar Salemink 
(2003a) argue that rural debts must not necessarily be seen as social 
evils but also as a risk-absorbing strategy of the essential 
creditworthiness and economic viability of small holding farmers.  
 
Middlemen, however, do not subscribe to the exploitation theory and 
refer to the subsistence attitude of the silk weavers by calling them 
‘lazy’ because of their allegedly slow speed of production. In their 
former profession as silk weavers they realized very well that the 
production of one sampot hol a month was the limit, because one had 
to cultivate paddies, feed the cattle and raise kids. But once having 
become bosses (thaoke) themselves they changed their ‘old’ 
subsistence attitude and started to antagonize and misjudge the ever 
under-producing silk weavers as lazy Khmers. As an elder silk weaver 
from Sla village complained126: 
 
‘In earlier days the middleman was more relaxed. But nowadays, they 
are always in a hurry and complain a lot about the speed of the 
production. They also shout at us when we do not produce the correct 
colors’. 
 
The ascribed Khmer identity of the silk weavers is thus also re-
produced in a structure of misjudgments, which reminds us that 
identity operates through an active process of marginalization. This 
structure of ‘othering’ must be seen as an act of ‘symbolic violence’ 
(Bourdieu 1991) wherein ‘Khmer’ becomes synonymous with being a 
lazy, subsistence peasant, whilst a Chinese is an ambitious, 
innovative entrepreneur. That brings us to the paradoxical situation 
                                                 
126 Interview October 2004 
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that national and global stakeholders depict the silk weavers as 
descendents of the greatest Khmer empire ever, Angkor, whereas the 
middlemen and wholesalers connote them as credit-depending, lazy 
Khmers.              
 
The art of gift giving 
But processes of ‘othering’ and marginalization aside, social 
hierarchies in the Cambodian silk weaving arena are also a delicate 
balance of power, because when middlemen refuse to honor their 
obligations as a patron, silk weavers can dump them and choose 
another boss. About this delicate balance Solange Thierry (1978) has 
written that demerit legitimizes changes in the positions of individuals 
within Cambodian hierarchy, and can make a person fall in status 
immediately. While doing fieldwork I came across several middlemen 
who shivered at the thought how lack of support from a village leader 
or district leader could demerit them and damage their business 
badly. As Mr. Mong once explained127:  
 
‘The village leader can kill your business, because he has a lot of power 
and can spread a lot of bad talk about you. I must establish close 
relationships with him and must bring him cigarettes or wine from 
Phnom Penh. I also give his wife and daughters a lower silk yarn price’. 
 
Mr. Mong was afraid that the village leader would deliberately create 
biases between him and the weavers and demerit his prestige as a 
good boss. To prevent the village leader from destroying his business 
and to protect his reputation he offers gifts and discounts to the 
village leader and his wife128 to keep a lasting hold over them. 
Moreover, being raised in a class-conscious society Mr. Mong knows 
that his university degree will help him to regain ideological 
                                                 
127 Interview December 2004 
128  In this case the wife and daughters of the village leader were weavers and thus clients of the 
middlemen as well.   
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domination over the local, often illiterate village leaders, who will 
respect him for his superior knowledge. The roots of this concern with 
educational levels can be traced back to the great Chinese philosopher 
Confucius, whose ideas about prestige, frugality, benevolence, filial 
pity, hard work and social organization became deeply rooted in the 
hearts of the Chinese gentry-class.  
 
However, Mr. Mong knows that a few bottles of wine, silk yarn 
discounts and a university degree alone are not sufficient to gain 
prestige and enhance his powerful position; he must also support all 
kinds of local development projects such as the building of a new 
school, an irrigation project, etc. This is because ‘official’ state 
revenues are not sufficient to develop the village and the extra 
schools, roads and water pumps will bring much wanted prestige for 
the village leader, which will enable him to be re-elected.  
 
To win the blessings of the village leader Mr. Mong organizes a ‘bon 
kathen’ ceremony every year somewhere in October or November, 
depending on the Buddhist lunar calendar. ‘Bon kathen’ is an annual 
ceremony in which laities give donations to Buddhist monks in their 
village pagoda in return for merit. Traditionally lay people give cotton 
krama to the monks, but lately wealthy government officials and 
merchants have been donating money for the building of schools, 
irrigation projects or a new road. After the completion of the ‘bon 
kathen’ ceremony, donors receive five kinds of merits: susanthanera 
(‘complete organs’), ‘surubata’ (‘looking good’), suvannata (‘good color’), 
susurata (‘a sweet sound’) and adhibaccambarivaro (‘having many 
followers’)129. In particular receiving adhibaccambarivaro is interesting 
for the middlemen, because it allows them to convince silk weavers 
and the local officialdom to follow them.130  
                                                 
129 Available online: http://www.budinst.gov.kh/kathen.html. 
130 ‘Bon kathen’ can be seen as a Bourdieuan form of symbolic capital that the middlemen-wholesalers 
guilds use to impress the local officialdom. 
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By organizing a ‘bon kathen’ ceremony Mr. Mong will capitalize his 
long-term relationships with his wholesaler and ask him to donate a 
great sum of money on behalf of a local road or another charity 
project. In this way he can present himself symbolically as a powerful 
Chinese merchant with good connections and impress the local 
officialdom.131 Mr. Mong wants to impress the district chief to prevent 
him from taxing, because he is responsible for duties such as tax 
collection, writing bills for land sales, organizing and executing public 
works and passing down proclamations, laws and propaganda from 
the central government to the village level.  
 
For this reason the district chief is seen as a ‘loak thom’, a big person 
having a lot of administrative power and demands that he can impose 
on the local population. In theory, the district chief must tax the 
middlemen for profits, houses, lands, business registrations, motor 
vehicles, turnovers, public lighting, value added, and so on.132 
However, like in any politically turbulent nation the Cambodian tax 
collection system is vulnerable, and district chiefs are very selective in 
whom to burden and whom not. The ill-paid district chiefs will not 
give tax discounts and trade permits to small middlemen, but only to 
big persons (loak thoms) like themselves.  
 
Scholars in Cambodia have often legitimized such forms of elite 
favoritism as a ‘Khmer fairness ideology’ in which ‘’helping one’s kind’’ 
is seen as a normal social practice (Ledgerwood and Vijghen 
2002:109-150). In a related vein Ross Marlay and Clark D. Neher 
(1995) have deployed the term ‘patron-client communitarianism’, 
                                                 
131 I visited a couple of ‘bon kathen’ ceremonies in the weaving regions and witnessed how a ceremony 
leader, often a high-ranked district official, thanked donors by name in public, precisely mentioned who 
gave what and in what amount, and blessed them for their giving.     
132 In June 1994 the government decided to reform the tax system found under the Finance Act 1994, to 
mobilize revenues and to strengthen its administrative capacity. Under Sub-degree No 114 a new 10 per 
cent VAT tax was implemented in 1999 to replace the consumption tax.     
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legitimizing the favoritism and rent-seeking advantages of the Khmer 
elite by means of the Buddhist idea of accepting suffering and losses 
as one’s fate. However, the ‘Khmer fairness ideology’ seems to depict 
‘elite favoritism’ as a given fact and does not recognize that middlemen 
battle with each other for resources in the officialdom. In doing so 
Marlay and Neher (1995) fail to acknowledge how some middlemen 
deliberately organize ‘bon kathen’ ceremonies in order to become the 
favorite middlemen of the district chief and to escape heavy taxation 
in this way. Yet, middlemen who possess the ‘art of gift giving’ (cf. 
Yang 1994) to the officialdom have an advantage over those who lack 
such qualities. In other words, those middlemen who realize that ‘bon 
kathen’ is an important form of symbolic capital to bond with the 
officialdom are more likely to grow than middlemen who never ‘kom 
bos san touch rom long Phnom’ (‘throw the fishing line over the 
mountain’).       
 
Strategic marriage 
In the final pages of this chapter I will switch to the trade career of 
Mrs. Bun again and outline how she managed to control the cross 
border silk yarn trade in the 1990s, and why it was wiser for her to 
downplay her Khmer identity again. To protect her favorite trade 
position Mrs. Bun cleverly subcontracted former weavers as 
middlemen, because she knew these craftswomen and farmers lacked 
the political contacts to cross the border and had no means to become 
a future competitor. As one middleman from Veal village 
commented133: 
 
‘I once biked to Tan Chau, I think it was ten years ago, to buy silk yarn 
there. The owner of the factory told me it was only possible to buy 5000 
kilogram of silk yarn and not just a few silk batches. I returned home 
empty-handed because I cannot afford to buy such large quantities’.  
 
                                                 
133 Interview September 2004 
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Another middleman, situated at the corner of the Saiwaa market in 
Prey Kabas district, came up with the same ‘5000 kilogram story’, but 
also complained he could not cross the border ‘tax-free’ like the 
wholesalers134.  
 
‘You know, the wholesalers have good connections at the border, so 
they do not have to pay import tax. I do not have these connections and 
have to pay ten per cent import tax. So it is much cheaper for me to buy 
the silk yarn directly from the wholesalers’.  
 
In the immediate aftermath of the war Mrs. Bun had no difficulties to 
cross the Cambodian border, as it was extremely porous and open to 
anyone. In fact, precisely because the borders were so porous Mrs. 
Bun was able to trade tons of silk yarn to Thailand and grew rich by 
the mark-ups that way. However, from 1982 onwards the PRK state 
party decided to regulate the Vietnamese and Thai cross-border trade 
‘communist style’. This was because the PRK government feared the 
far-flung ethnic Chinese trade networks connecting Ho Chi Minh City 
with Phnom Penh and Bangkok, as they were convinced they would 
bypass the state as a regulator and revenue collector (Gottesman 
2003:149-151). Moreover, the PRK regime was also convinced that the 
ethnic Chinese traders supported their families in China and not the 
Cambodian economy. To go against this far-flung contraband trade 
two border treaties were signed in the early 1980s135 and military 
patrols began to guard the Cambodian river and land borders (ibid.). 
In line with the usual communist preference for centralized control the 
PRK Ministry of Commerce established Joint Economic Commissions, 
sister province policies136 and numerous other bilateral trade 
agreements with both Thailand and Vietnam. And to complete their 
                                                 
134 Interview September 2004 
135 The 1982 Agreement on the Historical Waters and the 1985 Treaty On The National Border 
Delimitation. 
136 Sister province policies were bilateral trade policies made between Southern Chinese and Cambodian 
provinces during the PRK regime.  
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‘communist mission’ Hanoi-trained custom officials, most of them 
Vietnamese, were stationed at the border to collect the state revenues 
and fees there (ibid.).  
                                                                                                                                                                          
Since it had become a huge obsession for the PRK government to 
regulate the far-flung Chinese Cambodian trade networks Mrs. Bun 
was confronted with a gender problem. Not being able to bond with 
the officialdom because of her gender Mrs. Bun desperately needed 
contacts in the upper echelons of the state departments. With regard 
to the latter it is widely accepted that women in Southeast Asia cannot 
steer any political domains and depend on men for the procurement of 
licenses and government support. However, Mrs. Bun was lucky 
because it was equally widely known in the Cambodian business 
arena that high-ranked state officials were not loyal to the communist 
ideology behind the PRK border regulations at all, and were very 
willing to become patrons for wealthy merchants (Gottesmann 
2003:190-191). As Gottesmann noted,  after the atrocities of the Pol 
Pot revolution most government officials were bored with any kind of 
ideology and became what Max Weber (1930) calls ‘Ersatz capitalists’ 
for wealthy Chinese traders in Phnom Penh. As one middleman 
explained137: 
 
‘the wholesalers married influential state cadres from the PRK 
Commerce Department, because they are very influential persons and 
know many commune leaders, governors and border officials. 
Everybody knows that because Mrs. Bun and Mrs. Sourkia come from 
this area’.138  
                                                 
137 For privacy reasons I do not mention the name of the village. 
138 Interview October 2004. 
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In a similar vein, another middleman told me:139  
 
‘the husbands of the wholesalers are former state cadres from the PRK 
Commerce department. The wives do not even love their husbands, they 
do not even live together, but they are very clever and use them for their 
good connections at the border’.140  
 
Mrs. Bun’s own son-in-law, although without mentioning the strategic 
function of his marriage, ‘confessed’ he was a former state cadre, while 
a few blocks further, the male owner of the Neary Khmer silk shop 
also did not hide his officialdom career and explained he managed the 
shop because his wife was out of the country.141  
In other words, Mrs. Bun and at least two other members of the 
conglomerate used the tradition of elite intermarriage142 as symbolic 
capital to overcome their gender constraints and to get constant 
access to the Vietnamese silk yarn market in the mid-1980s. Not 
being able to steer the political domain herself, Mrs. Bun interlocked 
with fellow ethnic politicians in the higher echelons of the PRK 
officialdom by means of an arranged marriage, which again allowed 
her to control the lucrative cross-border silk yarn trade. Again she 
wisely silenced her Khmer identity and expressed her Chinese one 
because the Cambodian parliament consists predominantly of 
Vietnamese and Chinese members, a remnant of French colonial 
policies. The reason for this, as said, was that unlike their British 
counterparts in countries such as Malaysia, the French colonizers 
looked down on the administrative qualities of the Khmers and 
                                                 
139 For privacy reasons I do not mention the name of the village. 
140 Interview December 2004. 
141 In reality his wife had been kidnapped the year before and was only released in exchange for a huge 
sum of money. Afraid to return to Phnom Penh she stayed with relatives in New Zealand. Shortly before I 
returned to Holland she returned to Cambodia again and continued to manage her silk enterprise.  
142 Linda Bell (1999) describes how silk industrials in Wuxi County also arranged marriages with the 
local officialdom to boost their power. 
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preferred Confucian-trained clerks and politicians from Vietnam and 
China (Chanda 1986: 56). The success of ethnic Chinese 
entrepreneurs such as Mrs. Bun also caused ethnic Chinese 
politicians in Cambodia to become well-integrated into the business 
life, and added to the establishment of a powerful ethnic Chinese 
political and economic elite. As William Case (2003) once said, access 
to the world market, even in developed ASEAN countries such as 
Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines, is 
based on the twin pillars of having colonial legacies and rents in the 
officialdom.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have attempted to answer the third research 
question: How do silk producers and traders negotiate their identities 
in the economic domain of the silk weaving industry? Both the silk 
producers and traders were ethnic Chinese who had become Khmers 
(col khmae) under a 1954 ethno-nationalistic citizenship law. Today 
however silk producers present themselves as ‘assimilated’ Khmers 
and the wholesalers and middlemen as ethnic Chinese. The diverging 
self-presentations of the silk weavers and traders jeopardize the 
agnostic way in which culturalist and capitalist scholars have 
approached ‘ethnic economies’ and ‘diasporas’. These cultural notions 
still seem to treat Chineseness as a harmonious organizing principle 
that ethnic Chinese use to unite themselves within the parochial 
boundaries of a shared ethnicity.   
 
This chapter, however, makes clear that silk producers and traders 
did not search for comfort within the parochial boundaries of a shared 
ethnicity but have established social antagonisms to legitimize the 
unequal production and trade positions within the network. These 
social antagonisms are not ‘real’ existing conflicts, but symbolic 
repertoires, body practices and lifestyles grounded in a specific social 
and material context (Jackson 2006: 322-330). This is because the 
Dragons United 
 
 211
Cambodian subject, having lived under the command of various 
foreign hegemonizers for centuries, is a multi-layered subject and 
cannot be approached in terms of one ethnicity anymore. As a 
consequence it is relatively ‘normal’ for Cambodian families to assume 
a Chinese, Khmer, Cambodian, Vietnamese or Thai lifestyle depending 
on the context.  
  
Because it is impossible for Cambodians to primordialize each other’s 
identity, symbols have become crucial forms of communication 
clarifying ‘who one is or who one wants to be in society’. That is also 
why in this chapter I come to the conclusion that the self-
presentations of the silk producers and traders have lost their state 
association and must be seen as lifestyles that belong to the position 
one has in the silk weaving network. The reason for this is that the 
Cambodian silk producers and traders did not approach each other in 
terms of ‘assimilation’ , ‘diasporic consciousness’ or ‘ethnic affiliation’, 
but in terms of unequal production and trade relationships and 
cultural repertoires and identities belonging to these positions. 
Processes of ethnicization have emerged under these social conditions 
because producers are expected to exhibit a subsistence Khmer 
lifestyle and traders a capitalist Chinese one. However, going against 
the culturalist discourse of a harmonious diaspora (Hsiao 2002), the 
choice of lifestyle was often re-produced by force, misjudgment and 
marginalization. That is also why this study comes to the conclusion 
that the ethnicized production and trade relationships could also be 
seen as a form of ‘symbolic violence’ (Bourdieu 1991), wherein ‘Khmer’ 
is synonymous with being a lazy, subsistence peasant, whilst a 
Chinese is an ambitious, innovative entrepreneur. 
 
The five female wholesalers, having controlled the cross-border silk 
yarn trade already from the late colonial period onwards, had no 
problem to play this correct role of an ambitious, innovative 
entrepreneur. Joining their fathers on trade trips the wholesalers not 
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only learned how to negotiate silk yarn prices, but also how to 
negotiate their Chinese identity vis-à-vis lower-ranked traders and 
weavers. This way Mrs. Bun learned that it was wise to live in a 
courtyard house, speak Cantonese, order a Chinese dragon, pity 
ancestors, worship Kuan Yin, celebrate the Mooncake festival, go to a 
fortune teller, organize bon kathen charity ceremonies, bury family 
members in a family grave, read Chinese newspapers and interlock 
with the officialdom for the procurement of licenses and tax 
reductions. In the hostile 1980s Mrs. Bun did not have to express her 
Khmer identity but used a shared Shunde county genealogy to form a 
silk yarn conglomerate with silk yarn traders from Takeo Province. 
This time her Chinese identity should not be seen as a symbolic 
toolkit to impress lower-ranked workers, but as a shared ideology to 
resist the hostile 1980s and to protect her lucrative windfall position 
as a powerful wholesaler. Even to gain officialdom rents to control the 
cross border silk yarn trade she did not have to become a Khmer, 
because high-ranked clerks in Cambodia are also ethnic Chinese, a 
remnant of French colonial administrative policies (Chanda 1986).    
 
In the working place regimes (Ong and Nonini 1997) of the wholesalers 
a corporate Chinese identity was expected from the middlemen 
couples as well. As rural representatives of the urban wholesalers, the 
middlemen couples had to supply the weavers with silk yarn, control 
the speed of production and check the quality of the sampot hol.  The 
clever wholesalers, however, aware of the ‘differences in the 
togetherness’ (Ang 2001), deliberately chose to subcontract ambitious 
middlemen couples with a non-trading background, because it 
assured them the couple would be short of cross-border ties in 
Vietnam and would thus not easily become silk yarn wholesalers 
themselves. They did expect the middlemen couples to become one of 
them, though, and used personal visits and gossip mechanisms to 
check their adherence to a Chinese lifestyle.  
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Playing the correct Chinese role was not easy for the middlemen 
because as descendents of the weaving class they had been socialized 
as Khmer for many generations. As a consequence, the middlemen 
couples had some identity construction work to do and had to 
downplay their Khmer lifestyle. In an act of mimicry the middlemen 
couples started to copy the lifestyle of the wholesalers and replaced 
their wooden Khmer huts for a courtyard house, hung red lampions in 
front of their house, bought Chinese consumption goods, revived 
Chinese rituals, used a Chinese calendar and replaced the Khmer 
sarong for a Chinese suit. This change in lifestyle had nothing to do 
with a desire for a mythical homeland (cf. Pan 1998) or an allergic 
reaction against un-ambitious Khmer, but should instead be seen as 
symbolic capital necessary to climb socially to the ranks of a 
middleman.   
 
At the bottom of the silk pyramid, some 20,000 silk weavers produce 
sampot hol under the close supervision of the 100 subcontracted 
middlemen couples. The silk weavers not only learned dye and silk-
weaving techniques from their mothers and grandmothers, but also 
the identity and roles that go hand in hand with being a silk weaver. 
Although the weavers share ancestral roots with the wholesalers and 
middlemen they identify themselves predominantly as ethnic Khmers 
and argue they feel Khmer, love the king and are devoted Buddhists. 
Unlike the wholesalers and middlemen, they celebrate Khmer religious 
ceremonies, follow the Khmer Buddhist calendar, cremate their dead 
and resemble the image of assimilated Chinese.  
 
Of historical importance for the weavers’ ‘assimilation’ was 
undoubtedly the rush on Khmer grooms after the 1929 ban on 
Chinese landownership and the fact that they internalized the Khmer 
culture of their husbands. Another important factor was the virtual 
ban on Chinese language and cultural practices under Lon Nol (1970-
1975) and Pol Pot (1975-78), and the repression of Chinese language 
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teaching and cultural celebrations from 1979 to 1991 by the People's 
Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) and its successor the State of Cambodia 
(SOC). However, a strict focus on intermarriages and state bio-politics 
alone does not explain why silk weavers who married a fellow ethnic 
farmer identify themselves as ethnic Khmers and why other silk 
weavers who climbed up to the ranks of middlemen represent 
themselves as ethnic Chinese.   
 
The Khmer self-identity of the silk weavers must also be seen as a 
form of symbolic capital, which marks their humble position in the 
silk network vis-à-vis the fellow ethnic but higher-ranked middlemen. 
An overt Khmer identity was necessary because, as said, the 
middlemen couples in the weaving villages were former weavers, kin 
members, and thus shared common ancestral roots. For this reason, 
the silk weavers and middlemen found themselves in an awkward 
situation, because morally, in Cambodia, the former is always the 
exploited and the latter the exploiter (cf. Conway 1993). To legitimize 
the changing labor relationships the weavers depicted the different 
standard of living of the middlemen, like ‘real’ Khmers do, as part of a 
foreign culture rather than as an aspect of exploitation. In this 
negotiation process they had to silence their Chinese background and 
could not express a Chinese lifestyle, even if they would have liked to  
do so. 
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Chapter 6 
100 % Khmer, Sir!: Ethnicity and consumer behavior 
          
 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter we have seen how the wholesaler Mrs. Bun, 
although she is a Cambodian citizen, primarily expressed a Chinese 
identity and expected the same identity token from the middlemen she 
subcontracted. In this chapter I will attempt to explain the gap that 
exists between the ‘marginal’ ethnic Chinese and ‘dominant’ Khmer 
modernization claim and answer the fourth research question, 
addressing the reasons why ethnic Chinese silk traders market ‘their’ 
silk weaving products as authentic Khmer?  
 
Following the business career of a former silk weaver, this chapter will 
illustrate the strategic conditions under which ethnic Chinese silk 
traders in Cambodia do not have any reason to divert from the grand 
narrative of Khmer modernization and express a far-away Chinese 
past. According to Karl Marx (2000 [1867]) the leading culture in 
society is the one of the economic and political elite and has the 
ambition to alienate the workers from their culture. In the Cambodian 
market place, however, the silk products are not marketed in 
accordance with the culture of the silk capitalists, but in accordance 
with the working culture of the silk weavers. Elaborating on Walter 
Benjamin’s (1940) concept of ‘traditional modernity’ and Jean 
Baudrillard’s (1998 [1970]) concept of ‘consumer culture’ this chapter 
will illustrate the modern conditions under which silk traders in 
Cambodia prefer to market the sampot hol as authentic Khmer.
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Case study 
At the entrance lane of the popular Central Market hundreds of tourists 
stroll around looking for handicrafts to complete their ultimate Cambodia 
discovery experience. Mine victims, often former Pol Pot soldiers, walk 
around on wooden crutches and wear ‘I survived Cambodia’ t-shirts. They 
attack the tourists with a gunfire of questions: ‘You want to buy books about 
Pol Pot, Sir, I have very good books on the Khmer Rouge, Sir, very cheap, I 
also have pictures, you like pictures about Angkor Wat, Sir, or you want to 
go to the Killing fields, Sir, my friend can bring you, no, Sir, you do not like, 
you want girl then Sir, I can arrange many beautiful girls for you, Sir’. On 
the side of the entrance lane some twenty market stalls are pilled up with 
silk scarves, wooden Buddha statues and all kinds of silverware. In front of 
the market stalls young women dressed in silk sampot, white ‘Sesame street’ 
t-shirts and New York Yankee baseball caps greet the tourists in their own 
language and encourage them to visit their shop in English, ‘you want to buy 
silk scarves Sir, 100% Khmer, Sir, only seven dollars, good price for you, 
Sir’. Once the seller gets the attention of the customer, a co-vendor, often the 
mother, welcomes him/her with two or three plastic chairs and samples of 
silk scarves wrapped around her neck. Most of the tourists are Japanese, 
Koreans, Chinese and Taiwanese and to a lesser extent French, Americans 
and Australians. Cambodian Americans, who fled the country during and 
after the Pol Pot war, stroll around the Central Market as well, and are easily 
recognized because of the ‘authentic’ dressed mother and the ‘all American’ 
dressed children, who are more assertive as well. ’Jesus, you are tall Sir,143 
have you been to the Angkor Wat temples yet, I guess not, because they are 
still there [laughing]’.  
 
Most of the silk vendors on the Central Market are former silk weavers from 
Takeo, Kandal and Prey Veng provinces who opened a retail shop some ten 
years ago. One of these former silk weavers is Youn Malis, an introvert, 
somewhat shy woman, who complains a lot about the heat in the market, 
about how tough it is to compete with the young, fanatic and multi-lingual 
silk vendors, and mostly about the decreasing number of tourists. Despite 
her omnipresent pessimism, however, she starts every conversation with the 
                                                 
143 Pointing at my six foot seven height. 
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same ‘feel good story’ on how many scarves she sold to UN workers in the 
1990s and how well she filled her pockets during this period, because 
UNTAC’ members did not bargain at all. But nowadays, she repeats over and 
over, tourists do not come to Phnom Penh anymore, but only go to Siem 
Reap to see the Angkor Wat temples and fly directly from there to Bangkok, 
Singapore or Hanoi. As for the decline in tourists Youn Malis particularly 
blames the government and complains they only think about the Angkor Wat 
tourists and how to fill their pockets through them, and no longer about how 
to attract tourists to Phnom Penh. She has often heard about this problem 
on the radio and television and explains that since Cambodia became a 
member of ASEAN in 1999 tourists have only been going to Angkor.  
 
Youn Malis also has a small stock of sampot hol, phamung and sarong, 
which she sells to Cambodian American women instead of local women, 
because the latter do not buy sampot at the Central market. Youn Malis has 
one regular overseas customer, who visits her shop every year to fill her 
suitcase with seventy kilograms of sampot. This regular customer turns out 
to be her elder sister, who fled the Pol Pot war in the 1980s to a Thai border 
camp, and from there successfully sought asylum in the United States. 
During the war her younger sisters, together with her father and an older 
brother were deported to different working zones and for this reason she lost 
track of them. In the working zones she was very afraid of the Pol Pot 
soldiers, but her mother told her she just had to work hard and not tell 
anything about their Chinese background. Her mother also told her they 
were lucky to be farmers and that they had to act like that to survive the 
regime. Her mother, as an elderly lady, continued her weaving enterprise, 
but she herself also a skilled weaver, had to work on the surrounding 
paddies all day. Life conditions were terrible and after a long day of work she 
could only eat a handful of rice and some vegetables. As a young woman she 
witnessed how some of the villagers were taken away, officially to work in 
another village, but from her mother she heard that they were killed. Later 
the killings became more obvious and when someone’s name was mentioned 
by a Khmer Rouge soldier you knew that you could be next.  
 
Life in general deteriorated as time passed by, because there was less food 
and soldiers began to shout at people more and more often. Later Youn Malis 
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did not have to work on the fields anymore but was ordered to bury dead 
Khmer Rouge soldiers, who were casualties of combat. She became 
increasingly afraid that she would die too, and at night she could not sleep 
because she missed her father, brother and sisters. Luckily she survived the 
war and could return to her hometown of Prek Changkran to continue her 
weaving enterprise. In these days she often biked to Phnom Penh and 
bartered silk yarn against gold from Mr. Meng Kong, a wealthy middleman in 
Prek Changkran, who had just opened a shop in Phnom Penh. To her relief 
she also saw her father and one younger sister return home, while another 
younger sister and her older brother were still missing. One year later she 
heard that her younger sister had sought asylum in the United States and 
that her older brother had been killed in a town near Battambang. This was 
a huge shock for Youn Malis, because the whole family had woven many 
sampot to get him to the University of Phnom Penh and was very proud of 
him for that reason.  
 
After his death Malis was determined to quit her weaving enterprise at some 
point, and to go to Phnom Penh to offer her son a good education instead. In 
the mid-1980s she married a neighboring Khmer farmer, who, like herself, 
had ambitions to migrate to Phnom Penh. In 1992 Youn Malis opened a 
sampot shop in Phnom Penh after she had borrowed start-up capital from 
co-villagers and had sold two hectares of land. From her start-up capital she 
bought a stall for two hundred dollars at the Central Market and a stock of 
sampot hol to get into business. Her husband did not accompany her in her 
business and found a job as a state cadre at the tax department. Only her 
younger daughter works in her shop, but most of the time only in the 
weekends. The main reason why Youn Malis opened up a silk stall was her 
sister in the United States, who had found a good job there as a nurse and 
was able to visit Phnom Penh once a year. This way she could buy sampot 
exclusively from her shop and distribute these further to other Cambodian 
refugees in the United States. Youn Malis explained that many other silk 
vendors at the Central Market had relatives in the United States and did 
business this way. She added that her younger cousin, a sarong retailer 
three stores away, was ‘in the process’ of marrying a Khmer American and 
opening a silk shop in the United States. However, slightly to her surprise, 
her plan to sell sampot to Khmer Americans did not work out, as she was 
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not able to obtain credit from a middleman, notably a fellow villager, and 
therefore came to depend more and more on the tourist industry for a living.       
 
Initially this was not such a big problem, because after the war was over 
thousands of UN-expats became stationed in Phnom Penh and asked her for 
silk scarves to bring home as souvenirs. The UN-troops, however, did not 
like the silk sampot she had once woven herself for their dull color and 
rather high price, and asked for the machine-made and more colorful Lao 
and Thai scarves. Youn Malis learned about the UNTAC’s taste for foreign 
silk scarves from the other silk vendors, but none of the silk vendors told the 
UNTAC people about the real origin of the silk scarves, and simply sold them 
as ‘Khmer’ scarves to them. After I noticed the foreign origin of the scarves 
Youn Malis begged me not to tell ‘other’ tourists about this trade secret144 as 
it could damage her business. She also kept silent about her Chinese 
background for a long time and identified herself as a loyal Khmer and good 
Buddhist to me for more than six months. This had nothing to do with the 
war, she explained afterwards, because she was not afraid anymore, but 
simply with the fact that she feels, like her husband, that she is a real 
Khmer. To underscore her Khmer identity she told me that she went to the 
Buddhist temple every week, celebrated Phcum Ben, loved the King and 
asked advice from the achaa about her life, family and future. In sharp 
contrast with her loyal Buddhist identity however, she also ‘confessed’ that 
she celebrated Chinese ceremonies such as Cheng Ming, Saen Kbal Tuk (‘the 
Hungry Ghost festival’), the Mooncake festival and New Year. And, also 
contrary to her loyal Khmer discourse, she complained heavily about her 
husband’s relatives ‘eating up’ her business, something her own relatives, 
ethnic Chinese, would never do.   
 
A multi-layered identity 
The above biography of the middle-aged silk vendor Youn Malis 
represents the third and last group of traders in the silk weaving 
industry, the silk vendors. Analyzing processes of modernization and 
ethnicization in the organization of the Cambodian silk weaving 
                                                 
144 She asked me not to tell it to tourists, but she did allow me to write this secret down in my 
dissertation.    
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industry we have seen how national and global stakeholders depict 
the industry as authentic Khmer, while network dominance asks for a 
Chinese identity. The Khmer modernization narrative thus thrives on 
the bureaucratic myth that the ethnic Chinese in Cambodia have 
become Khmer people, while the trade career of Mrs. Bun celebrates 
primal features of Chinese culture such as thrift, family, networks, 
and officialdom connections in a Confucian hierarchy.   
Representing the grand Khmer narrative while being of ethnic Chinese 
descent, Youn Malis negotiates her identity in between the conflicting 
narratives of Chinese dominance in the market place and the Khmer 
identity of the silk weavers. The question I seek to answer in this 
chapter is why Youn Malis presents herself so overtly as an ethnic 
Khmer in public, concealing her Chinese identity, while Mrs. Bun 
dismisses Khmers as business partners, considering them lazy and 
non-industrial. To complicate things even further, since she harbors 
ambitions to become a sampot entrepreneur in urban Phnom Penh, 
why does she not celebrate features of Chinese culture instead of 
concealing them?  
        
In the recently published book ‘Diasporic Ventures, the Life and Work 
of Wang Gungwu’ (Benton and Liu 2004: 51), Wang Gungwu 
dismisses the concept of Chinese diaspora for its oversimplified 
character, and rejects the political explosiveness of the term, because 
he fears that Chinese networks are seen as an enormous octopus 
operated by China, spreading its tentacles across the world. I once 
watched Youn Malis burning paper money during ‘saen kbal tuk’, the 
Chinese Hungry Ghost festival, and also called her an ethnic Chinese. 
Youn Malis herself laughed at me and explained that her celebrating 
saen kbal tuk had nothing to do with her appreciation of a far-away 
Chinese past but should be seen as a habit she learned from her 
parents. She could not speak one word of Chinese and had no desire 
at all to visit China, because her home village was Prek Chakkran. 
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Moreover, beside Chinese festivals, she celebrated all kinds of Khmer 
ceremonies such as Phcum Ben, New Year, the King’s birthday and the 
water festival. Illustrating the multiple character of identities in 
Cambodia my translator once said to me145:  
 
‘I have Chinese roots and celebrate Chinese festivals, but I also 
celebrate Khmer festivals, and I am also a Christian and celebrate the 
birthday of Jesus’.  
 
The silk vendor Youn Malis married a Khmer; however, possessing a 
Khmer citizenship does not resemble Aihwa Ong's (2000) image of the 
nomadic and deterritorialized flexible citizen, nor does the fact that 
Youn Malis’ eyes do not get wet hearing the Chinese national anthem. 
This is also why Ma and Cartier (2003: 5) warn us that the idea of a 
prototypical ethnic Chinese is problematic because Chinese all over 
the world have very different experiences. Being socialized primarily as 
a Khmer the ‘hidden’ Chinese identity of Youn Malis and many other 
silk entrepreneurs reminded me of a famous painting of Salvador Dali, 
‘The Venus of Milo’, an anthropomorphic figure with multiple layers. 
Elaborating on Sigmund Freud’s theories of unconsciousness Dali 
illustrates that the modern body is one full of hidden layers, which 
can only be opened by means of psychoanalysis. The trick for an 
ethnographer in this case, like it would be for a psychoanalyst, is thus 
to find out why Youn Malis has no reason to open up her Chinese 
layer. Finding out why this is so I will analyze her trade career and 
outline the historical construction of her mother’s identity in the 
French colonial period.  
                                  
The Chinese ban on landownership 
In the early colonial period the silk weavers had access to land and 
could cultivate mulberry trees and sericulture workshops at the banks 
of the Mekong river. Their bosses, the Cantonese silk merchants, 
                                                 
145 Interview August 2004 
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controlled the silk industry and the French had to come to terms with 
the Chinese bangs (secret societies) for the attraction of fresh Chinese 
labor, and with the Chinese compradors to market their silk yarn to 
the export companies in Saigon. However, in the 1920s, undoubtedly 
frustrated by the powerful economic positions of the Chinese 
immigrants and by their own incapability to control them, the level of 
French tolerance towards the Chinese started to change and the 
French decided to empower the indigenous Khmers. To accomplish 
this they started to label the ethnic Chinese as greedy traders, whose 
greatest pleasures in life were opium, gambling and extortion. And 
although the French reaped huge sums of money from the Chinese 
population through discriminatory poll taxes, they also complained 
that the Chinese were exploiting the indigenous Khmers and remitting 
their entire incomes home (Edwards 2003). To empower the Khmer 
peasants the French also decided to sever the rights of Chinese to own 
land and implemented a land law in 1929 denying Chinese access to 
land (Edwards 2003; Willmott 1967).  
 
The 1929 ban of Chinese landownership had great implications for 
Youn Malis’ mother’s economic future because suddenly she, and 
many other silk weavers in Kandal, Takeo and Prey Veng with her, 
became landless. This is because in the bureaucratic calculus of the 
French it was no longer possible to be a farmer and to be Chinese at 
the same time (Edwards 2003). Luckily for the Chinese weavers, 
though, there was one escape possible because under the 1920 Civil 
Code a Chinese woman who married a Khmer man automatically 
obtained a Cambodian citizenship and was entitled to own land and 
thus could continue her weaving enterprise (ibid.). To save their 
weaving enterprise, intermarriage with a Khmer became a very 
profitable strategy for Chinese weavers and not coincidentally, many 
Chinese silk weavers, among whom Youn Malis’ mother, married a 
Khmer peasant.  
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The colonially established farmers’ identity of Youn Malis’ mother and 
her marriage with a Khmer peasant must thus be seen as a strategic 
form of essentialism to continue their silk business. Or, to recall what 
Peter Gosling and Linda Lim (1983:1-14) said about the assimilation 
of Southeast Asian Chinese: 
 
‘We sometimes seem to forget that ‘assimilation’ may also be a 
necessary cultural practice for Southeast Asian Chinese to survive or to 
grow economically as a business in a certain area’.  
 
As a consequence Youn Malis grew up in two worlds, a Chinese and a 
Khmer one, and learned how to deploy instrumental frontstage and 
backstage identities. In practice, however, we will see in the following 
pages that she did not have to negotiate her identity, because it was 
much wiser and later also much more profitable to identify herself as 
a loyal Khmer citizen and Angkorean silk weaver.     
 
A Pure Khmer 
On 17 April 1975 tragedy struck Youn Malis’ life and she was 
deported, like millions of other Cambodians, to one of the seven Pol 
Pot working zones. The ‘pro-farmer and anti-Chinese gentry class 
rhetoric’ of the Khmer Rouge regime dovetailed with the ideological 
anti-huaqiao discourse prevalent in Cultural Revolution China 
(Edwards 2003). For this reason the massive physical destruction of 
200,000 ethnic Chinese (half of Cambodia’s Chinese population) by 
Khmer Rouge soldiers (cf. Becker 1986) did not bother the Khmer 
Rouge leaders at all, but was instead seen as a ‘Great Leap Forward’ in 
the peasant revolution. Although the Khmer Rouge regime was not 
opposed to the Chinese race, but to the Chinese capitalist class (cf. 
Vickery 1986), the young and ill-educated Khmer Rouge 
revolutionaries found it hard to cut the Chinese cake class-wise and 
signs of Chineseness became associated with capitalism. In practice 
every ethnic Chinese, whether or not from an elitist background was 
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at danger, because eating pork, wearing trousers, using chopsticks, 
worshipping Chinese deities and speaking Mandarin all became 
associated with Chinese capitalism and thus with the death penalty 
(cf. Edwards 2003).  
To survive the Khmer Rouge regime Youn Malis, like her mother 
during the French colonial period, had to conceal her Chinese 
background behind a Khmer mask. The reason for this was that 
Khmer peasants were seen as crucial subjects to create the agrarian 
utopia they were striving for and the Chinese merchants as enemies of 
this ruralization plan. Youn Malis’ mother strongly advised her to only 
speak Khmer, dress like a Khmer, identify herself as a peasant and 
tell nobody about her Chinese roots. On the surface the Khmer Rouge 
regime might have seemed classless and people were encouraged to 
call each other ‘brothers’ and ‘friends’, but behind the scenes they 
were encouraged to spy on each other and betray non-revolutionary 
figures. Luckily, having a Khmer father and being transculturally 
socialized it was not difficult for Youn Malis to act as the correct 
revolutionary figure. Her older brother, though, was less lucky and 
was betrayed by a co-worker after they had found out about his 
university education, and he got killed by the Pol Pot soldiers because 
of his intellectual background.146  
Afraid being labeled ‘351’ 
In 1979 the Pol Pot nightmare ended for Youn Malis after former 
Khmer Rouge cadre Heng Samrin, backed by the Vietnamese army, 
had occupied Cambodia and ousted the Khmer Rouge rebels. 
Immediately after the war was over, she returned to her village Prek 
Changkran and continued her weaving enterprise under the close 
supervision of Vietnamese soldiers and government officials. However, 
the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) regime was basically a 
Vietnamese vassal state and, like the Pol Pot regime, repressed any 
                                                 
146 Ironically, the Pol Pot biographer Philip Short (2003) argues that Pol Pot was a Sino-Cambodian 
intellectual as well who had received a university education in Paris. 
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manifestation of Chinese identity. Heng Samrin echoed the tactics of 
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and punished the ethnic Chinese in 
Cambodia for their support of Pol Pot (Edwards 2003).  
 
Observing the anti-Chinese sentiment of the new PRK regime Stephen 
Heder (1981) reported that Vietnamese troops had restricted the 
movement of Chinese around Cambodia and had barred their entry 
into commercial areas. To tackle the Chinese problem the PRK regime 
endorsed a ‘351’ assimilation program based on the presumption that 
the greedy Chinese merchants had already caused too many problems 
to the national unity of Cambodia. The ‘351’ assimilation program was 
meant to map the Chinese in Cambodia, based on the prejudice that 
behind every noodle shop a communist Chinese network would hide 
(Gottesmann 2003). Although they did not inflict death penalties on 
them as had been common practice under the Khmer Rouge regime, 
the PRK regime denied Chinese Cambodians the freedom to celebrate 
Chinese New Year, to worship their deities, speak Chinese in public or 
display Chinese cultural artifacts. Afraid of being labeled ‘351’, 
wealthy Chinese bribed their way out and adopted a Khmer name, 
while poor ethnic Chinese such as Youn Malis married a Khmer to 
conceal their Chinese identity.  
 
In 1989, after the establishment of the State of Cambodia, restrictions 
on Chinese expressions of identity waned in the slipstream of the 
improved state relationship between China and Cambodia and the 
withdrawal of the ‘anti-Chinese’ Vietnamese advisors from Cambodia 
(Edwards 2003). The return of King Sihanouk from exile in 1991147 
was also seen as a dividing line between the discrimination of the past 
and the cultural freedom enjoyed by most Chinese today (Edwards 
2003). And undoubtedly the arrival of ‘new’ Chinese entrepreneurs 
injecting the postwar Cambodian economy with huge sums of aid and 
                                                 
147 Sihanouk lived in exile enjoying the hospitality of the Korean ruler Kim II-Sung.   
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investment dollars also dimmed the associations of Chinese with 
communism and Pol Pot support.  
 
Like in the prosperous 1960s Cambodia witnessed a renaissance of 
Chinese schools, newspapers, dialect organizations and temples 
catering to the massive re-awakening of Chineseness in Cambodia. 
From the 1990s onwards the Cambodian government, under the lead 
of a young Prime Minister Samdech Hun Sen, restored the rights of 
Chinese Cambodians to express their Chinese roots, speak Chinese in 
public, worship their deities and celebrate the Hungry Ghosts and 
Mooncake festivals again. And despite the state narrative that only 
one per cent of its population is ethnic Chinese, modernity, like in 
Thailand (cf. Szanton-Blanc 1997) became associated with China and 
not with Cambodia. In Phnom Penh, housing styles, clothing, food, 
leisure and entertainment shifted progressively towards the Chinese 
style and the Mandarin language became widely accepted as a 
business language.  
 
Precisely in this period of Chinese ‘renaissance’ Youn Malis decided to 
quit her job as a silk weaver and find a job in Phnom Penh as a 
sampot retailer. Having a past as a silk weaver, good connections with 
middlemen in her village, access to a local credit saving system and 
overseas relatives in the United States, Youn Malis saw good future 
perspectives in Phnom Penh. But despite the fact that being modern 
and having business success became associated with the image of the 
industrious Chinaman, Youn Malis, unlike her middleman and unlike 
the sampot silk vendors on the Olympic and Old Market, kept 
identifying herself as Khmer. Why did she not express her Chinese 
background like many other entrepreneurs in Phnom Penh, or, to 
reverse the question, why does she still exhibit an overtly Khmer 
identity?   
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Khmer men do not peddle 
To understand why Youn Malis still presents herself as ethnic Khmer 
we must analyze her failure to establish a credit relationship with her 
middleman and become a sampot entrepreneur first. Part of the 
answer is related to her being married to a Khmer. In a weaving 
context her middleman saw Youn Malis’ marriage with a Khmer as an 
advantage, because the matrilocal system would move him into his 
wife’s natal compound and oblige him to give her a hand in her 
weaving enterprise.148 This to the satisfaction of the middleman, who 
likes to see many kin members around a loom, as this guarantees him 
a well-running weaving enterprise that will survive for many 
generations. However, when Youn Malis expressed ambitions to 
become a sampot retailer the middleman judged her business identity 
differently. This was because he had doubts about her 
trustworthiness as she did not comply with the ideal of traders 
copying a Chinese lifestyle. Let me explain this further.  
 
Being himself transculturally socialized and thus familiar with both 
the Khmer and Chinese lifestyle, the middleman knew that Youn 
Malis’ husband, like most male Khmers, would like to keep the market 
place at arm’s length. In line with his view on the Khmer sexual 
division of labor her husband indeed preferred a job in the officialdom 
and did not want to peddle sampot on the market. The middleman 
observed how her husband, but also her two sons, never appeared in 
Youn Malis’ retail store and did not show any ambitions in this 
direction either. As Youn Malis (laughingly) recalled149: 
 
‘No, my husband never helps in my shop. He works at the tax 
department and does not like the markets. He thinks selling silk is a job 
for women and not for men. My son does not help either, he is busy 
                                                 
148 In the weaving villages I came across many matrilineal kinship systems, although most weavers 
argued that the choice was open.     
149 Interview October 2004 
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with school. Only my daughter helps, but often only in the weekends. 
She goes to school as well’.   
 
Similarly, a neighboring peddler, also a former weaver, echoed150:  
 
‘My husband is a constructor and never comes in my shop to help. He 
does not like the markets because that is something for women. I have 
two sons and one daughter. My son does not work on the market, he 
likes to stroll around (daileen) with friends along the riverside. Perhaps 
my daughter will take over the business later, but I am not sure. 
Perhaps she will marry a rich man and work in his shop, then what can 
I do?  
 
What bothers a middleman about such stories is the husband’s 
preference to start a career outside the market place and the 
incapability of the above retailers to mobilize kin members. Precisely 
because Youn Malis lacked family support in Phnom Penh her 
middleman wondered whether she could ever attract customers, 
bargain with several customers at the same time, establish a 
permanent clientele and ask for government licenses, on her own. In 
his opinion Youn Malis’ market stall was embedded in weak family 
links, and had no possibilities to accumulate capital and increase its 
stock in the future.  
 
But Youn Malis had other family problems151:  
 
‘The family of my husband eats up my business. They always come to 
Phnom Penh when they are sick and when they have debts. During 
Phcum Ben, when I go to their homes, I always have to bring food with 
me and clothes. My family is poor as well, but they never come to 
Phnom Penh and beg for money, but my husband’s family always 
                                                 
150 Interview October 2004 
151 Interview October 2004 
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comes to me and asks for money. How can I ever become rich that 
way?’  
 
This could be compared to what the owner of the wholesale shop La 
Maison de la Soie once said152: 
 
‘During UNTAC there were many sellers and we all sold a lot of 
handicrafts. I was not a very good peddler at all, some were much 
better than me, but their business never grew. This is because they 
always gave their profits away, while I re-invested all my profit in my 
business and slowly became bigger and bigger’. 
 
Can Buddhists become rich? 
To understand Youn Malis’ husbands’ moral attitude against capital 
accumulation it is perhaps wise to make a religious side-step and 
analyze the differences in soteriologies (i.e. theories on how people 
achieve enlightenment) between Khmer Buddhism and Chinese 
Buddhism. Although the Khmer Buddha does not condemn wealth, he 
does teach his followers to spend their profits moderately (mattannuta) 
rather than satisfying their own desires (Payutto 1998). In contrast 
with the classical economic discourse to reinvest profit into one’s 
business, Theravada Buddhist texts teach household members to 
share their wealth with generosity and return it for beneficial 
purposes in accordance with the path of the Noble One (ibid.: 69). In 
one passage for instance the Buddha explains to the wealthy 
merchant Anathapindika how he should spend his profits in a morally 
sound way and how he should please his family, his friends, his 
servants, his co-villagers and his sangka (ibid.: 86). The Theravada 
Buddhist concept of ‘pratityasamutpada’ also offers a strong moral 
base for giving (aawie), pointing at the interdependence of things and 
actions and noting that helping others in this life will bring prosperity 
in the next one (ibid.). 
                                                 
152 Interview September 2004  
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The above moral attitudes do not increase one’s stock but increase 
one’s merit, which again will give a person a better karma in a future 
life. In other words, Khmer Buddhist moralities do not measure a 
person’s worth by material wealth, but instead judge the ethical value 
of wealth by the ways in which it is obtained, and the use to which it 
is put (ibid.). That is also why Youn Malis’ husband feels morally 
obliged to spend his income and that of his wife on sick and poor 
family members. Followers of Chinese Buddhism in contrast practice 
a completely different kind of Buddhism, Mahayana, and sometimes 
mix that with forms of Confucianism or other forms of popular beliefs 
(Ornatowski 1996).  
 
Although both kinds of Buddhism value lay-normativity highly in 
discourse, economic ethics in Mahayana Buddhism show differences 
with those in Theravada Buddhism, because of its different 
understanding of nirvana, enlightenment, and the Bodhisattva ideal. 
The most important difference between Mahayana and Theravada 
soteriologies is the former’s greater acceptance of this-worldly 
economic activities by the Chinese sangha. This must again be 
understood in terms of Buddhism’s entry in China as a foreign religion 
and its efforts to accommodate itself to an already existing 
Confucian/Daoist heritage (ibid.). Unlike Buddhism, Confucianism 
placed much more emphasis on happiness and prosperity in ‘this 
world’, which also contributed to the development of commercially-
minded monks, monasteries and followers. In Chinese temples for 
instance one could see commercial activities that could never have 
taken place in Indian temples, such as grain milling, oil seed pressing, 
money lending, mutual financing associations and the renting of lands 
to farmers in exchange for some percentage of the crop (ibid.).  
  
Apparently Youn Malis deployed a more commercially oriented and 
this-worldly vision on capital accumulation than did her husband. 
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However, being married to a Khmer, she did not have the power to 
resist his worries, because women only rule the money pot in 
Cambodia, but not the other life spheres (cf. Ledgerwood 1990). Not 
being able to resist her husband’s objection against capital 
accumulation, it became impossible for Youn Malis to establish a 
long-lasting trust relationship (tjumpah) with her middleman. Again, 
in a weaving context her middleman did not care that Youn Malis’ 
husband spent most of her profits wisely on his kin members, friends 
and the sangha,153 because the more debts the better. This is because 
debts guaranteed the middleman that Youn Malis would continue to 
produce for him and not dump him for another middleman. But once 
she wanted to become a silk vendor in Phnom Penh the middleman 
was suddenly abhorred with her husband’s ‘spending culture’ and 
witnessed to his dissatisfaction how her sampot stock did not increase 
and that Youn Malis was not able to copy the lifestyle that goes hand 
in hand with the image of a Chinese family firm.  
 
The myth of a harmonious diaspora 
Expressions like ‘blood is thicker than water’ (Kuo 1996:119) are often 
used to express the closely-knit character of Chinese business 
networks and express a primordial and racist definition of ethnicity. 
Taken as authentic features of an essentially Chinese culture both the 
Chinese family and guanxi particularism have been systematically 
used as objects of cultural analyses by scholars studying ethnic 
Chinese (cf. Ong and Nonini 1997). In particular familism, guanxi 
(good connections), ganqing (sentiment) and a common native place 
(tongxiang guanxi) have been emphasized as positive attributes to the 
trust and credit that make the Chinese commercial system prosper 
around the world (Hamilton 1996; Kotkin 1993; Ong and Nonini 1997; 
Weidenbaum and Hughes 1996).  
 
                                                 
153 The monk-order 
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The trade career of Youn Malis, however, represents a counter-
narrative to the idea that guanxi particularism and tongxiang guanxi 
benefit ethnic Chinese, and that all Chinese are willing to provide each 
other with credit, commercial contacts and inside information. It is 
ironic that Youn Malis first used her marriage with a Khmer 
successfully to conceal her Chinese identity, but cannot climb socially 
to the ranks of a sampot entrepreneur now because she married a 
Khmer. This also indicates that her hybridity is not always a blessing 
for her but can also work against her, in this case when trying to 
obtain credit. Or, in the words of Stuart Hall (1996:3): 
 
‘Identification is a process of articulation, a suturing, an over-determination, 
not a subsumption. There is always ‘too much’ or ‘too little’ - an over-
determination or a lack, but never a proper fit, a totality’. 
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Because Youn Malis’ hybridity was a disadvantage to bond socially 
with her middleman she decided to start up a silk stall in the 
diaspora- and tourist-oriented silk industry. Helpful in this regard was 
her sister who lived in Boston, as well as many other Cambodian 
Americans roaming around the Central Market to fill their suitcases 
with sampot hol. Since Cambodia opened up its border in 1991, Leiper 
(1998) noted an enormous increase of Cambodian Americans visiting 
their homeland as ‘American’ tourists. The Cambodian Americans 
have clear emotional interests in Cambodia and depict the silk 
weaving industry as an Angkorean treasure that was destroyed by the 
evil Khmer Rouge revolutionaries. Forced to leave their homeland in 
the 1970s and having lost many relatives in the Pol Pot working zones 
the Cambodian diaspora framed a diasporic consciousness around the 
silk industry as authentic Khmer. As Katharaya Um (2006: 88) 
explains:  
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‘For many Cambodian refugees, nostalgia for a glorious pre-war homeland 
became a way of reclaiming an identity amidst the loss, disorientation and 
liminality of their refugee condition’.  
To tap herself into the wider spectrum of the global economy Youn 
Malis recognized this nostalgia as a market niche and became a 
storyteller and representative of the grand Khmer narrative, selling 
authentic Khmer silks. To make a living as a storyteller she 
commercialized her weaving past, not only to attract the Cambodian 
diaspora, but, as we will see in the pages that follow, also a second 
group of Khmer authenticity seekers: tourists. Her Khmer identity was 
a blessing again. 
After Angkor Wat became a UNESCO World heritage project in 1992 
the number of tourists visiting it has grown astonishingly from 
140,000 visitors in 1993 to 800,000 in 2002 and over one million in 
2005 (Ministry of Tourism 2005). Most of the tourists are middle-class 
package tourists who fly in directly from eastern Asian and Western 
countries to Phnom Penh and lately also to Siem Reap. With a 
recovering postwar economy desperately seeking for extra revenues, 
‘Angkor tourism’ generates a gross income amounting over US$ 220 
million and represents one of the country’s most important assets for 
socio-economic development (Economic Institute of Cambodia 2004). 
On the whole the tourism industry is estimated to employ some 
70,000 Cambodians, of which only 10,000 are working in the hotel 
and travel industries (ibid.). The ‘other’ 60,000 workers try to make a 
living out of tourism for instance by selling ‘authentic’ Khmer 
handicrafts.  
In the slipstream of heritage tourism, Richie and Zins (1978: 253) 
have defined cultural tourism as ‘the consumption by tourists of 
features resembling the culture of a society’. Richie and Zins identified 
certain elements of culture, which attract tourists to particular 
destinations, such as handicrafts, language, traditions, the history of 
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a region, architecture, dress, and so on (ibid.). However, it is not a 
secret anymore that World Heritage programs conceive culture in 
rather static and geographically bounded terms and often cover up 
paradoxical social and economic relations within the industry (Dahles 
2001). After UNESCO framed the Angkor Wat temple complex as a 
monument of past glory (Winter 2006), it also framed the silk woven 
sampot hol as an historical core in the identities of the Khmers.  
 
In the official UNESCO narrative the silk weavers in Takeo Province 
are ethnic Khmers and the hol weaving techniques have their roots in 
the temple complex of Angkor. Fitting into the ‘grand narrative’ that 
the silk woven sampot hol can be traced back primordially to the ruins 
of Angkor, the standardized and homogenous UNESCO discourse 
clearly corresponds with the romantic stories tourists like to hear 
about ancient old ruins and authentic crafts having survived decades 
of brutal civil wars. Recalling Arjun Appadurai’s (1996) notion of 
‘touristscape’ a high UNESCO official in Phnom Penh once told me 
how he had reconstructed Phnom Chisor in Takeo Province as an 
authentic weaving site and had added to it authentic performance arts 
such as Khmer drama dances, shadow theatre, oral folklores and Arak 
music to attract tourists and generate incomes for the Khmer artists 
at the same time. Although these performative artists were internal 
migrants from other provinces, they were presented as Phnom Chisor 
villagers to meet the expectations of tourists.        
 
The invention of traditions and the social construction of authenticity 
in the tourism industry are not new phenomena, of course, and have 
been widely studied (Cohen 1988, MacCannell 1973, Urry 1990). We 
all know by now that tourists consume ancient tales of discovery like 
‘real’ commodities and have adopted a romantic gaze in their search 
for ‘naturalness’ (Urry 1990). In Cambodia, after package tourists and 
backpackers have visited the once-lost Angkor Wat temple complex, 
they fill their suitcases and backpacks with Khmer sampot hol. In the 
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wake of this discovery experience the argument goes that, confronted 
with the authenticity demand of tourist handicraft, silk vendors start 
to reconstruct and objectify their ethnicity and consider it as an 
authentic commodity to tourists (cf. MacCannell 1973). They stage, to 
paraphrase Dean MacCannell, their authenticity to attract tourists 
and prevent them from seeing other cultures.  
 
Contrary to what tourists believe, the silk scarves and sampot that 
Youn Malis peddles are machine-made replicates from Laos, Burma 
and Thailand. She begged me to keep silent about this trade secret, 
because it could damage her business and future income. To eclipse 
the cultural diversity of her commodities Youn Malis presents herself 
‘Khmer style’ with a make-up-free face, curled black hair and a silk 
krama wrapped around her neck. To complete her ‘Khmer authenticity 
strategy’ she is seated on a bamboo mat and burns incense to create a 
spiritual atmosphere. And once the intended tourists sit in her plastic 
chairs she overloads them with machine-made Lao scarves, which she 
sells as 100% Khmer. This ‘act of Khmer authenticity’ is also how 
Dahles and Zwart (2003), the author of this thesis, and Weyers (2005) 
were misled by handicraft vendors on Cambodian tourist markets as 
they staged themselves and their commodities as authentic Khmer.  
 
But when Youn Malis markets her foreign scarves as authentic Khmer 
she is not fooling tourists, but instead anticipating on what tourists 
define as authentic Khmer. The Russian technical forces in the 1980s, 
the UNTAC members in the 1990s and also the contemporary tourists 
disliked the expensive sampot hol for its dull color and preferred 
machine-made colorful scarves from Lao and Birma to bring home as 
souvenirs. In a related vein Eric Cohen (1988) observed how tourists 
in Thailand and Java appreciated commercialized replications of local 
artifacts more than the original ones, and were not always seeking for 
authentic experiences at all. And going against the postmodern 
indices that tourists search for ‘naturalness’ (Urry 1990) Popelka and 
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Littrell (1991) also studied tourists’ perceptions of authenticity and 
found that only nine per cent focused on the issue of the genuineness 
versus fakeness of the product. Although scholars accept that 
heritage-based tourism revolves around the fragmentary nature of 
late-modern society and a lack of depth and originality in tourists’ 
own lives (cf. Baudrillard 1998 [1970]), we must be careful when 
assuming that tourists share the same kind of pessimism. As Eric 
Cohen (1988) observed, middle-class package groups, unlike the 
educated elite, are relatively unconcerned with the problem of 
authenticity and do not care about being surrounded by copies and 
plastic art.  
 
Conclusion 
Addressing the fourth research question (Why do ethnic Chinese silk 
traders market ‘their’ silk weaving products as authentically Khmer), I 
have presented another case study in this chapter, this time around 
the silk vendor Youn Malis. Following the trade career of this middle-
aged silk vendor from the late colonial period onwards I have shown, 
why, contrary to Mrs. Bun and all the wholesalers and middlemen, 
this retailer has no reason to exhibit a Chinese trader’s lifestyle and 
counter the Khmer modernization claim. When Youn Malis says she 
feels Khmer, is a devoted Buddhist and loves the king she is not 
eclipsing a Chinese identity, but is instead a Cambodian citizen with a 
multi-layered identity who has no reasons to revive a far-away 
Chinese past. Being socialized in the Khmer weaving class, having 
gained a Cambodian citizenship and being married to a Khmer Youn 
Malis has been socialized primarily as a Khmer, who happens to have 
Chinese ancestors. Of course she celebrates Chinese New Year and, 
yes, she offers food to please the Hungry Ghosts in November, but 
unlike the wholesalers she does not close her stall on that day, 
because she is not ‘really’ scared that these ghosts will harm her 
business. There has only been one moment in her trade career when 
she wished she could negotiate her Chinese past a bit better, and that 
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was when her middleman was judging her as a future business 
partner to give credit to. Youn Malis did not succeed in establishing 
trade connections with her middleman, notably a co-villager and 
former patron, because of her husband’s Khmer Buddhist attitude 
against capital accumulation. As a consequence she had great 
difficulties to copy and exhibit the Chinese life style that goes hand in 
hand with a closely-knit and harmonious family firm.    
 
Turning the burden of a Khmer identity into a blessing again she 
decided to sell ‘foreign’ handicrafts as authentic Khmer on the tourist 
markets. On the tourist markets she used her Khmer weaving identity 
strategically again because tourists love to buy authentic Khmer silks 
from an authentic Khmer weaver. When Youn Malis expands her silk 
business across the borders into the Cambodian Diaspora 
communities her Khmer weaving identity is also an advantage. The 
Cambodian Diaspora has a clear emotional interest in her being an 
authentic Khmer weaver, too, because they depict the ‘hol’ silk 
weaving techniques, like themselves, as remnants of an Angkorean 
past that survived the evil Khmer Rouge revolutionaries.  
 
This chapter has also shown that the identity of the foreign silks and 
the ‘indigenous’ sampot hol have merged into one symbol of Khmer 
authenticity. This is because it follows the global consuming desires of 
today’s tourists and Khmer expatriates for Khmer authenticity. 
Marxist scholars would say this consumption behavior has exercised a 
monopoly over Youn Malis’ identity and has forced her to become the 
commodity she sells.  In such a vision the silks that Youn Malis sells 
have ultimate power over her, a situation George Lukacs, cited in 
Inglis and Hughson (2003:23-24), called reification. Jean Baudrillard 
(1998 [1970]) also dislikes the ‘fake’ character of commodities and 
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sees such forms of capitalism as an uncontrollable sign system full of 
simulacra (ibid.:148-149).154   
 
The question remains what is fake and what is reality in a multi-
layered and hegemonized country such as Cambodia. The Cambodian 
subject, as I have shown, is used to exhibiting different lifestyles and 
codes of conduct. Thus if the Cambodian subject does not think in 
terms of primordial affiliations, why would Youn Malis then be a 
victim of the ‘fake’ commodity she sells? Of course Youn Malis can not 
tell tourists about her Chinese ancestors.  Of course the sampot hol 
cannot have its roots in China.  And of course Youn Malis has become 
the identity that her commodity has ‘forced’ her to become. But does 
that mean she is a passive victim of a global demand for authenticity 
or must we see her identity as that of an active entrepreneur 
consciously exhibiting the ‘correct’ lifestyle to earn a living in one of 
the poorest countries of Asia? 
                                                 
154 According to Baudrillard (1998 [1970]) simulacra are images that fabricate a reality that has no 
existence except for its fabrication. 
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Conclusion 
         
 
 
Within the context of a booming Cambodian silk weaving industry the 
aim of this thesis is to generate empirical knowledge about migration 
movements, business networks, identity politics and modernization 
processes. Elaborating on concepts of ethnicity, transnationalism and 
materialism on the one hand and postmodern and post-Marxist 
theories on the other I have attempted to answer the following 
research question:  
‘How does the ethnically complex organization of the silk weaving 
industry relate to diverging modernization narratives and which 
interests do these narratives serve in the contemporary Cambodian 
nation state in general and its silk industry in particular?  
One conclusion to be drawn from this research it is that the 
Cambodian silk weaving industry sits uncomfortably in between two 
narratives of modernization; i.e. a dominant cultural narrative 
referring back to the glorious Angkor empire and a re-emerging 
economic narrative singing the praise of the commercial qualities of 
the ethnic Chinese population. As the dominant modernization 
narrative about the silk weaving industry holds, Khmer women 
manufactured silk skirts and used an ikat weaving technique also 
referred to as ‘hol’ as early as the twelfth century. This dominant 
narrative describes how the ‘hol’ ikat weaving techniques disappeared 
from the Cambodian landscape during the Khmer Rouge revolution 
and returned again in the 1990s, mainly due to the efforts of foreign 
development agencies.      
The Cambodian population and their political leaders are extremely 
proud of this craftsmanship and consider the ‘ikat’ woven sampot hol 
as an important ‘totem pole’ of their nationhood. In the run-up to the 
UN-sponsored elections in 1993, the veteran Cambodian politician 
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Son Sann even proposed a ‘sampot test’ as a means of discerning the 
true ethnic identity of Cambodians. This patriotic remark was made 
during a heated debate about the voting rights of Vietnamese 
residents of Cambodia, and it was believed that only pure Khmer 
(khmae sot) could pass a sampot test, a feat deemed impossible for 
Vietnamese who commonly wear trousers.  
 
Precisely because narratives about cultural objects in Cambodia are 
loaded with ethnic pride, breaking cultural codes or making ‘false’ 
statements about their origin can lead to demonstrations or even 
outbursts of anger. In January 2003, the popular Thai TV soap-star 
Suvanant Kongying remarked in an interview with a Cambodian 
newspaper that she would visit Cambodia only under the condition 
that they would return Angkor Wat to its right owner, Thailand. In the 
week that followed the publication of this interview, raging 
Cambodians destroyed $47 million worth of Thai property (Thai 
embassy, Thai hotels, Thai cars) in Phnom Penh and evicted more 
than 700 Thai nationals, including Ambassador Chatchawed 
Chartsuwan and his staff. A few days later, the left-wing Cambodian 
politician Sam Rainsey made things even worse declaring that prime-
minister Hun Sen had purposely used and blown up the phrase of this 
young and naïve soap-star to promote his campaign for the coming 
elections and win souls for his CPP party.  
 
This incident once again illustrates that postcolonial Cambodian 
political leaders use to seek legitimacy in the imagery of the twelfth-
century temple complex of Angkor Wat, as Penny Edwards (1999) 
argued, making this temple complex the dominant cultural and 
political framework for national identity building, in which images of 
history, place, landscape are envisioned. Yet, going against the 
narrative that Cambodia modernized in a Khmer way, colonial 
scholars emphasized the constructive character of Khmer culture and 
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argued that French colonial art institutions authenticated the sampot 
hol as a symbol of Khmer ethnic pride (Edwards 1999, 2002; Muan 
2001). In an attempt at critically assessing this ‘total colonial fact’ 
(Ben Ari 1999) both Edwards and Muan remind us that Cambodian 
nationalism must not be seen as a colonial allergy but as its avatar, 
because postcolonial state leaders adopted the French Oriental 
discourse.  
 
Although the colonialism/modernism continuum of Edwards (1999) 
and Muan (2001) is refreshing, they seem to be just as trapped in the 
total colonial fact. Exhibiting an orientalist perspective (Said 1995), 
these writers seem to have established a blind spot, as only one 
possible modernization claim exists for them: the French one. Yet, 
establishing a historical perspective on the origin of the Cambodian 
silk weaving industry in chapter three, this thesis indicates that the 
origin of the present-day Cambodian silk weaving industry neither lies 
in the Courts of Angkor nor in French colonial art institutions, but 
that it is the result of Chinese migration and a demand for authentic 
silk clothes by the Khmer elite in late nineteenth-century Cambodia. I 
deliberately refer to the origin of the present-day silk weaving 
industry, because academic research has shown that the Chinese 
again adopted the weft ikat weaving techniques from Tai speaking 
groups (cf. Howard 1999). Still, adopting the weft ikat weaving 
techniques from the Tai, it were the Chinese immigrants who 
manufactured a silken cloth they referred to as sampot hol.  
 
After being hegemonized by the Siamese and Vietnamese courts for 
centuries, Cambodia was ‘liberated’ by the French in 1863 and the 
Khmer elite was desperately searching for a dress to mark their 
independence as Khmer. The Cantonese silk merchants recognized the 
Khmer desire after an indigenous identity and marketed the sampot 
hol as authentic Khmer. Filling this silk ‘niche’ was profitable for both 
parties, because the Khmer elite, as customers, got their much-
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wanted identity and the economic Cantonese elite, as producers, was 
presented with an opportunity to continue their silk businesses. At 
stake was thus the establishment of a pre-colonial ‘winning hegemony’ 
(Gramsci 1971) between two different social categories, who had joint 
political, cultural and economic interests to depict the sampot hol as 
authentic Khmer.   
   
Often, Chinese migration to Southeast Asia has been described as the 
effect of poverty, wars and a colonial demand for their labor. This 
study has shown that the ethnic Chinese dominated the silk weaving 
industry long before the arrival of the French colonists. In fact, the 
French silk industrials could not compete with the Cantonese silk 
merchants at all and depended on their revenue farms for the supply 
of raw materials, labor and export channels. The Cantonese silk 
immigrants, therefore, were not naïve opportunity seekers, starting up 
a whatsoever business under the patronage of French colonists. 
Instead, their migration movements were business-oriented and many 
of them had already been conditioned for centuries to respond to 
various kinds of market niches abroad (cf. Kuhn 2006), in this case 
silk producing and weaving in Cambodia.  
  
To understand how this modernization process continued I have 
attempted to answer the second research question in chapter four:  
‘How did the present-day silk weaving industry transform into a multi-
layered silk weaving network?’ Initially, the Cambodian silk weaving 
industry was a humble household affair in which silk weavers 
cultivated their own mulberry trees, reeled their own silk yarn and 
peddled their own sampot. From the late colonial period onwards, 
however, silk yarn was imported from Japan, China and Vietnam and 
the village-based silk weaving industry transformed into a 
transnational multi-layered business network.  
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Going against the capitalist argument that increasing global 
competition, mass production and the emergence of the consumer as 
the driving force behind capitalism will flatten ethnic Chinese 
business networks (cf. Yeung and Olds 2000), this chapter has 
pointed at the fact that descendents of the Cantonese silk immigrants 
still organize their production and trade relationships within the 
pyramid structure of the ‘colonial’ revenue farm system their 
ancestors once introduced (cf. Trocki 1997; Wilson 2004). As 
indicated, small wholesaler conglomerates hold some 75 per cent of 
the total amount of 20,000 silk weavers in a firm credit grip, 
controlling the cross-border silk yarn trade (cf. Dongelmans, Seng and 
Ter Horst 2005). In line with political-economic writers such as Khan 
and Jomo (2000), Wedeman (2003), Duara (1988) and Case (2000), 
this chapter comes to the conclusion that rents are essential for 
maintaining social order and also necessary for economic growth in 
Cambodia.  
 
Although Cambodia became a member of the Greater Mekong 
Subregion (GMS) in the 1990s and openly promoted an ‘open sky 
policy’, silk weavers and middlemen, who notably live in the 
borderlands, cannot buy silk yarn themselves at the Tan Chau 
spinneries. The idea of the border as an excluder of economic 
opportunities for the weavers and middlemen clearly goes against the 
‘cultural optimism’ of globalization theorists such as Samudavanija 
Chai-Annan (1994), Robin Cohen (1997) and Andrew Walker (1999) 
who have applauded the re-emergence of ethnic-based cross-border 
relationships in the Mekong region. Instead, the results of this study 
bring us much closer to what Donnan and Wilson (1999) once said 
about border crossings, namely that they implicate the twin narratives 
of inclusion and incorporation on the one hand and of exclusion and 
dispossession on the other hand. Due to their good connections with 
high ranked government officials only the powerful wholesalers in 
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Phnom Penh have the opportunity to cross the border and buy raw 
silk from the Tan Chau spinnery.   
 
In Marxist terms, the institutional alliance between a small political 
and an economic elite may be dubbed as unproductive, exploitative 
and corrupt. However, in the Cambodian context, the silk weavers and 
middlemen do not feel exploited by the business practices and power 
position of the wholesalers. As James Scott (1976) stated, exploitation 
is not a scientific concept but a moral one, and silk weavers and 
middlemen account for their lack of power in the officialdom as part of 
their rank in the silk weaving network. In this regard one should not 
forget that Buddhist monks in the village pagoda also put silk weavers 
and middlemen into place, and remind them continually of how much 
merit powerful traders must have collected in a previous life and how 
justly they are reaping the rewards of generosity and compassion.  
Yet, the cultural, economic, institutional and political arguments do 
not explain the ethnic differences that exist between present-day 
Khmer silk producers and Chinese silk traders. Often ‘ethnic 
economies’, ‘diasporas’ and ‘transnational business networks’ are seen 
as homogenous entities that operate within the boundaries of shared 
group affiliations. In its early days, the Cambodian silk weaving 
industry was organized within the boundaries of an ethnic Chinese 
diaspora. As illustrated on the cover of this thesis and more explicit in 
chapter four the nineteenth century silk weavers lived in houses 
decorated in a Chinese style and wore black farmer pants from China. 
Today, however, silk weavers no longer wear black farmer pants but 
spin the wheels in a cotton sarong or a silken sampot.  
In chapter five I have attempted to shed light on the processes of 
ethnicization that occurred under the ethnic Chinese modernization 
conditions and to answer the third research question: How do silk 
producers and traders negotiate their identities within the economic 
domain of the silk weaving industry? Undoubtedly, the 1929 land law 
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and the repression of Chinese identity in the 1970s and 1980s has left 
their marks on the Khmer self-presentations of the silk weavers, but 
this does not explain why wholesalers and middlemen wear ‘Chinese’ 
pants and why silk weavers dress themselves in a sampot resembling 
the image of an indigenous Khmer. Embracing a materialist view on 
the subject, this study comes to the conclusion that Khmer and 
Chinese self-presentations must not be seen as primordial affiliations 
or as outcomes of state bio-politics (cf. Foucault 1978, 1980, 1991), 
but instead as lifestyles, cultural repertoires and codes of conduct 
rooted in a territorial division of labor and local community networks.  
 
Although there is nothing new about shifting and strategic identities, 
transnationalism scholars have neglected to connect the flexible 
identities of the ethnic Chinese to their social position in the ‘bamboo’ 
networks (cf. Weidenbaum and Hughes 1996). As Philip Yang (2006) 
indicates, transnationalism scholars have extensively written about 
diverse home and host experiences (cf. Ma and Cartier 2003), but 
failed to write about the network experiences ‘in-between’. Although 
this study does not have the ambition to institutionalize the 
reductionism of classical Marxist theories, it illustrates how 
production and trade relationships became ethnicized according to 
distinctive and unequal positions in silk industry.   
 
Chapter five has shown how the silk entrepreneurs in Cambodia 
moulding themselves as ethnic Chinese and downgrade the silk 
producers, whose labor they consume, as Khmer. The ethnic 
distinctions between silk producers and traders give credit to Abner 
Cohen’s view on ethnicity pointing out that it is a useful heuristic 
concept tailored to make sense of particular, historically delineated 
economic processes such as colonization, urbanization and 
modernization. In his own words:   
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‘one need not be a Marxist in order to recognize the fact that the earning of 
livelihood, the struggle for a larger share of income from the economic 
system constitute an important variable significantly related to ethnicity’ 
(Cohen 1990 [1974]: 91).  
Culturalist literature emphasizes that reciprocal relationships within 
ethnic groups enforce harmony and consensus towards the lineage (cf. 
Fukuyama 1995; Kotkin 1993; Redding 1990). However, this study (cf. 
chapter five) shows that middlemen and wholesalers used ethnicity to 
antagonize and downgrade kin members and fellow ethnics as lower 
ranked weavers. In the working place regimes of the wholesalers and 
middlemen the sampot hol, the house on poles and Khmer religious 
relics are symbols that express the poor economic position and 
subsistence ethic of the silk weavers. In contrast, the Chinese housing 
style, dress system and Confucian religious orientation exhibit a 
lifestyle that legitimizes a trader to reap the benefits of the commodity 
and ‘own’ the labor of the weavers, kin member or not.  
This brings me to the conclusion that identity is a both a material and 
a symbolic affair in the Cambodian silk weaving industry, and that the 
trick for weavers and traders is to play the correct role that belongs to 
someone’s economic and political position in the network. Playing the 
correct role as a peasant or trader is not uncommon for Cambodians. 
As chapter two has shown, underneath the myth of an all-Khmer 
nation rests an extremely diverse and pluralistic society that has been 
hegemonized and ‘civilized’ by both domestic (especially the Khmer 
Rouge regime) and foreign powers for centuries. As a consequence, the 
Cambodian subject is used to adapt to different codes of conduct and 
deploys multi-layered identities for strategic use.  
As anthropologists argued, identities are symbolically constructed in 
social processes, like in the case of mimetic practices, in which one 
literally adopts cultural codes from powerful others to climb socially 
(Jackson 2006: 326). Especially in preliterate societies where most 
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practical learning is a matter of direct observation and ‘prestige 
imitation’, role-identities are important sources of symbolic capital 
(ibid.). In this regard the American sociologist Erving Goffmann (1959) 
observed that front-stage performances are most visible and are used 
as forms of ‘impression management’ among marginal people who are 
discriminated and must hide their ‘stigma’ to successfully interact 
with others. In Goffmann’s notion of ‘impression management’ human 
beings, called actors, play roles and give impressions of how they 
would like to be seen. At the front-stage actors stage a public face that 
depends on the audience they are confronted with and the context 
they are situated in, while once leaving the public stage and entering 
the backstage, they feel much safer and closer to their ‘real’ mental, 
moral and psychological self (ibid.).  
Still, linking the symbolic identities of the silk weavers and traders to 
unequal production relationships and subsistence ethics alone is not 
sufficient to understand the gap that exists between the ethnic 
Chinese dominance of the industry and the Khmer modernization 
claim vested on the silk products by a range of stakeholders including 
the ethnic Chinese silk traders. According to Marx, the state usually 
secures the interests of the capitalist class in society and deploys 
‘ideologies’ that mask the true, class-based exploitative nature of 
society (Inglis and Hughson 2003: 23). The story that the majority of 
the Cambodian parliament still consists of ethnic Chinese [as a 
remnant of French colonial policies (Osborne 1969; Meyer 1971) 
should be interpreted in this light. However, the political and capitalist 
elite in Cambodia proliferates the culture of the workers and not the 
one of the capitalists. In other words, there exists a gap between the 
ethnic background of the political and economic elite in Cambodia and 
between the ways they advertise Cambodian culture publicly.  
In chapter six I have attempted to shed light on the gap that exists 
between the Khmer and Chinese modernization processes and to 
answer the fourth research question: Why do ethnic Chinese silk 
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traders and other crucial stakeholders (the state, NGOs and local 
communities) market silk weaving products as authentically Khmer?  
Following Walter Benjamin’s (1940) notion of ‘traditional modernity’ 
and Jean Baudrillard’s (1998 [1970]) concept of ‘consumer societies’ 
this study comes to the conclusion that all stakeholders, including the 
ethnic Chinese silk entrepreneurs, had an economic interest to 
market the silk products as being the ‘traditional’ ones of the Khmer 
silk weavers. First, to cope with the trauma of the Pol Pot regime 
postwar national leaders re-introduced the sampot hol as the national 
dress and nostalgically linked it back to the glorious age of Angkor, 
like their forebears used to do. Mythologizing Khmer culture to create 
national unity was put to the extreme by the PRK regime, which, 
demonizing Pol Pot, wanted to reverse a ‘reality’ in which Cambodians 
had killed each other during the war into a ‘new’ narrative of Pol Pot 
survivors sharing the same traumatic event and Angkorean roots. 
Converting aggressors into victims the postwar regime needed the 
‘fictive’ Khmer sampot hol again to unite all Cambodians as members 
of the same destroyed Khmer community.  
Secondly, the return of king Sihanouk from exile in 1991 and 
members of the royal household publicly advertising the sampot hol as 
authentic Khmer, the Angkorean origin of sampot hol became an 
important symbol of community, peace and liberty. After all, the Royal 
family is beloved by the majority of the Cambodian population and 
traces its genealogy back to the glorious era of Angkor, a genealogy 
that the war-stricken population needed to be reminded of in order to 
heal the wounds of the failed Khmer Rouge era. Albeit cruel, a ‘trauma 
dress’ supported by both the state and the royal family was lucrative 
for the silk entrepreneurs, because it guaranteed them a huge regular 
clientele, mainly in the busy April-November ceremonial season.  
Thirdly, as the case-studies organized around the silk retailers in 
chapter six indicated, the Cambodian diaspora also had emotional 
and economic reasons to present silk weaving as authentic Khmer. 
Conclusion 
 
 249
Forced to leave their homeland in the 1970s and having lost many 
relatives in the Pol Pot working zones, the Cambodian diaspora framed 
a narrative of diasporic nostalgia around the silk industry as 
authentic Khmer. Allowed to visit their homeland again in the 1990s, 
Cambodian expatriates filled their suitcases with sampot hol and re-
distributed these among Cambodian diaspora communities in the US, 
Europe and France. Silk traders such as Mrs. Bun and Youn Malis 
recognized this diasporic demand for Khmer authenticity skillfully and 
had no reason to market the sampot hol as Chinese.  
 
Fourth, after Angkor became listed as a UNESCO World Heritage site 
in 1992, the number of tourists increased from a mere 9,000 in 1993 
to around one million in the year 2005 (Ministry of Tourism 2005). In 
particular the temples of Angkor and sites relating to the Pol Pot era 
became the focal point of a 1990s post-conflict ‘Restoration Culture’ 
led by international organizations such as the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (Ollier 
and Winter 2006). The arrival of millions of dollars of financial 
assistance integrated Cambodia further into a dense web of Khmer 
consumer culture, in which it again became very lucrative for the silk 
entrepreneurs to advertise silk weaving products as authentically 
Khmer. 
 
In sum, and coming to terms with the gap that emerged between the 
Khmer modernization claim vested in the silk products and the ethnic 
organization of the silk weaving industry, this study comes to the 
conclusion that this gap must be seen as a political strategy to 
imagine a nation (cf. Anderson 1991 [1983]) and a marketing strategy 
to meet consumer demands for Khmer authenticity. In negative terms, 
the strategic silence around the Chinese origin of the sampot hol can 
be valued as a superstructure (cf. Marx 2000 [1867]) that covers up 
the story that the ethnic Chinese are not only economically powerful, 
but also dominant in the political domain of Cambodia.  
Conclusion 
 
 250
But, to paraphrase Fink (1995: 25), canceling out the real does not 
mean the symbolic becomes a postmodern phantasm, because the 
symbolic creates a new ‘reality’, a reality which is named by language 
and can thus be thought and talked about in a meaningful way. As 
Walter Benjamin (1940) pointed out, myths are not only negative 
indices of the real but also have a positive productive dimension for 
the future. Or, in the words of Glynos and Stavrakakis (2004: 207), 
myths can be traumatic in the sense that they threaten identities but 
they are positive in the sense that they serve as the foundation on 
which new identities are constituted.  
 
Although it is true that the business practices of the businesspeople 
in the silk industry operate vertically within the boundaries of ethnic 
Chinese ethnicity, their business practices also filled a gap in ‘Khmer’ 
culture and gave millions of Cambodians a sense of ethnic pride after 
the horrifying Pol Pot regime. Conversely, the grand Khmer narrative 
can be regarded as a myth that silences other truths, but we must 
acknowledge that Cambodian history was a painful one which had to 
be eclipsed by a fallacious Khmer symbol. To eclipse a painful history 
of war and poor economic conditions, a myth about an ancient 
Khmer-rooted silk weaving industry is meaningful for the emotional, 
symbolic and economic recuperation of the nation. Making whole what 
has been smashed, silk weavers and traders had to silence their 
Chinese backgrounds and stage themselves as descendents of the 12th 
century Khmer. This also means that progress in Cambodia is 
interwoven with silence because, resembling Walter Benjamin’s (1940) 
‘angels of progress’, silk weavers and traders have to enter the 21st 
century with their faces to the past and their backs to the future.
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Appendix A 
 
 
A mobile research approach 
 
In ‘Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century’, the American 
anthropologist Eric Wolf (1969: xii) elaborates: 
 
‘The anthropologist is greatly aware of the importance of groups, which 
mediate between the peasant and larger societies of which he forms a part. 
The landlord, the merchant, the political boss, the priest stand at the 
junctures in social, economic and political relations, which connect the 
village to wider ranging elites in markets or political networks. In his study 
of peasant villages he has learned to recognize their crucial role in peasant 
life, and he is persuaded that they must play a significant role in peasant 
involvement in political upheaval. To describe such groups, and to locate 
them in the social field in which they must manoeuvre, it is useful to speak 
of them as ‘classes’. Classes are for me quite real clusters of people whose 
development or decline is predicated on particular historical circumstances, 
and who act together or against each other in pursuit of particular interests 
prompted by these new circumstances. In this perspective, we may ask – in 
quite concrete terms – how members of such classes make contact with the 
peasantry. In our accounts, therefore, we must transcend the usual 
anthropological account of peasants, and seek information also about the 
larger society and its consistent class groupings, for the peasant acts in an 
arena, which also contains allies as well as enemies. This is arena is 
characteristically a field of political battle’.  
 
In his famous study on peasant rebellions Eric Wolf was perhaps one 
of the first anthropologists to undermine a particular anthropology 
that drew distinct analytical boundaries around villages, regions and 
states, and instead suggested to approach peasant communities as a 
part of larger networks (Schneider and Rapp 1995: 57). Today, 
however, ethnographers cannot but start to appreciate a cross-border 
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approach on organizations, because recent literature on processes of 
globalization has identified the emergence of transnational spaces 
(Pries 2001: 3). This also implies that we cannot study people and 
their cultures in a Malinowskian way anymore, but
must exchange, following Eric Wolf, the once territorially bounded 
research site for a mobile approach (ibid.).             
 
To collect data on how the contemporary silk weaving network is 
organized in terms of trade and trader relationships I adopted a 
mobile research approach and followed the silk threads spatially from 
‘worm to sampot’ between April 2004 and May 2005. Because the 
monsoons would soon flood the sandy roads to the rural weaving 
areas I decided to start my research in Phnom Penh and meet the 
retailers and wholesalers within and around the main markets first155. 
After the roads had run dry in November I relocated my study to the 
weaving regions in Takeo, Kandal and Prey Veng province156. Although 
I had some knowledge of the Khmer language I did not feel 
comfortable to do the interviews by myself and was very happy to have 
the help and moral support of my interpreter and good friend Sophal. I 
had met Sophal in the ‘Khmer Language Center’ in Phnom Penh where 
I was following language classes and he was one of the teachers. With 
Sophal by my side, getting access to the weaving villages was not so 
hard either, and a ‘gift’ to the village leader was often sufficient to do 
my job there. In fact, the village leaders and silk weavers were more 
than willing to talk about their careers and enjoyed giving interviews. 
Because of the cheerfulness of the weavers and the pastoral sound of 
the clacking looms I enjoyed doing fieldwork there very much and 
considered it ‘an ethnographer’s heaven’ compared to the crowded, 
bad-smelling and hot Phnom Penh silk markets.  
 
                                                 
155 There were exceptions. Since I lived in Phnom Penh I had the opportunity to conduct  interviews with 
wholesalers and retailers all year long.  
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In March 2005 I traveled to the Vietnamese highlands, more 
specifically to Bao Loc district, and interviewed five silk spinners and 
a manager of a silk spinnery there. I made this field trip because the 
silk weavers in Cambodia confirmed to me that the silk yarn they used 
was imported from Vietnam, which made me curious to know which 
ethnic group spins the yarn and who dominates the Vietnamese-
Cambodian cross-border silk yarn trade. Once in Bao Loc town I met a 
university student, who had spent his entire childhood in the United 
States and identified himself to me as Frank. For three days Frank 
and I roamed around the Central Highlands of Vietnam and he 
introduced me to the silk farmers in the hilly surroundings of Bao Loc. 
It was not difficult to get access to the silk farmers as we could simply 
walk into their mulberry plots and interview them about their farm 
activities. The silk farmers enjoyed talking about their passion for 
mulberries and silk worms and often invited us to continue the 
conversation while having lunch at the farm. Getting access to the 
state-owned silk spinnery in Bao Loc was much tougher and it was 
only through Frank’s tremendous patience that I got the chance to 
observe a silk spinnery from the inside, normally forbidden terrain for 
foreign observers. Luckily, the factory manager turned out to be a six 
foot six volleyball player who shared a passion for NBA basketball with 
me, especially for the giant Chinese superstar Yao Ming. Thanks to 
this shared passion I managed to set up a relatively smooth 
conversation with him and found out soon that silk yarn was not 
exported to Cambodia by the state-owned spinneries but by the 
private Chinese spinneries in Tan Chau, a border town in the 
Southern Mekong region of Vietnam.  
 
The next day I traveled to Tan Chau and after a few days of relative 
silence I got in contact with Ms Ngo, a travel agent who once worked 
in one of the Tan Chau spinneries. Being a tour operator she spoke 
English fluently, which made her a good candidate to interpret for me 
and visit the Tan Chau silk merchants. The owner of the Tan Chau 
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silk spinnery turned out to be an elderly lady, who, to her regret, was 
just on her way to her family in Saigon. But she indeed recognized my 
interpretor and also felt sorry for me traveling this long to speak to 
her. Moreover, the idea of being mentioned in a book about silk 
weaving also flattered her ego and finally she decided to give a one-
hour interview. Perhaps because of my own excitement at having an 
interview with such an influential trader I see this as the best 
interview of them all.                           
 
Throughout my fieldwork period (April 2004-May 2005) I visited the 
Phnom Srok silk region and interviewed directors of NGOs there who 
had subcontracted silk spinners for their silk yarn rescue programs. 
Particularly informative were my many meetings with the Japanese 
silk expert Kikuo Morimoto with whom I spent a lot of time talking 
about silk weaving. Although he is heavily criticized for selling the ikat 
woven pidan for a high price in western art galleries, he was also a 
charming and devoted man with great knowledge of the Cambodian 
silk weaving industry. In many ways he reminded me of the Thai silk 
rescuer Jim Thompson, whose rescue attempt also did not harm the 
Thai silk industry. Among ourselves Kikuo Morimoto also suspected 
that the silk weavers were of Chinese origin, because they looked 
Chinese to him and also spoke a Chinese dialect. From Kikuo 
Morimoto I also acquired technical knowledge about silk weaving as a 
practice, which again was very useful in my conversations with the 
weavers. It was also because of Kikuo Morimoto’s enthusiasm that I 
decided to follow a silk weaving workshop at the Silk Farm in Siem 
Reap to further enlarge my knowledge of the weaving techniques.           
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Appendix B 
 
 
 
The CAS silk census 
While mapping the pivotal silk actors in the silk weaving industry luck 
turned heavily in my favor in December 2004, when my expertise was 
recognized by Roger Henke, director of the Center for Advanced 
Studies (CAS) in Phnom Penh and I was asked to participate in a 
national census of the Cambodian silk weaving industry. This was 
because CAS was subcontracted by an American donor organization, 
USAID, to explore the possibilities of reintegration of former 
prostitutes in the silk weaving industry. Suddenly I found myself in 
the luxury position to update the 2001 silk census (Pujebet and Peyre 
2001) and saw a great opportunity to map the Cambodian silk 
weaving industry in terms of trade and trader relationships (see 
chapter three). Apart from myself, the CAS consultant team consisted 
of an experienced Cambodian economist, Seng Bunly, and another 
Dutch anthropologist, Boris Dongelmans, who both had conducted 
several studies already about economic opportunities in rural areas 
for so-called ‘vulnerable’ people. Our job was to establish a 
methodological tool to answer the following three objectives: 
   
1. Mapping of the silk industry, its trade functions and different 
business models in use. 
2. Exploring opportunities for a growth of the silk industry and an 
increase in its labor demand.  
3. Exploring opportunities for weak and vulnerable people to enter the 
industry.  
 
In order to meet this ambition we decided to develop a loom census 
and ask the weavers in Cambodia about what fabric was on their 
loom, the numbers of active weavers per family, their age-sex ratio’, 
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how they obtained credit, their monthly incomes, the loom activity, 
and competition from their industries. We started the census in the 
hope that we would have enough time and resources to count all the 
weavers, as we did not know how many people were involved in the 
industry as weavers. Unfortunately, we did run out of time and money 
after the CAS surveyors had questioned the impressive number of 
11687 silk weavers. To finish the national census we got into contact 
with the French-based silk NGO ‘Projet d’appui au secteur de la soie’ 
(PASS) that counted an additional 7751 looms increasing the total 
number of looms in Cambodia to 19438.  Next to designing the census 
we also spent a number of weeks in the different silk weaving areas 
and quite a number of interviews were held with weavers and 
middlemen to understand the business model they used. An 
important focus of attention during this qualitative part of the study 
was to increase our understanding of the social aspects of the 
industry and to find out how social relations in rural Cambodia help 
shape economic relations and opportunities.   
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Appendix C 
 
 
 
The interviews 
To explore and analyze how the silk traders negotiated their identity in 
the organization of the silk weaving industry I used ethnographic 
interviewing as a data collecting method. The ethnographic approach 
is based on the belief that knowledge of social phenomena can be 
gained only by direct experience, a view also referred to as 
‘ethnographic realism’ (Hammersley 1997: 131-142). The heart of this 
realism is based on the idea that there are independent and unknown 
realities that become known by the researcher getting into direct 
contact with them (ibid.).   
 
Structured interviews 
To collect ethnographic data about the ‘inner structure’ of the silk 
enterprises I conducted 85 structured interviews between April 2004 
and May 2005; i.e. twenty silk weavers, fifteen middleman couples, 
forty silk retailers and all five wholesalers. Designing these interviews I 
elaborated on the ethnic entrepreneurship literature (Light and Gold 
2000) and divided my questions among the following ‘capitals’ in the 
Bourdieuan (1977) sense, leading to the following interview questions: 
 
Economic capital  
-Where did your start-up capital come from? 
-Did you have savings?  
-Did you get support from a  micro-credit association?  
-Do you give or receive personal loans?  
-Are you a member of a credit rotating system?  
-Do you prefer long- or short-term credit relationships?  
-Is it difficult to obtain long-term credit relationships?   
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Human capital 
-Do you have a schooling diploma?  
-How much work experience do you have?  
-Who taught you the business/weaving skills?  
-Do you remember business/weaving stories of your ancestors?  
-Did you often join your parents on trade trips?  
-Did you learn business/weaving skills from NGOs?  
-How many hours do you work per day?  
-How many employees do you have?  
-How do you improve your business/weaving skills?      
 
Social capital 
-Who founded the business/weaving enterprise?  
-Did you inherit the business from your parents?  
-Do you own the business?  
-Are your children supportive?  
-Do you recruit laborers within the natal compound?  
-Do you outsource labor activities?  
-Do you obtain credit from family members?  
-Are you collaborating with other entrepreneurs?  
-Do you belong to a dialect or surname association?  
 
Cultural/symbolic capital 
-Are you inviting business partners during ceremonies?  
-Do you meet credit members at religious ceremonies?  
-Are these ceremonies important to gain credit?  
-Do you donate money to the local community?  
-Do you donate money to the pagoda?  
-Do you give presents to the local officialdom?  
-Are your business skills a secret?  
-Are there differences in Khmer values and Chinese values?  
-Do you know much about Chinese ceremonies?  
-Do you follow the Khmer or Chinese Buddhist calendar?  
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-Are you closing your shop during ‘saen kbal tuk’ (the Hungry Ghost 
festival)?  
 
Semi-structured interviews 
I raised more open questions during the second or third interview 
because I wanted to analyze how the silk producers and traders 
negotiated their identity, not only to get things done within the 
enclave, but also to disclose or antagonize other ethnics. Ethnic 
economy scholars often stress the unique skills and outlooks shared 
by members of an ethnic group in their homeland or enclave: the so-
called ‘toolkit’ of symbols, stories, rituals, and worldviews that people 
may be using in establishing configurations. A lesser used model 
however, emphasizes the way entrepreneurs establish ethnic 
boundaries (cf. Barth 1969) around their credit members, and disclose 
other ethnics. Since I was running out of time I was able to interview 
ten silk weavers, seven middleman couples, fifteen silk retailers and 
four wholesalers this way. The questions I raised to the traders during 
these interviews were the following157: 
 
- Are you proud of the sampot hol? 
- Is the sampot hol a Khmer dress? 
- Why do you refer to the silk weavers as ethnic Khmer?  
- Why do you refer to yourself as an ethnic Chinese?  
- Do you feel more Khmer or Chinese?  
- Is it true that Chinese are better in business than Khmers?  
- Why do you only trust Chinese traders?  
- Would you ever hire a Khmer employee?  
- Is there a difference between Chinese and Khmer styles of doing 
business? 
- Can you give examples why Khmer traders are not creditworthy? 
                                                 
157 I say ‘kinds of questions’, because these were only starting questions. In reality most questions ended 
up in long conversations, in which I raised numerous other questions, which I cannot trace back in detail 
anymore. 
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To the silk weavers I raised the following kinds of questions:  
 
- Why are you so proud to be a Khmer?  
- Is it true that Chinese are better in business than Khmers? 
- Why are all silk weavers Khmer?  
- Are there also Chinese weavers? 
- Why do you only subcontract kin members?  
- Why do you depict yourself as an ethnic Khmer and your middleman 
as Chinese while you both ‘became’ Khmers?  
- What is the difference between Chinese and Khmers?  
- How come the middlemen and wholesalers are so powerful? 
- Do they have connections with the officialdom? 
-Is there a lot of gossip about each other in the weaving villages?   
 
Life-history interviews 
The third data collecting method I used were life-history interviews. A 
central location for the pioneering of life history methods was the 
Chicago School in the 1930s, which generated a range of innovative 
life history studies as part of the wide-ranging studies of the urban 
environment undertaken by the sociology school (Goodson 2001: 129-
142). According to Goodson the main landmark in the development of 
the life history was the publication of Thomas and Znaniecki’s (1918-
1920) mammoth study, the Polish Peasant in Europe and America 
(ibid.). In exploring the experiences of Polish peasants migrating to the 
United States, Thomas and Znaniecki relied heavily on migrants’ auto-
biographical accounts (ibid.). The zenith of the life history method 
according to Goodson (ibid.) was reached in the 1930s with Clifford 
Shaw’s account of a mugger in ‘the Jack-Roller’. As Howard Becker’s 
(1971: 71) comment on Shaw’s study underlined: 
 
‘By providing this kind of voice from a culture and a situation that are 
ordinarily not known to intellectuals generally and sociologists in 
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particular, the Jack Roller enables us to improve our theories at the 
most profound level: by putting ourselves in Stanly’s skin, we can feel 
and become aware of the deep biases of such people that ordinarily 
permeate our thinking and shape the kinds of problems we investigate. 
By truly entering into Stanly’s life, we can begin to see what we take for 
granted (or ought not to) in designing our research – what kinds of 
assumptions about delinquents, slums and Poles are embedded in the 
way we set the question we study’.      
 
In my final research months I approached three silk weavers, three 
silk retailers, three middleman couples and two wholesalers and 
asked them to participate in a life history interview. In the case of the 
silk weavers I asked the eldest and most interesting storytellers. 
Regarding the middlemen and wholesalers I picked the most powerful 
ones. And in the case of the silk retailers I chose former silk weavers 
who had failed to steer the sampot market and diversified into the 
tourist markets. Some of these interviewees, such as the elderly silk 
weaver Sotheap, the wholesaler Mrs. Bun, the middleman couple Mr. 
Mong and Mrs. Heang and the retailer Youn Malis became key 
storytellers of this research. My main aim was to collect data on how 
the silk weavers and traders negotiated their identity as ‘strangers’ in 
Cambodia. This way I wanted to grasp some taboo ‘outsider’ 
experiences of the silk traders and analyze what it meant to be ‘a 
Khmer with a white skin’ in Cambodia. In theory all Cambodians are 
ethnic Khmers, but does that mean that there are no differences 
between those who are Khmers and those who became Khmers in 
practice? Often at home and sometimes in a restaurant I had been 
fascinated by the silk weavers’ and traders’ stories of how they had 
experienced their childhood, how they survived the Pol Pot working 
zones, how they negotiated their identity in the hostile 1980s and how 
they anticipated to the arrival of tourists and expatriates in the 1990s.  
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Sensitivities and constraints in the field 
Interviewing the silk weavers and traders called for sensitivity with 
respect to the extreme violence most of them had been confronted 
with during the Pol Pot regime. Without exception all of them had lost 
relatives, they all had been victims of violence, they all had had to dig 
holes to bury the dead, they all had to remain silent about their 
Chinese past and they all found it extremely difficult to talk about this 
period. That is also why I approached the different silk entrepreneurs 
as ‘a not so smart stranger’, who happened to be in town by 
accidence, walked into this fascinating silk industry and decided to 
stay a bit longer to write a book about it. I never asked direct 
questions such as: ‘how does the middleman exploit you?’ This would 
immediately lead to a non-response because the silk weavers ‘like 
their middlemen a lot’, simply because they eat and live from his 
credit. But I could ask more indirectly: ‘I heard from other silk 
weavers that they experience a lot of stress finishing their sampot hol 
in time, how about you, does your middleman make you work late 
often as well?  
 
The silk entrepreneurs did not feel comfortable talking to a tape 
recorder or a video recorder, which made me decide to take notes. This 
again made it more difficult for me to concentrate on the conversation 
so I decided to interview the traders without any recording tools and 
write down the conversation in my notebook as soon as possible 
afterwards. Another ethnographic hurdle I had to take were the busy 
schedules of the silk traders and wholesalers not who were not eager 
to talk freely about their business at all. The owner of the Banteay 
Srey wholesale shop, Mrs. Bun, even saw a clear causal relationship 
between me visiting her shop on a certain day and her not selling silks 
that day. In her eyes I was bringing bad luck to her family and for 
more than six months she considered me a Hungry Ghost. In the end 
my regular interpreter turned out to be a stand-in-the-way because of 
his humble class background and only after I brought with me a 
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higher-class interpreter, the Banteay Srey doors suddenly opened for 
me. In the words of the higher-class interpreter, ‘that is how things 
work in Cambodia’.   
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Appendix D 
 
 
 
An historical approach   
In order to collect data about how the ancestors of the silk 
entrepreneurs brought their business to Cambodia I had to adopt a 
historical approach, because oral history in this case was not 
sufficient. To be honest, after I had articulated the hidden histories of 
the silk entrepreneurs I felt a bit uncomfortable bearing this 
‘unpopular’ secret with me. The reason for this was that my professor 
would not be comfortable with it, because she assumed, albeit 
hypothetically, that the silk weaving industry was Khmer-dominated 
and perhaps a counter discourse against the many Chinese-
dominated industries in Southeast Asia. I also realized that my 
Cambodian friends would not accept a Chinese discourse of the 
Khmer sampot hol, because ‘in their heads’ it was authentically 
Khmer. In fact, even my interpreter Sophal, an ethnic Chinese himself, 
kept on saying that the weavers were Khmer, even after he had heard 
their ‘hidden’ life histories ‘live’ on the spot. I guess the best thing, 
politically at least, would have been to avoid the taboo identity of the 
silk weavers and become a member of the dominant discursive 
formation. However, I decided not to do so and dig deeper into the 
lives of the silk entrepreneurs, ending up in the French colonial 
archives of Phnom Penh and Aix-en-Provence.        
 
Much of the problem of articulating the hidden identities and powers 
of the silk industry is rooted in the nature of ethnographic endeavor 
itself, the impossibility of ethnographers to see the larger relationships 
structuring the jumble of human interaction around them (Bourgois 
1995: 140). Or, to paraphrase the same author, ‘structures of power 
and histories cannot be talked with’ (ibid.). It is thus only by means of 
historical data that I could articulate the hidden identity of the silk 
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entrepreneurs and find answers to questions that I could not answer 
by asking or observing. A historical research approach calls to mind 
the work of Eric Wolf (1982), whose book ‘Europe and the People 
Without History’ advocates an integration of the disciplines of 
anthropology and history. In this important book, Wolf critiques the 
daily routine of anthropological research and argues that 
anthropologists merely consider previously assembled cases of 
cultures, which they construct from observed or reported data 
(Schneider and Rapp 1995: 6-7).  These models, he continues, are 
then either compared synchronically or serially with respect to each 
other, using one or more diagnostic criteria to order the cases in 
question. The main point Wolf wants to make is that we often regard 
the data we observe as realities in and of themselves, and not as 
results of under-laying processes operating on a historical time-line. 
But eschewing these shortcuts Wolf has shown us what 
anthropologists can learn about particular local histories if those 
histories are charted in relation to the large-scale transformations of 
let us say the last three hundred years (Schneider and Rapp 1995: 9).  
 
This is also why Schneider and Rapp (1995: 9) argue that researchers 
influenced by Wolf generally want to know what happened in their 
research site during times of tributary and mercantile expansion, 
European or other colonialism and imperialism, political and religious 
movements for national independence, neo-colonial or other 
development initiatives, and the related processes now unfolding. In 
their volume ‘Articulating hidden histories’ they have given the floor to 
a range of researchers who investigate topics ranging from the 
invention of colonial tribalism in West Africa, to peasant insurgency in 
revolutionary Vietnam, to the ecological activism of North American 
housewives (ibid.). All these accounts share the vision that painful 
lives and taboos cannot be dealt with solely by means of fieldwork 
observation, but need to be understood as the history of social, 
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economic and political forces strong enough to dislodge people from 
their ‘hidden’ identities (ibid.).        
 
In my opinion, Wolf and his followers were right, and some of the 
crucial dislocations in this thesis could be found in the French 
colonial archives of Phnom Penh, Siem Reap and Aix-en-Provence. It 
was in Aix-en-Provence that I found the image of the weaver on the 
front of this thesis, whose black farmers’ pants and signs on her 
house articulated the Chinese immigrant background of the 
Cambodian silk weavers. In the archives, I also came across works on 
the Cambodian rural economy by Yves Henry, Jean Delvert, Charles 
Robequain, Alain de Forest, and Virginia Thompson. But for the 
purpose of articulating the hidden identity of the silk industry I 
benefited most from the historical works of Penny Edwards on 
Cambodian national culture and more recently, on the ethnic Chinese. 
Although I do not agree with her rather Hegelian view on culture, I do 
acknowledge that she has a more profound inside knowledge of 
Cambodian culture than I have.  
 
Having said all this, I want to return to the elderly silk weaver Sotheap 
one more time and ask myself the question: would I expect so many 
layers around her identity at first glance? Would I expect her 
grandmother to arrive in Cambodia in the 19th century as a migrant 
from Shunde County district? Would I suppose her silk yarn to come 
from Vietnam, China or Uzbekistan? And would I guess that the 
sampot hol she is weaving would be worn at a Buddhist ceremony in 
Little Phnom Penh, Southern California? My answer is simple: no, I 
would not, because when I met Sotheap she seemed to me an ordinary 
Khmer weaver living in a far away rural village, sitting behind her 
loom ten hours a day, frozen in time and history. Also, the rhythm of 
her clacking loom gave me the impression that nothing exciting had 
ever happened in this town. But the truth could not be further from 
this, and to understand the hidden, problematic, hybrid, fragmented 
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and multiple identities of Sotheap, a present-day ethnographer should 
not only observe her village life, but cross national borders as well and 
spend a lot of time in the archives. 
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Samenvatting 
 
 
Verweven met Cambodja: handel –en identiteitspolitiek in de 
(post)-koloniale Cambodjaanse zijdeweef industrie  
 
  
 
Binnen de context van een bloeiende Cambodjaanse zijde-
weefindustrie heb ik getracht empirische kennis te genereren met 
betrekking tot migratiecondities, zakelijke netwerken, 
identiteitspolitiek en modernisering. Kenmerkend voor de 
Cambodjaanse zijde-weefindustrie is haar ongemakkelijke positie 
tussen twee moderniseringsverhalen: een cultureel en een economisch 
verhaal. Het culturele moderniseringsverhaal koppelt de hedendaagse 
Cambodjaanse zijde-weefindustrie aan het succesvolle twaalfde-
eeuwse Angkor rijk en gaat ervan uit dat de weefsters etnische Khmer 
zijn. Omdat zijdeweven als een authentieke bezigheid van de Khmer 
beschouwd wordt, zijn de Cambodjaanse bevolking en haar politieke 
leiders erg trots op de ‘ikat’ geweven zijden kleding en beschouwen zij 
de ‘sampot hol’ als nationale klederdracht. Het culturele 
moderniseringsverhaal is erg populair in Cambodja. Dit verhaal wordt 
– in navolging van vroegere Franse kolonisten (Delvert 1961, Henry 
1932, Forest 1980) – thans gereproduceerd door hedendaagse 
Cambodjaanse politici, handelaren, buitenlandse en lokale NGO’s, 
academici en gewone burgers (Green 2003,2004; Dahles en Zwart 
2003; Morimoto 1995; Pujebet en Peyre 2001). 
 
Na een jaar veldwerk in de weefdorpen en op de zijdemarkten in 
Phnom Penh is mij gebleken dat er ook een minder bekend 
moderniseringsverhaal bestaat over de authenticiteit van de 
Cambodjaanse zijde-weefindustrie. Zowel de weefsters als de 
handelaren blijken een Chinese achtergrond te hebben; een 
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achtergrond die de weefsters slechts mondjesmaat laten zien, maar 
waar de handelaren juist erg trots op zijn. Het minder bekende 
moderniseringsverhaal verwijst niet naar het grote Angkor rijk, maar 
naar de komst van de meest succesvolle en meest omstreden zakelijke 
diaspora in Zuidoost-Azië, de etnische Chinezen. De kloof tussen het 
culturele (Khmer) moderniseringsverhaal en het economische 
(Chinese) moderniseringsverhaal intrigeerde mij en ik vond het een 
uitdaging om beide verhalen in kaart te brengen en hun onderlinge 
relatie te verklaren in dit proefschrift. In hoeverre kan de zijdeweverij 
in Cambodja als een door de Chinezen geïntroduceerde industrie 
worden gezien? Waarom wordt zijdeweven in Cambodja zo 
nadrukkelijk aan het Angkor rijk gekoppeld door de staat, het 
koningshuis, de buitenlandse ontwikkelingsorganisaties en de 
toerisme industie? Waarom presenteren zijdeweefsters zichzelf als 
authentieke Khmer, terwijl tussen handelaren en groothandelaren 
zich als (etnisch) Chinezen voordoen? Met andere woorden, en 
daarmee formuleer ik tevens mijn onderzoeksvraag:  
 
‘Hoe verhoudt de etnisch complexe organisatie van de Cambodjaanse 
zijde-weefindustrie zich tot twee divergerende moderniseringsverhalen 
en welke uiteenlopende belangen dienen deze verhalen in het algemeen 
en binnen de zijdeindustrie in het bijzonder?   
 
Om deze hoofdvraag te operationaliseren heb ik vier deelvragen 
opgesteld:  
Vraag 1: Onder welke historische omstandigheden zijn Chinese 
zijdewevers en handelaren naar Cambodja gemigreerd?  
Vraag 2: Hoe is het huidige zijdeweefnetwerk georganiseerd in termen 
van productie en handelsrelaties? 
Vraag 3: Hoe passen zijdeproducenten en zijdehandelaren hun 
identiteit aan binnen de context van de zijde-weefindustrie? 
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Vraag 4: Waarom beschouwen zowel etnisch Chinese zijdehandelaren 
als de Cambodjaanse staat, ontwikkelingsorganisaties, academici en 
gewone burgers, de zijdeproducten als authentiek Khmer?  
De eerste deelvraag heb ik getracht te beantwoorden in hoofdstuk drie 
van mijn proefschrift. Omdat de weefsters en handelaren van etnisch 
Chinese afkomst blijken te zijn, ontstond het idee om uit te zoeken om 
welke redenen zij naar Cambodja gemigreerd waren. Penny Edwards 
(2001) gaat ervan uit dat de Chinese migratie naar Cambodja op 
staatsniveau gereguleerd werd en dat China op deze manier 
overbevolking en armoede tegen wilde gaan. Vooral in de Frans-
koloniale periode zou de behoefte aan Chinese arbeidskrachten en 
handelaren groot zijn geweest; een behoefte die het door oorlog en 
armoede geteisterde China van de afgrond zou hebben gered (idem.). 
Staten werden ook door vroegere China-deskundigen al aangevoerd 
als ‘push’ en ‘pull’ factoren van de Chinese migratie naar Zuidoost-
Azië (Freedman 1979, Purcell 1965, Willmott 1967). 
Sinds kort echter worden deze hypotheses van staatsgereguleerde 
migratiecondities tegengesproken. Historisch onderzoek in de Zuid-
Chinese Pearl River delta heeft aangetoond dat de Chinese migratie 
naar Zuidoost-Azië geen staatsaangelegenheid was, maar voortkwam 
uit eeuwenoude individuele handelsstrategieën van welvarende 
familiebedrijven (cf. Kuhn 2006, Miles 2006, Yang 2006). Ver voor de 
komst van Europese kolonisten zouden rijke handelsfamilies in 
Zuidwest-China afgezanten naar Zuidoost-Azië hebben gestuurd 
(idem.). Deze afgezanten zouden de taak hebben gehad te zoeken naar 
‘niches’, bijvoorbeeld het weven van zijde, en te peilen of expansie van 
de zijdehandel over de grens wel winstgevend zou zijn (idem.). Bij 
groen licht van de familieafgezant arrangeerde de rijke zijdehandelaar 
een ware volksverhuizing en stelde hij duizenden lokale wevers in 
staat voor hem te gaan werken in Zuidoost-Azië. Via lokale etnische 
banden zouden ontelbare, los van elkaar opererende zakennetwerken 
en dito Chinese diasporagemeenschappen zijn ontstaan in Zuidoost-
Samenvatting 
 294
Azië (cf. Wilson 2004). Zowel de Chinese als de ontvangende staat zou 
in deze migratiebewegingen geen enkele rol hebben gespeeld (Kuhn 
2006, Wilson 2004). 
In hoofdstuk drie kom ik dan ook tot de conclusie dat de komst van 
Chinese migranten naar Cambodja geen Chinees, Cambodjaans of 
Frans-koloniaal gereguleerde aangelegenheid was, maar zeer 
waarschijnlijk werd ingegeven door individuele strategieën van zijde-
industriëlen in Shunde County en Nanhai (beiden gelegen in de Pearl 
River delta) tengevolgen van een aantal noodlottige gebeurtenissen. 
Wat was het geval? Rond het begin van de negentiende eeuw (1821) 
zakte de wereldprijs van ruwe zijde tot een dieptepunt en was er 
nauwelijks nog werk voor handelaren en wevers in de Pearl River delta 
(Cliver 2004, Frederico 1997, So 1986). Ook verloor China in 1841 de 
eerste Opium oorlog van de Britten en sloten de Britten de haven van 
Kanton, een haven die van groot belang was voor de Pearl River 
zijdehandelaren. Tot overmaat van ramp werd de Pearl River delta 
geteisterd door Red Turban revolutionairen (1851-1864) die de 
moerbeibomen en de weefgetouwen van de weefsters verwoestten. Het 
was in deze politiek zeer bewogen en economisch zeer ongunstige 
periode dat rijke zijde-industriëlen uit de Pearl River, met in hun 
kielzog duizenden weefsters, besloten te migreren naar Zuidoost-Azië 
(onder andere naar Cambodja) met zijn in economisch en politiek 
opzicht gunstiger zakenklimaat. Uit grafonderzoek van de 
Amerikaanse antropoloog William Willmott (1967) blijkt bijvoorbeeld 
dat zeer veel Kantonezen in de Cambodjaanse zijderegio’s afkomstig 
zijn uit twee Pearl River regio’s, Shunde County en Nanhai. Met 
andere woorden, de ‘roots’ van  het meerendeel van de hedendaagse 
Cambodjaanse zijde-weefsters ligt niet in het grootste Khmer rijk ooit, 
Angkor, maar in de Zuid-Chinese Pearl River delta. Ook meen ik te 
kunnen concluderen dat de Chinese of Khmer staat niet 
verantwoordelijk is geweest voor de komst van de Kantonese 
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zijdeweefsters, maar dat de Kantonese zijdehandelaren en weefsters 
zichzelf letterlijk en figuurlijk Cambodja in geweven hebben.  
 
In hoofdstuk vier heb ik mijn blik op de hedendaagse zijde-
weefindustrie gericht en getracht de tweede deelvraag te 
beantwoorden: hoe is de hedendaagse zijde-weefindustrie 
georganiseerd in termen van productie en handelsrelaties. Volgens 
diverse auteurs heeft de Cambodjaanse discours over Khmer 
authenticiteit zijn oorsprong onder de Frans-koloniale elite en kan 
daarom als oriëntalistisch (Said 1995) beschouwd worden. Het zou de 
Frans-koloniale ‘School der Cambodjaanse Kunst’ geweest zijn die de 
sampot hol als authentiek Khmer heeft geconstrueerd en deze 
coonstructie werd door de postkoloniale Cambodjaanse elite 
overgenomen (Edwards 1999, Muan 2001).  
 
Hoewel ik het eens ben met het argument dat de Khmer authenticiteit 
van de sampot hol sociaal geconstrueerd is, deel ik niet de mening dat 
Franse kolonisten daar verantwoordelijk voor zijn. Zoals ik al 
beschreven heb in hoofdstuk drie, was het een Kantonese 
migrantenelite aan het einde van de negentiende eeuw die er 
economisch belang bij had om een nieuwe zijde-markt aan te boren in 
Cambodja en hun sampot hol te verkopen aan de Cambodjaanse elite. 
In lijn met de wens van de culturele elite in Cambodja werd de sampot 
hol al snel omgedoopt tot een authentiek Khmer kledingstuk, een 
omdoping die winstgevend was voor zowel de Kantonese als de 
Cambodjaanse elite.  
 
Hoewel er veel over het culturele moderniseringsverhaal van de 
Cambodjaanse weefindustrie is gepubliceerd (Green 2003, 2004; 
Morimoto 1995), is er maar weinig bekend over de rol van de Chinezen 
in het economische moderniseringsproces van het zijdeweven. 
Vanwege de geringe belangstelling voor het economische 
moderniseringsproces van het zijde weven weten we niet waar de 
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zijden kleding geweven wordt, hoeveel zijdewevers er zijn, waar ze 
wonen, wat voor zijdeweeftechnieken ze gebruikt en hoe 
arbeidsintensief het weven van een sampot hol is, hoe de weefsters aan 
hun ruwe materialen komen, wat voor rol tussenhandelaren daarin 
spelen, wie de tussenhandelaren zijn, wie de sampot hol verkoopt, wie 
de groothandelaren zijn, of wie de klanten zijn.  
 
In hoofdstuk vier heb ik getracht de economische basis van het 
zijdeweven te beschrijven en heb ik aangetoond dat de Cambodjaanse 
zijde-weefindustrie gemoderniseerd is van een bescheiden 
dorpsindustrie in de twintigste eeuw tot een gelaagd wereldwijd 
netwerk in de 21ste eeuw. Ten opzichte van de jaren negentig is de 
industrie zelfs met honderd procent gegroeid van 10,000 naar 20,000 
weefgetouwen (Dongelmans, Seng and Ter Horst 2005). Net als hun 
voorouders wonen en werken de weefsters nog steeds aan de 
rivierbanken van de Mekong en Bassac rivieren in de vier provincies, 
Takeo, Kandal, Prey Veng en Kampong Cham. Met uitzondering van 
een paar ontwikkelingsprojecten wordt ruwe zijde niet meer 
geproduceerd door de Cambodjaanse weefsters zelf, maar 
geïmporteerd uit Uzbekistan, Vietnam en China door vijf 
groothandelaren in de hoofdstad van Cambodja, Phnom Penh.  
 
De vijf groothandelaren die ik geïdentificeerd heb verkopen de ruwe 
zijde niet zelf aan de weefsters maar hebben daarvoor 
tussenhandelaren gecontracteerd, woonachtig in de weefregio’s. Deze 
tussenhandelaren, honderd in totaal, geven ook de orders van de 
groothandelaren door aan de weefsters, orders afkomstig van 
Cambodjaanse klanten uit binnen- en buitenland. Uit dit onderzoek 
blijkt tevens dat zestig procent van de totale productie van de sampot 
hol ‘in de diaspora verdwijnt’, een productie die grotendeels opgekocht 
wordt door diaspora Khmers woonachtig in de Verenigde Staten, 
Australië en Frankrijk. Behalve van de groothandelaren kopen 
Cambodjanen uit binnen- en buitenland ook sampot hol van 
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verkoopsters op de vier belangrijke markten in Phnom Penh: de 
Centrale Markt, de Russische markt, de Olympische markt en de 
Oude markt; ten tijde van mijn veldwerk 169 in totaal.     
 
Ondanks de verandering van de Cambodjaanse zijde-weefindustrie tot 
een gelaagd wereldwijd zijdenetwerk in de 21ste eeuw vertoont de 
structuur van het netwerk nog steeds de hiërarchische contouren van 
een piramide, met aan de top vijf groothandelaren, in het midden 
honderd tussenhandelaren en meer dan honderdvijftig 
marktverkopers en onderaan 20,000 zijdeweefsters. De 
netwerkdominantie van een kleine elite roept zowel herinneringen op 
aan verticale etnisch Chinese zakenstructuren zoals de ‘kongsi’ en aan 
zakenpraktijken die Karl Marx benoemde met termen als onproductief, 
exploitatief en corrupt. Uit mijn onderzoek blijkt echter dat de 
weefsters en tussenhandelaren niet in verzet komen tegen de macht 
van de groothandelaren, maar hun afhankelijke positie accepteren. 
Zoals James Scott (1976) al zei, is uitbuiting geen universeel 
wetenschappelijk concept maar een kwestie van moraliteit die per 
regio kan verschillen. In Zuidoost-Azië bijvoorbeeld zijn hiërarchische 
relaties, ook wel patroon-cliëntverhoudingen genoemd, veel meer 
geaccepteerd dan in het Westen. In dit licht speelt wellicht ook het 
Boeddhistische concept merit een rol, namelijk het principe waarbij 
Boeddhistische monniken het succes of falen van iemand toeschrijven 
en accepteren aan de hand van gebeurtenissen in eerdere levens.  
 
In hoofdstuk vijf heb ik in antwoord op de derde deelvraag getracht 
grip te krijgen op de overlappende en conflicterende identiteiten van 
de zijdewevers en de verschillende soorten handelaren. De zijdewevers 
en verkoopsters op de toeristenmarkten presenteren zich conform het 
culturele moderniseringsverhaal als etnische Khmer; de 
groothandelaren en tussenhandelaren doen zich conform het 
economische verhaal voor als etnische Chinezen. Dit is niet altijd zo 
geweest. Op de voorkant van mijn dissertatie zien we een foto van een 
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Cambodjaanse weefster uit 1921 die een Chinese zwarte leren broek 
draagt. Op de palen van haar huis zien we ook Chinese 
welkomsttekens staan. Vandaag de dag echter dragen de weefsters 
geen zwarte leren broeken meer maar louter nog katoenen of zijden 
sarong conform het beeld van de geassimileerde Khmer. De 
tussenhandelaren en groothandelaren wonen daarentegen in Chinese 
huizen, dragen moderne broeken en overhemden en presenteren zich 
conform het beeld van de moderne Chinese zakenman. Waarom 
presenteren wevers, tussenhandelaren en groothandelaren, veelal 
behorend tot dezelfde etnisch Chinese diaspora, zich etnisch zo 
verschillend?  
Om dit te begrijpen is het nodig een materialistische kijk op het 
onderwerp te hanteren en de ongelijke productieverhoudingen van 
Marx te verbinden met de bijbehorende levensstijlen. Hoewel het besef 
van het bestaan van strategische en situationele identiteiten niet 
nieuw is binnen de sociale wetenschappen, verbinden nog weinig 
sociale wetenschappers deze identiteiten met netwerkposities en 
ongelijke arbeidsverhoudingen. De etnisch Chinezen in Cambodja zijn 
geen homogene groep maar vertonen onderlinge verschillen. Deze 
verschillen kunnen niet genealogisch verklaard worden, maar blijken 
symbolisch geconstrueerd te zijn om uiteenlopende posities in het 
productie- en handelsproces te classificeren. De geconstrueerde 
etnische verschillen tussen de zijdeproducenten en zijdehandelaren 
grijpen terug op de wijze waarop Abner Cohen (1990 [1974]) etniciteit 
al zag, namelijk als zijnde gerelateerd aan het opkomend kapitalisme 
en arbeidsspecialisaties.  
In dit proefschrift kom ik tot de conclusie dat de Khmer en de Chinese 
etnische identiteiten in de Cambodjaanse zijde-weefindustrie ingezet 
worden om verschillen te markeren tussen producenten en 
handelaren, juist omdat die etnische verschillen er niet zijn. De staat 
als panoptisch oog (Foucault 1980) speelt in dit proces geen 
belangrijke rol meer. Een vaak gehoord argument is dat de weefsters 
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hun Chinese identiteit niet meer willen profileren sinds het anti-
Chinese Pol Pot regime. Maar datzelfde zou dan ook moeten gelden 
voor de groothandelaren en tussenhandelaren, die eenzelfde verleden 
hebben. In hoofdstuk vijf hebben we echter kunnen zien dat 
groothandelaren en tussenhandelaren zichzelf weer trots presenteren 
als etnische Chinezen. Het heeft er dus alle schijn van dat niet de 
staat, maar de lokale arbeidsverhoudingen tussen weefsters en de 
handelaren het verschil in etnische presentatie genereren. Ik kwam 
eens een weefster tegen die het volgende vertelde;  
‘Ik ben Khmer, ik volg de Khmer Boeddhistische leer en weet helemaal 
niets meer van mijn Chinese voorouders. Mijn tussenhandelaar is een 
oudere neef van mij. Hij is Chinees ... Waarom is hij Chinees en ik niet? 
... Gewoon, omdat hij tussenhandelaar is. Tussenhandelaren zijn 
Chinezen, zij hebben geld en macht’. 
Bovenstaand voorbeeld geeft aan hoe instrumenteel de weefster en de 
tussenhandelaar, hoewel familie van elkaar, hun identiteit 
construeren ten opzichte van elkaar. Etniciteit heeft in dit voorbeeld 
weinig te maken met een gezamenlijke voorouderlijke afkomst, met 
gedeelde familiebanden of een gedeeld staatsburgerschap, maar is een 
symbool dat verschillende arbeidsverhoudingen en sociale posities 
uitbeeldt. De Chinese identiteit refereert in dit geval naar economische 
welvaart, patroonposities en ondernemerschap, terwijl de Khmer 
identiteit een armoedige, ondergeschikte arbeiderspositie uitbeeldt. 
Waar etniciteit vaak culturele verbondenheid symboliseert, wordt 
etnische identiteit hier ingezet om die verbondenheid te verbreken en 
het verschil in sociale en economische positie tussen familieleden te 
legitimeren. 
In de symbolische orde van de Cambodjaanse economie zijn Chinezen 
dus de handelaren met geld en zijn de Khmer de arbeiders die daarvan 
afhankelijk zijn. In de symbolische orde van Cambodja kan een 
tussenhandelaar dus alleen de arbeidskracht van de weefsters 
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‘bezitten’ (Marx) als hij Chinees is of in ieder geval wordt. Een 
tussenhandelaar, al is zij als een Khmer weefster gesocialiseerd, zal de 
Chinese levenstijl van de rijke handelaar moeten overnemen om 
sociaal te klimmen. Op zich is dat niet nieuw. Zoals de religieuze en 
symbolische antropologie al eerder geïllustreerd heeft, wordt identiteit 
symbolisch geconstrueerd in relatie met anderen, zoals dat 
bijvoorbeeld het geval is bij imitatie, wanneer men letterlijk culturele 
codes van meer invloedrijke anderen kopieert om sociaal te klimmen 
of om een bereikte sociale status zichtbaar te maken (Jackson 2006: 
326). Vooral in samenlevingen met een hoog analfabetisme-cijfer zien 
we dat leren een kwestie van observatie en imitatie is, en dat rol-
identiteiten belangrijke vormen van kapitaal zijn (ibid.)  
In overeenstemming hiermee is ook de observatie van de Amerikaanse 
socioloog Erving Goffmann (1959) dat mensen rollen spelen om een 
stigma kwijt te raken en/of succesvol met andere mensen te 
onderhandelen. In wat Goffmann noemt ‘impressie management’ 
spelen mensen publiekelijk rollen waarin ze gezien willen worden en 
vallen ze thuis terug op een identiteit die dichterbij henzelf ligt (ibid.). 
Met andere woorden, en aldus de derde vraag beantwoordend, de 
conflicterende identiteiten van de zijdeproducenten en handelaren 
moeten niet gezien worden als ‘echte’ etnische verschillen, maar als 
geconstrueerde levenstijlen, die horen bij de arbeiders- of 
handelsklasse van het zijdenetwerk. 
In hoofdstuk zes heb ik de vierde deelvraag beantwoord en geprobeerd 
uit te zoeken waarom de producenten en handelaars van sampot zich 
als etnisch Chinees presenteren, terwijl de ‘sampot’ zelf vervolgens 
conform het traditionele moderniseringsverhaal verkocht worden als 
authentiek Khmer. Met behulp van Walter Benjamin’s (1940) concept 
van de ‘traditionele moderniteit’ en Jean Baudrillard’s (1998 [1970]) 
idee van de ‘consumptiemaatschappij’ heb ik aangetoond dat de 
etnisch Chinese zijde- handelaren in Cambodja economische motieven 
hadden om de sampot hol als traditioneel Khmer te verkopen. Volgens 
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Benjamin (1940) bestaat er niet zoiets als postmoderne vooruitgang, 
maar moet moderniteit beschouwd worden als een ruïne in een nieuw 
kapitalistisch jasje. Karakteristiek voor zijn perceptie van traditionele 
moderniteit is het schilderij ‘Angelus Novus’ van de Amerikaanse 
schilder Paul Klee, dat een engel laat zien die vooruit geblazen wordt 
door een kapitalistische storm. De engel kijkt echter niet naar voren, 
maar richt haar gezicht naar het verleden. Baudrillard (1998 [1970]) 
vrij vertalend voegt hieraan toe dat de engel achteruit kijkt omdat de 
postmoderne mens graag tradities consumeert en dus 
verantwoordelijk is voor een traditionele moderniteit. 
De keuze van etnisch Chinese zijdehandelaren om sampot hol conform 
het traditionele moderniseringsverhaal als authentiek Khmer te 
verkopen, moet vooral worden gezien als een reactie op 
consumptiegedrag. In hoofdstuk zes heb ik mij daarom gericht op het 
consumptiegedrag van zijdeklanten. Ten eerste speelt de 
Cambodjaanse staat een belangrijke rol in het consumptiegedrag van 
de lokale bevolking en de marketing van sampot hol als traditionele 
Khmerproducten. Zoals gezegd, is de sampot hol in Cambodja 
gedefinieerd als nationale kleding door zowel de prekoloniale, koloniale 
als postkoloniale staat (Edwards 1999, Muan 2001). Ook na de 
mislukte revolutie van Pol Pot bleef de sampot hol een belangrijk 
nationaal symbool, omdat de Cambodjaanse staat veel belang had bij 
het creëren van rust en onderlinge eenheid. Om het trauma van de 
mislukte Pol Pot revolutie te verwerken en het onderlinge vertrouwen 
terug te winnen koos het naoorlogse ‘People’s Republic Kampuchea’ 
regime (1979-1989) voor een traditioneel moderniteitspad, met Angkor 
Wat als nationaal symbool. Alle Cambodjaanse cultuur, inclusief het 
zijdeweven, kan in het staatsverhaal niet anders dan afkomstig zijn uit 
het Angkor rijk.  
Ten tweede spelen de leden van het Cambodjaanse koningshuis een 
belangrijke rol in het consumptiegedrag van de Cambodjaanse 
bevolking en de marketing van sampot hol als authentieke 
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Khmerproducten. De leden van het koningshuis dragen altijd een 
sampot hol bij officiële ceremoniële gelegenheden en geven zodoende 
ook een duidelijke boodschap af aan de Cambodjaanse bevolking dat 
de sampot hol een traditionele vorm van Khmer modernisering is. 
Immers, de koningen zijn rechtstreekse afstammelingen van 
Jayavarman VII, de architect van het Angkor Wat tempelcomplex. Veel 
Cambodjanen voelen zich sterk verbonden met het koningshuis en 
dragen net als de koning een sampot hol bij ceremoniële 
plechtigheden. 
Ten derde speelt het consumptiegedrag van Cambodjaanse 
vluchtelingen een belangrijke rol in de marketing van sampot hol als 
authentiek Khmer. Van de vele Cambodjanen die vlak voor en tijdens 
de Khmer Rouge revolutie hun moederland ontvlucht zijn, zijn 
ongeveer 500,000 in de diaspora blijven leven (Poethig 1997). Velen 
keren jaarlijks terug naar Cambodja en kopen daar sampot hol, uit 
nostalgische overwegingen of voor ceremoniële doeleinden, maar soms 
ook om te verhandelen in hun nieuwe thuisland. 
Tenslotte speelt het consumptiegedrag van buitenlandse toeristen een 
belangrijke rol in de marketing van de sampot hol als authentiek 
Khmer. Nadat Angkor Wat officieel tot UNESCO Wereld Erfgoed 
omgedoopt werd in 1992, steeg het aantal toeristen van 9,000 in 1993 
tot 1 miljoen in het jaar 2005 (Ministry of Tourism 2005). Grote en 
kleine ontwikkelingsorganisaties gingen zich vanaf dat moment 
bezighouden met het van de ondergang redden van de Cambodjaanse 
weefcultuur, een cultuurgoed dat – zo men zegt - zijn oorsprong kent 
in het Angkor Wat rijk. Het reddingsverhaal van een authentieke 
Khmer weefcultuur spreekt erg tot de verbeelding van de toeristen ter 
plekke, die net als alle andere toeristen hunkeren naar authenticiteit 
(Cohen 1988, MacCannell 1973, Urry 1990). 
Mijn vierde deelvraag tenslotte richt zich op deze veronderstelde 
Khmer authenticiteit van het zijdeweven in Cambodja. Hoe komt het 
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dat zowel etnisch Chinese zijdehandelaren als de Cambodjaanse staat, 
ontwikkelingsorganisaties, academici en gewone burgers het verhaal 
van de Khmer authenticiteit zo gretig omarmen? Het traditionele 
Khmer moderniseringsverhaal van de sampot hol is uiterst 
winstgevend voor de etnisch Chinese zijdehandelaren. De etnisch 
Chinese zijdehandelaren hebben zakelijk uitstekend begrepen dat 
Khmer zijde, als merknaam, uiterst gewild is op de zijdemarkten. Zij 
hebben er begrijpelijkerwijs geen enkel belang bij het Khmer 
moderniseringsverhaal af te vallen en hun klanten te wijzen op een 
vervalsing van de Cambodjaanse geschiedschrijving. Sterker nog, door 
zich ondergeschikt te maken aan het Khmer moderniseringsverhaal 
hebben de etnisch Chinese weefsters en handelaren zich letterlijk en 
figuurlijk Cambodja in kunnen weven.  
 
 
